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Confirmation is not the end of a reorganization case. It is ordinarily the
most significant single event in the case, the climax of efforts that may have
lasted years. But as our Article demonstrates, confirmation does not resolve
all controversies between the debtor and the creditors and does not terminate
all litigation in a case. Part I of the Article considers the jurisdictional
implications of confirmation. Part II discusses the role of confirmation as res
judicata and discharge of debt. Part III considers the implementation of the
plan of reorganization, postconfirmation modification of the plan, revocation
of the plan, postconfirmation conversion of a case, postconfirmation
dismissal, and the effects and implications of the postconfirmation filing of
a second case.
I. POSTCONFIRMATION JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT

A. An Overview of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the courts administering the bankruptcy laws of the
United States' is shrouded by the mists of ambiguity and uncertainty, 2

1. The bankruptcy jurisdiction of federal district courts is currently found in 28
U.S.C. § 1334 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982) (repealed
1984). Such jurisdiction, like the present jurisdictional grant to the district court, was
extensive. The present grant has been described as "the broadest possible jurisdiction."
Robert A. Greenfield, The National Bankruptcy Conference's Position on the Court
System Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984, and
Suggestions for Rules Promulgation, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 359, 362 (1986). The
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compounded by a bastardized status designed to avoid the creation of
hundreds of additional Article III federal judges.3 The basic jurisdictional

Reform Act differed significantly from the current legislation, however, as to its
treatment of the bankruptcy court. Section 1471(c) provided that the bankruptcy court
was to "exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts."
28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1982) (repealed 1984). In contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) allows each
district to refer cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy judges for the district. If referral
takes place, § 157 goes on to regulate and restrict the jurisdictional reference in a
patchwork of complex subsections, which are extraordinarily expensive and wasteful of
judicial resources. The jerry-built structure includes § 157(c)(1), which restores the
special reference procedure of § 117 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
2. As Professor Countryman observed:
In the arcane world of federal bankruptcy law, nothing is more arcane
than the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. That was true under the old
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as frequently amended, and was even more true
when that Act was replaced by the new Bankruptcy Code of 1978, effective
October 1, 1979. The situation became still worse in 1982, when the Supreme
Court found at least some part of the 1978 effort unconstitutional. The Ninetyeighth Congress responded to the Court's ruling by amending the Code in
1984. The best that can be said of the 1984 amendments to the new Code is
that a hitherto unacceptable situation has now been rendered intolerable by a
process that reflects no credit on any branch of the federal government.
Vein Countryman, Scrambling to Define BankruptcyJurisdiction:The ChiefJustice, the
Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J.

ON

LEGIS. 1, 1 (1985)

(footnotes omitted).
3. Professor Countryman addressed the reasons for some of the opposition of the
federal judges to Article M status of bankruptcy judges.
District Judge Wesley Brown, chairman of the ad hoc committee, also
appeared in House hearings and revealed the ad hoc committee's own draft
of a statute for the bankruptcy court system. This draft was a virtual copy of
the Senate bill, except that the bankruptcy judges were again designated
.referees in bankruptcy." The ad hoc committee focused its objections to the
House bill on the creation of "specialized" judges and on the additional
expense involved, ignoring the facts that the specialized judges and most of
the expense would be present whether or not the bankruptcy judges were
Article III judges. Former District Judge Simon Rifkind opposed the increase
in the number of Article IMI judges, however, on the ground that it "would
dilute the significance, and prestige, of district judgeships." Similarly,
Attorney General Griffin Bell, himself a former circuit judge, opposed a
system of Article Il bankruptcy courts on the ground that such action "would
almost certainly operate to diminish the prestige and influence of our district
courts." Judge Weinfeld had volunteered to "meet head on" the "suggestion
that the opposition of the judges is sort of an ego trip on the part of the
judges; that they're holding on to their power-a jealousy of their power."
But when the Rifkind and Bell statements were read to him, Weinfeld said,
"I don't disagree with those statements at all."
Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted). The lobbying efforts of the federal judges in the 1970s and
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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provisions were contained in section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 4 To
the extent not inconsistent with the particular reorganization or arrangement
chapter, these jurisdictional provisions applied to reorganizations and
arrangements as well.5
One of the important recommendations of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was that bankruptcy judges be granted
"jurisdiction to determine most controversies arising from cases commenced
under the Act."6 This proposal was implemented in the Commission's

again in the 1980s is discussed in some detail by Professor Countryman. Id. at 7-12, 2933. Professor Countryman also questioned the legality and propriety of lobbying efforts
of members of the judiciary.
A few days after the House action, Chief Justice Warren Burger
reportedly called Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), ranking minority
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Senator Malcolm Wallop (RWyo.), a minority sponsor of the bill, to delay a vote in the Senate because
of his dissatisfaction with the new bankruptcy court provisions. The Chief
Justice was particularly unhappy with those provisions calling for presidential
appointment, making the bankruptcy courts "adjuncts" of the circuit courts of
appeals rather than the lower-level district courts, and adding bankruptcy
judges to the Judicial Conference. The Supreme Court's public information
officer reportedly confirmed the Chief Justice's call to Thurmond. He
explained this "unusual action" by saying that the Chief Justice was acting in
his role as Chairman of the Judicial Conference, "which by law is authorized
to tell Congress what it thinks of bills affecting the court system."
That is a rather free-handed interpretation of the statute creating the
Judicial Conference, which provides that "[t]he Chief Justice shall submit to
Congress an annual report of the proceedings of the Judicial Conference and
its recommendations for legislation." It is particularly unusual when read in
connection with a section of the federal Criminal Code forbidding the use of
any federally appropriated funds, unless expressly authorized by Congress, to
pay for any "telephone, letter . . . or other device" intended to influence the
vote of any member of Congress, unless on the request of such member.
Id. at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1976) (repealed 1978). For a succinct description of the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see Countryman,
supra note 2. Jurisdictional provisions were also contained in Bankruptcy Act §§ 60(b),
67a(4), 67e, and 70e(3), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(b), 107(a)(4), 107(e), and 110(e)(8) (1976)
(repealed 1978).
5. Bankruptcy Act §§ 102, 302, 402, 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 702, 802 (1976) (repealed
1978). In addition, Bankruptcy Act §§ 111, 311, and 411, 11 U.S.C. § 511, 711, and
811 (1976) (repealed 1978), granted the bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction over the
debtor and the debtor's property.
6. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 85 (1973) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
REPORT 1]:
The Commission proposes the establishment of bankruptcy courts vested
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Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973. Section 2-201(b)(6) of the proposed act
gave bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over matters of significance in the
administration of reorganization cases.' The Commission's recommendation
became law with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 9
Somewhat less than four years after the October 1, 1979 effective date
of the Reform Act, 10 the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline held
unconstitutional the grant to a non-Article III court of jurisdiction over a
prepetition action for breach of contract. Since the broad grant of jurisdiction was part of a "comprehensive restructuring of the bankruptcy laws,"'12
the Court struck down the entire jurisdictional framework, although delaying
the effective date of its ruling.' 3 Congress eventually enacted a new

with jurisdiction to determine most controversies arising from cases
commenced under the Act. At the same time these courts would be relieved
of most of the administrative duties heretofore performed by the courts of
bankruptcy. Jurisdiction of railroad reorganizations would remain, however,
with the United States district courts. This redistribution of jurisdiction and
duties should substantially reduce the number of courts needed to discharge
the judicial duties of the Act. As a result, the lines defining judicial districts
and circuits would be inappropriate and would not apply to the bankruptcy
courts. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy courts would be an integral part of the
federal judicial establishment. The judges would be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate for terms of fifteen years. The
judgments and orders of the bankruptcy courts would be final, but subject to
review on appeal to the United States district courts. Further review by the
appellate courts would be largely governed by provisions in Title 28 of the
United States Code. The procedures of the bankruptcy courts would be
governed by rules of practice and procedure made pursuant to section 2075'
of Title 28 of the United States Code, the enabling act which authorizes the
Supreme Court to prescribe procedure and practice under the Bankruptcy Act.
See also id. at 5-7. Article III status was carefully considered, but the Commission
ultimately decided to recommend what was politically doable-Article I status. The
Commission had given serious consideration to additional district judges to handle
bankruptcy litigation. Thus, if the Commission had known that the Article I structure it
recommended was unconstitutional, the Commission likely would have recommended that
the District Courts handle bankruptcy litigation.
7. See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, § 2-201, at 30-31 (1973) [hereinafter
REPORT H].
8. Id.
9. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. On November 6, 1978, President Carter
signed into law the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 14 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc.,

Nov. 10, 1978, at 2005.
10. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 402(a), 92 Stat. at 2682.
11. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
12. Id. at 87 n.40.
13. For a discussion of the stay and its one continuance to December 24, 1982, and
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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jurisdictional framework in an attempt to cure the constitutional defect laid
bare in Northern Pipeline, but
the pervasive grant of jurisdiction to the
4
district court remained intact.1
B. PostconfirmationJurisdiction over ReorganizationCases
Under the Bankruptcy Act
Chapter X, the general corporate reorganization chapter of the
Bankruptcy Act, is the predecessor of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 5 For that reason, discussion of jurisdiction under the Act will focus

the ensuing legislative and judicial scrambles, see Countryman, supra note 2, at 18-33.
14. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333. Professor Countryman described the effect of the 1984 amendments
as follows:
The entire bankruptcy jurisdiction is again conferred on the district courts
by language identical to that employed in section 1471(a) and (b) of the
Judicial Code of 1978, but there is no provision similar to old section 1471(c)
directing the bankruptcy court to exercise "all" of that jurisdiction. Instead,
new section 157 of the Judicial Code authorizes each district court to provide
that "any or all cases" or "proceedings" within that jurisdiction shall be
referred to the bankruptcy judges.
Countryman, supra note 2, at 34-35.
15. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6181:
The Bankruptcy Act contains four chapters for the reorganization of
businesses. Chapter VIII (Section 77) is for railroad reorganizations; chapter
X for other corporate reorganizations, provides a complete financial
restructuring of a corporation; chapter XI provides for arrangements and
compositions for corporations, partnerships, and individuals; and chapter XII
contains the procedures for arrangements for noncorporate entities involved
in real estate. The line between the latter three chapters, unclear when drawn
in 1938, had blurred further over the past 40 years. In 1938, the business
reorganization concept was not nearly as well developed as it is today, and the
chapters reflect a certain lack of sophistication in handling the myriad
problems of modem corporate finance.
The Commission recommended a comprehensive chapter for the rehabilitation of
distressed businesses, available to all persons except insurance and banking corporations,
savings and loan associations, railroads covered by Chapter IX, and municipalities
covered by Chapter VIII. REPORT I, supra note 6, at 237. As suggested in the
Commission Report, Chapter X was the model for the Commission's proposed
reorganization chapter, and that chapter strongly influenced the structure of Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code. Cf. id., at 257 ("[IThe flexibility of present Chapter XI is
retained to the extent compatible with the interests of creditors, but the protective
features of present Chapter X are generally made applicable, with the exception of the
'absolute priority rule,' which is substantially modified."). This is evident from the
postconfirmation provisions of Chapter 11, which closely parallel those of Chapter X.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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on Chapter X reorganizations. Although surely not a matter of subject
matter jurisdiction, Chapter X expressly allowed the modification of a
confirmed plan.' 6 This power ended with the substantial consummation of
the plan.17 On the consummation of the plan, the judge was directed to
enter a final decree which, among other things, closed the estate. 8 The
concept of a "closing of the case" in and of itself implicitly recognized the
Compareinfra notes 16-20 and accompanying text with infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
16. Section 222 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (as amended October
1, 1973) provided:
A plan may be ...

modified, with the approval of the judge ....

after

its confirmation if, in the opinion of the judge, the ... modification does not
materially and adversely affect the interests of creditors or stockholders. If the
judge finds that the proposed ...

modification ...

does materially and

adversely affect the interests of creditors or stockholders, he shall fix a
hearing for the consideration, and a subsequent time for the acceptance or
rejection, of such ... modification. The requirements in regard to notice of
hearing, to submission to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to
acceptance, to filing and hearing of objections to confirmation and to the
confirmation, as prescribed in subchapter VII of this chapter in regard to the
plan proposed to be ...

modified, shall be complied with.

11 U.S.C. § 622 (1976) (repealed 1978).
17. Section 229c of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (as amended October
1, 1973) provided that once "a plan has been substantially consummated ....
the plan
may not thereafter be ... modified if the proposed ... modification materially and

adversely affects the participation provided for any class of creditors or stockholders by
the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 629(c) (1976) (repealed 1978). Substantial consummation was
defined as
(1) transfer, sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the
property dealt with by the plan pursuant to the provisions of the plan;
(2) assumption of operation of the business and management of all or
substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan by the debtor or by the
corporation used for the purpose of carrying out the plan; and
(3) commencement of the distribution to creditors and stockholders,
affected by the plan, of the cash and securities specified in the plan as
provided for in section 224 of this Act.
Bankruptcy Act § 229a, 11 U.S.C. § 629(a) (1976) (repealed 1978).
18. Bankruptcy Act § 228, 11 U.S.C. § 628 (1976) (repealed 1978):
Upon the consummation of the plan, the judge shall enter a final decree(1) discharging the debtor from all its debts and liabilities and terminating
all rights and interests of stockholders of the debtor, except as provided in the
plan or in the order confirming the plan or in the order directing or
authorizing the transfer or retention of property;
(2) discharging the trustee, if any;
(3) making such provisions by way of injunction or otherwise as may be
equitable; and
(4) closing the estate.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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ongoing jurisdiction of the court; however, another provision of Chapter X
made it express:
The court may direct the debtor, its trustees, any mortgagees,
indenture trustees, and other necessary parties to execute and deliver or
to join in the execution and delivery of such instruments as may be
requisite to effect a retention or transfer of property dealt with by a plan
which has been confirmed, and to perform such other acts, including the
satisfaction of liens,19 as the court may deem necessary for the consummation of the plan.
Thus, Chapter X contemplated that the court retain jurisdiction and therefore
have oversight of the performance of the plan until the entry of a final
decree. 20
Chapter XI used a different approach to postconfirmation jurisdiction.2 ' After confirmation the court had jurisdiction to allow or disallow
claims,' and to allow modification of a confirmed plan if an application
to modify was filed within six months after confirmation and fraud "was
practiced in the procuring of such arrangement. "I If the court concluded
that the confirmation should be set aside, the court could consider alterations
or modifications of the arrangement for the purpose of correcting the fraud;
but it could not materially modify or alter the arrangement adversely to the
interests of any party who did not participate in the fraud and who did not
consent or to the prejudice of any innocent person, who, for value,
subsequent to the confirmation, acquired rights in reliance upon it.24
However, an arrangement could provide for a further retention of
jurisdiction.' In that event, Chapter XI allowed the modification of
19. Bankruptcy Act § 227, 11 U.S.C. § 627 (1976) (repealed 1978); see also Bankr.
R. 10-309(a).
20. Chapter XII was similar to Chapter X. In real property arrangements under

Chapter XII, modification of the arrangement was allowed "either before or after its
confirmation." Bankruptcy Act § 469, 11 U.S.C. § 869 (1976) (repealed 1978). Chapter
XII also allowed an arrangement procured by fraud to be set aside on application filed

within six months of confirmation. Bankruptcy Act § 511, 11 U.S.C. § 911 (1976)
(repealed 1978). Upon consummation, the court was to enter a final decree. Bankruptcy
Act § 477, 11 U.S.C. § 877 (1976) (repealed 1978). The court was expressly authorized

to enter orders necessary to effectuate consummation.
21. See Paul F. Festerson, RetainedJurisdictionin ChapterXI of the BankruptcyAct:
Why Not? Or, How to Have Your Cake and Eat it, Too, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 492

(1974).
22. Bankruptcy Act § 369, 11 U.S.C. § 769 (1976) (repealed 1978).
23. Bankruptcy Act § 386, 11 U.S.C. § 786 (1976) (repealed 1978); see Bankr. R.

11-41.
24. Bankruptcy Act § 386(3), 11 U.S.C. § 786(3) (1976) (repealed 1978).
25. Bankruptcy Act § 368, 11 U.S.C. § 768 (1976) (repealed 1978). As Festerson
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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observed:
After confirmation of a plan, those things which do occur take place because
the court "retains jurisdiction." The phrase appears repeatedly in the Act. It
is nowhere defined and only slightly understood. The object is to set sail upon
this uncharted sea, and to inquire what promise it may hold for the salvation
of the struggling enterprise.
Festerson, supra note 21, at 493.
Curiously, the drafters of the Chandler Act Amendments provided for dismissal of
the case upon confirmation, except as otherwise provided in sections 369 and 370.
Bankruptcy Act § 367(4), 11 U.S.C. § 767(4) (1976) (repealed 1978). Section 369 dealt
with final allowance or disallowance of claims, and section 370 provided for distribution
subsequent to confirmation.
This dismissal was not, however, the end of the case. In Mr. Festerson's words,
"The players do not leave the field." Festerson, supra, at 494. Section 357(7) and (8)
and section 368 allowed the court to retain jurisdiction. Not until consummation, was
there to be an end to the proceeding with the entry of a final decree under section 372.
Mr. Festerson also points out that section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act "provides quite
simply that the court may 'reopen estates for cause shown.'" Id. at 501. And "there is
no basis to question the applicability to proceedings in Chapter XI of the provisions for
reopening the estate." Id.
The problem with the approach of Chapter XI was that the postconfirmation
"powers" were left to the draftsmen, some of which were unartful. Id. at 502. Mr.
Festerson goes on to point out that under the Act,
[w]ithin certain broad limits, the debtor is free to invent his own world and
in negotiation with his creditors to determine outside the courtroom what
duties will remain for the court once the confirmation is had. The prime
corollary of the thesis is that the plan need be drafted with great particularity.
It needs to state exactly what it is that the court will have a voice in, exactly
what benefits will survive the confirmation and what burdens will expire with
it, or vice versa. As all good lawyers know, the name of the game is to take
every legitimate advantage of the rules; to seek, as the advantage may appear,
the best of the world within and without the courtroom.
Id. at 510.
Mr. Festerson discusses the type of problem that may result from the debtor's and
its counsel's being able to provide for ongoing jurisdiction. In Jones v. Waynesburg Bank
(In re Ohio Builders & Milling, Inc.), 128 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1942), the plan provided
that the court would retain jurisdiction over the assets. After confirmation the debtor
secured a loan with the assets, without obtaining court approval. This was held invalid
since "no encumbrance could be put upon the assets of the debtor without the court's
approval." Id. at 166.
In Seedman v. Friedman, 132 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1942), the court avoided a similar
unjust result. Seedman contracted for bulk purchase of the debtor's merchandise and
fixtures pursuant to express provisions in the plan. The plan was thereafter set aside. The
trustee then sold the assets to a third party, and Seedman filed a priority claim to recover
for damages for breach of the contract. The court concluded that authorization of the sale
was not essential and that
[t]he court properly retained jurisdiction under it only insofar as necessary to
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payment provisions of a confirmed arrangement prior to full payment of the
deferred consideration or, if the deferred consideration was represented by
negotiable promissory notes, before delivery of the notes to the creditors,
if the court retained jurisdiction. Furthermore, upon default or termination
of an arrangement on "the happening of a condition specified in the
arrangement," the court had the power to dismiss the Chapter XI case,
adjudge the debtor a bankrupt, and direct that bankruptcy proceed. 6
C. PostconfirmationJurisdiction over Chapter 11
ReorganizationsUnder the Bankruptcy Code 7
As was the case with former Chapter X, Chapter 11 does not expressly
address postconfirmation jurisdiction. Chapter 11, as did Chapter X, limits
postconfirmation modification of a confirmed plan, but contrary to former

carry out its provisions and the terms of the arrangement.... The court,
however, was without authority to exercise a continuous and active control
over the conduct of the debtor's business ...
But even if this interpretation is incorrect, retention of jurisdiction, at
least under the circumstances of this case, should still be operative only to
ensure compliance with the terms of the arrangement and the statutory
provisions, not to pass on all details of the debtor's business.
Id. at 294-95. Mr. Festerson points out that the judge in Seedman had no authority
"except the conclusions of Collier on Bankruptcy, which itself had no authority but the
veneration customarily accorded it." Festerson, supra,at 514. The important point is that
"Judge Clark's words and the authority of Collier and Seedinan have spawned a theory
which has come to be widely recited and little questioned." Id.
As Mr. Festerson makes clear, especially in his discussion of In re California
Eastern Airways, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 847 (D. Del. 1951) and North American Car Corp.
v. Peerless Weighing & Vending Machine Corp., 143 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1944) (§ 77(b)
core proceeding), the difficulty was that allowing the debtor to prescribe the extent of
retained jurisdiction led to broad and general retention of jurisdiction, which created
problems and led to the court's reaction against this. For example, in North American
Car Corp., the Second Circuit stated:
It should be the objective of courts to cast off as quickly as possible all
leading strings which may limit and hamper [the debtor's] activities and throw
doubt upon its responsibility. It is not consonant with the purposes of the Act,
or feasible as a judicial function, for the courts to assume to supervise a
business somewhat indefinitely.
143 F.2d at 939.
26. Bankruptcy Act § 377, 11 U.S.C. § 777 (1976) (repealed 1978).
27. This Article does not discuss postconfirmation jurisdiction of adjustment of debt
cases under Chapters 12 and 13. The principles discussed herein apply, however, with
the qualification that 11 U.S.C. §§ 1208, 1231, and 1329 vary these principles
somewhat.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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Chapter X, Chapter 11 restricts the ability of parties in interest to seek, and
the court to revoke, an order of confirmation. Chapter 11, like former
Chapter X, expressly grants the court power to effectuate a confirmed plan;
exactly what this means has been left to the courts. Not surprisingly, there
has been a divergence of opinion among the courts. The courts have also
disagreed about the need for, and effect of, plan provisions retaining
jurisdiction over a great variety of matters.
The Bankruptcy Code simplifies matters considerably by eliminating
different procedures for the rehabilitation of business debtors. 2" Under 28
U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (b), the district courts are granted original and
exclusive jurisdiction of cases under title 11 and nonexclusive jurisdiction
over civil proceedings "arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases
under title 11. "29 And under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) the district court in
which the title 11 case is commenced or is pending has "exclusive
jurisdiction of all of the property of the debtor in existence at commence3
ment of the case and of property of the estate." 1
Chapter 11 provides for the modification of a confirmed plan before
substantial consummation. 31 As in the case of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act, Chapter 11 of the Code impliedly recognizes the ongoing jurisdiction
of the court to effectuate the plan since a case continues after confirmation,
but the court can close a case after it has been "fully administered."32 This

28. Chapter 11 was not intended just for business debtors. Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S.
Ct. 2197 (1991).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988).
30. Id. § 1334(d).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b) (1988). Substantial consummation is defined under § 1101(2)

as:
(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to
be transferred;
(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan
of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property
dealt with by the plan; and

(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.
Id. § 1101(2). Borrowing from Chapters XI and XII, Chapter 11 also expressly provides

for revocation of an order of confirmation for fraud on application within 180 days after
entry of an order. Id. § 1144. However, this is in reality a limitation on the court's

power.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) ("After an estate is fully administered and the court has
discharged the trustee, the court shall close the case."); see also FED. R. BANKR. P.
3022 ("[A]fter an estate is fully administered in a chapter 11 reorganization case, the
court, on its own motion or on a motion of a party in interest, shall enter a final decree
closing the case.") Section 2a(8) of the Bankruptcy Act gave the court jurisdiction to
close cases. 11 U.S.C. § 1l(a)(8) (1976) (repealed 1978); see also Bankr. R. 514. Under
the Bankruptcy Code, "[a] case may be reopened in the court in which such case was
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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is made express by section 1142, which authorizes orders necessary to the
implementation of the plan.33 The reorganization court also has broad
powers under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, applicable generally to
cases under the Code, "to issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy
Code]."
The broad jurisdiction of the court under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and
3
(b) 1 otherwise continues, 36 as did the jurisdiction of the Chapter X court

closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause." 11 U.S.C.
§ 350(b). There is no Bankruptcy Rule for reopening Chapter 11 cases, although FED.
R. BANKR. P. 5010 covers the reopening of cases under Chapters 7, 12 and 13. Section
2a(8) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 also gave the court jurisdiction to reopen cases. 11
U.S.C. § 11(a)(8) (1976) (repealed 1978); see also Bankr. R. 515 (generally applicable
to Chapters X, XI, and XII cases by way of Bankr. R. 10-501, 11-60 and 12-59).
33. Section 1142 provides that:
(a) Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, rule, or
regulation relating to financial condition, the debtor and any entity organized
or to be organized for the purpose of carrying out the plan shall carry out the
plan and shall comply with any orders of the court.
(b) The court may direct the debtor and any other necessary party to
execute or deliver or to join in the execution or delivery of any instrument
required to effect a transfer of property dealt with by a confirmed plan, and
to perform any other act, including the satisfaction of any lien, that is
necessary for the consummation of the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1142 (1988).
34. Id. § 105. This section is derived from the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1988).
35. Section 1334 gives jurisdiction to the district courts, and the bankruptcy courts
get it only by reference pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). Congress intended that
bankruptcy courts have pervasive jurisdiction. It carried out this intent by granting
jurisdiction over proceedings arising under or in title 11 or related to a case under title
11. A proceeding arises under title 11 if the cause of action is created by the Bankruptcy
Code or concerns the administration of the estate. National City Bank v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 802 F.2d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 1986); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note
15, at 445-46, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6400-01 ("[A]ny action by the trustee
under an avoiding power would be a proceeding arising under title 11, because the
trustee would be claiming based on a right given by one of the sections in Subchapter mH
of Chapter 5 of Title 11"); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 3.01 (c)(iii) (Lawrence P. King
ed., 15th ed. 1992). An example is an adversary proceeding to recover a postpetition
transfer under § 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. Such a proceeding is grounded solely on
the Bankruptcy Code. Any invocation of the avoidance powers generally arises under title
11.
Whether a proceeding "arises in" a title 11 case is uncertain. 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRuPTcY, supra, 3.01(c)(v) (listing counterclaims, turnover orders, and lien
determinations). Some cases suggest that a proceeding "arises in" a title 11 case if the
proceeding involves an administrative matter that would not exist outside the context of
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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under the Bankruptcy Act.37 Thus, since the confirmation of a plan in a

the bankruptcy case. Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987). An
example is a contested fee application.
With respect to "related to" jurisdiction, the widely accepted test formulated by the
Third Circuit in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins (In re Pacor, Inc.), 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984),
is whether the action "could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of
action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling
and administration of the bankruptcy estate." Id. at 994. This formulation is probably as
close to the mark as any definition, and the authorities seem to adopt the view that if the
action could conceivably have any effect on the estate, it will be within the scope of the
related to jurisdiction. Cases applying the test include: Gardner v. United States (In re
Gardner), 913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir. 1990); Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp.
(In re Xonics), 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th Cir. 1987); Dogpatch Properties, Inc. v.
Dogpatch U.S.A., Inc.(In re Dogpatch U.S.A., Inc.), 810 F.2d 782, 786 (8th Cir.
1987); National City Bank, 802 F.2d at 994; Bobroff v. Continental Bank (In re
Bobroft), 766 F.2d 797, 802 (3d Cir. 1985). Since this formulation leaves out
proceedings determining discharge, dischargeability, and reaffirmation, presumably those
are examples of proceedings arising in a case under title 11.
36. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Morris (In re Morris), 950 F.2d 1531 (1lth
Cir. 1992); Smith v. Commercial Banking corp. (In re Smith), 866 F.2d 576 (3d Cir.
1989); see also Spacek v. Thomen (In re Universal Farming Indus.), 873 F.2d 1334 (9th
Cir. 1989) (dismissal of case does not require dismissal of ancillary matters); Winston
& Strawn v. Kelly (In re Churchfield Management & Inv. Corp.), 122 B.R. 76 (Bankr.
N.D. IL. 1990) (continued jurisdiction over actions to recover preferential and fraudulent
transfers, because they were matters "arising under" title 11); Stardust Inn, Inc. v. Doshi
(In re Stardust Inn, Inc.), 70 B.R. 888 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (noting four factors to
be considered: judicial economy, fairness, convenience to parties, and degree of difficulty
of state-law issues).
The Eleventh Circuit in Morris expressly rejected the notion that this
"retained" jurisdiction operated like pendant jurisdiction (i.e., that the court
would have to expressly retain jurisdiction over a given action or it would be
dismissed when the case itself was dismissed). Instead, the court noted that
an adversary proceeding and the bankruptcy case itself are two distinct
proceedings, so that dismissal of one does not automatically result in dismissal
of the other.
LEIF M. CLARK & BRET A. MAIDMAN, POSTDISMISSAL, POSTCLOSING AND POSTCONFIRMATION JURISDICTION: WHEN IS THE BANKRUPTCY CASE REALLY OvER? 6 (Am.
Bankr. Inst. 1992 Annual Spring Meeting Educational Materials, LRP Publications 1992)
(citation omitted). The exclusive jurisdiction provisions of § 1334(a) and (d) seem to
require that the case be pending, but the original, nonexclusivejurisdiction over specified
civil proceedings under § 1334(b) does not seem to be so limited.
37. The basic jurisdiction of the Chapter X court was found in 11 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)
(repealed 1978). The constraints of 11 U.S.C. § 23 did not apply in Chapter X cases. 11
U.S.C. § 102 (1976) (repealed 1978). See generally 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.18,
at 539-48 (James W. Moore ed., 14th ed. 1977) (discussing jurisdiction of federal district
court); 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra, 11.13[3], at 276-83, 11.20, at 308-16
(same).
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Chapter 11 case does not terminate a case, there should be no change in the
basic jurisdiction of the court under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (b).3"
Confirmation does, however, result in a loss of exclusive jurisdiction
grounded on 28 U.S. C. § 1334(d), which grants exclusive jurisdiction over
property of the debtor and property of the estate. This is so at least as to
"property of the estate" since there is no longer any property of the estate
after confirmation, absent a plan provision delaying the revesting of title in
the debtor or its transfer pursuant to the plan. 39 Thus, Chapter 11 postconfirmation jurisdiction does not depend on whether the confirmed plan or the
order of confirmation provides for a retention of jurisdiction. It is like
Chapter X in that regard. Congress declined to follow the Chapter XI
model, which grounded the court's postconfirmation jurisdiction in large
part on whether the plan provided for a retained jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
some bankruptcy judges have viewed postconfirmation jurisdiction under
Chapter 11 as dependent on a retention of jurisdiction in the plan.4"

38. Arguably, termination occurs when the case is closed, and at that point
jurisdiction ceases. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) gives no guidance in this regard. It
may, however, be a reasonable implication of the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 350 for
closing and reopening cases. But there is at least a continuing jurisdiction for purposes
of § 350; or, better stated, a motion under § 350 is within the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (b).
This does not mean that there is jurisdiction over all disputes involving the
reorganized debtor, its owners, or creditors. The dispute must involve (1) an action
arising under Chapter 11, (2) administration of the estate, or (3) alteration of the debtor's
right, liabilities, options, or freedom of action. There would not be jurisdiction over, for
example, an action by a creditor against the reorganized debtor to recover a note
executed pursuant to the plan. In Zahn Associates v. Leeds Building Products, Inc. (In
re Leeds Building Products, Inc.), 160 B.R. 689 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993), the district
court held that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction over a postconfirmation adversary
proceeding to recover on a note executed by the debtor pursuant to the plan. Neither
implementation nor interpretation of the plan was involved.
39. See generallyRodney K. Hopkinson, The Status ofAttorney Fees Duringthe PostConfirmation/Pre-ConversionPeriod, 22 IDAHO L. REv. 381 (1986).
40. For example, Bankruptcy Judge Schwartzberg dismissed an adversary proceeding
postconfirmation in the absence of a plan provision retaining jurisdiction over such
claims. Neptune World Wide Moving, Inc. v. Schneider Moving & Storage Co. (In re
Neptune World Wide Moving, Inc.), 111 B.R. 457,462-64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); see
also In re Jr. Food Mart of Ark., Inc., 161 B.R. 462 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993) (holding
that bankruptcy court lacked postconfirmation jurisdiction to approve substitution on
debtor's board of directors, there being no relevant reservation of authority in
confirmation order). In Neptune the court had confirmed a reorganization plan that
provided a 23 % dividend to unsecured creditors. The disclosure statement indicated that
the debtor would not assert actions for preferences or fraudulent transfers. After
confirmation of the plan, however, the debtor initiated an adversary proceeding, asserting
affirmative claims based on improper usage of the debtor's bills of lading or damages for
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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alteration of the debtor's bills of lading. In determining that there was no jurisdiction
Judge Schwartzberg concluded that:
11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) permits a debtor to insert language in the plan and order
confirming the plan which authorizes the bankruptcy court to retain a limited
jurisdiction over specified property of the estate which did not vest in the
newly confirmed debtor. This provision reads as follows: (b) "Except as
otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the
confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor
(Emphasis added)." Therefore, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b), a
Chapter 11 plan and order confirming the plan may specifically provide for
retention of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court over actions pending at the
time of confirmation and actions commenced after the time of confirmation,
and over any assets recovered as a result of these actions. Additionally, 11
U.S.C. § 1142 confers limited post-confirmation jurisdiction upon the
bankruptcy court for the purpose of implementing the plan.
111 B.R. at 462 (citations omitted). Since the retention of jurisdiction provision of the
debtor's confirmed plan did not authorize postconfirmation adversary proceedings, Judge
Schwartzberg found that there was no postconfirmation jurisdiction.
In Hospital & Property Damage Claimants v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re JohnsManville Corp.), 7 F.3d 32, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1993), the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit cited Judge Schwartzberg's opinion in Neptune with apparent approval. The court
of appeals held that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to consider postconfirmation
objections by the debtor to the hospitals' property damage claims. The court of appeals
emphasized the plan's explicit exception of such objections from the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction and said that concerns regarding such claims were properly addressed by the
claims resolution facility established pursuant to the plan. An alternative basis for the
decision was the fact that the debtor's motion to disallow the claims was barred by a time
limitation imposed by the bankruptcy court's confirmation order.
In contrast, probably because § 1142 of the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides
for implementing orders and is not conditioned on the retention of jurisdiction by the
plans, bankruptcy judges have not been hesitant to find jurisdiction to interpret,
implement, and otherwise effectuate a plan, even though there was no express retention
of jurisdiction in that regard. E.g., Pennsylvania Cos. v. Stone (In re Greenlee Energy
Holdings of Pa., Inc.), 110 B.R. 173 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Micro-Acoustics
Corp., 49 B.R. 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
In Stone, prior to the filing of a Chapter 11 case, the debtor's stockholders were
involved in litigation about the ownership of the debtor's stock. The disputes continued
after the Chapter 11 case was filed, but a plan of reorganization was confirmed. In fact,
the debtor's shareholders supported the plan. Fifteen months after confirmation, one
group of stockholders filed an adversary proceeding against another stockholder, seeking
to determine plaintiffs' interests in the debtor. Bankruptcy Judge Scholl dismissed the
adversary proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that "this court's
limited post-confirmation jurisdiction to oversee the implementation of a plan permits us
only to clarify patent ambiguities in a confirmed plan or interpret matters concerning the
plan's operations which impact upon its effectuation." Stone, 110 B.R. at 174. But the
matter of stockholder ownership was, in the opinion of Judge Scholl, an issue that did
"not involve the Debtor or its estate but merely . . . the interrelationship of non-debtor
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individuals." Id. at 174-75. In an opinion that contained no analysis of the jurisdictional
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but rather numerous quotes from cases (both pre- and
post-Code), Judge Scholl concluded that:
post-confirmation jurisdiction is limited by Bankruptcy Code § 1142(b) to only
those matters the resolution of which are "necessary for the consummation of
the plan." In light of the provisions of § 1142(b), we conclude that we retain
post-confirmation jurisdiction for the limited purpose of resolving disputes
arising from the presence of patent ambiguities in the Plan or disputes which
affect the operation of the Plan as between the interested parties.
Id. at 184. But cf. TMS Assocs. v. Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. (In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.),
100 B.R. 480 (W.D. Mo. 1989). In Kroh Brothers, the court held that postconfirmation
jurisdiction extends to the conclusion of pending administrative matters. The court relied
on Bankruptcy Rule 3020(d) which provides: "Notwithstanding the entry of the order of
confirmation, the court may enter all orders necessary to administer the estate." FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3020(d), quoted in Kroh Bros., 100 B.R. at 486. The court also referred to
the Advisory Committee Note that "Subdivision (d) clarifies the authority of the court
to conclude matterspending before it priorto confirmation and to continue to administer
the estate as necessary, e.g., resolving objections to claims." Kroh Bros., 100 B.R. at
486. Furthermore, the court referred to the discussion in 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 35,
3020.06, 3020-7 to -8, to the effect that this power to conclude
administrative matters is parallel to the power under section 1142(b). The court added
that "a substantial number of courts have determined post-confirmation jurisdiction exists
under the Bankruptcy Code with respect to the resolution of many different issues." Kroh
Bros., 100 B.R. at 486. In support, the court referred to avoidance actions under §§ 547,
548, and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. By way of dictum, the court stated that a
retention of jurisdiction provision was necessary. Id.
In Unified Data Systems, Inc. v. Almarc Corp. (In re Almarc Corp.), 94 B.R. 361
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), the court had confirmed a Chapter 11 plan that provided for
retention of jurisdiction "to adjudicate all controversies concerning the classification or
allowance of any claim" and to "adjudicate all claims or controversies arising out of any
purchases, sales or contracts made or undertaken by the debtor during the pendency of
these proceedings." Id. at 363. Postconfirmation, the other party to a postfiling contract
with the debtor filed an adversary proceeding seeking to recover damages for breach of
contract from the reorganized debtor. The court dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction concluding that the plan could not confer jurisdiction and that there was no
jurisdiction since there was no showing that the dispute would have any effect on the
debtor's ability to consummate its confirmed plan. This was dictum because the court
also concluded that a contractual provision selecting a different forum was binding. The
concept that the retention ofjurisdiction provision is not controlling seems sound, as does
the conclusion that there was no jurisdiction, because the complaint concerned a
postconfirmation breach of contract. However, Judge Fox, as have other bankruptcy
judges, had difficulty articulating the basis for the lack of jurisdiction.
A leading commentator suggests that "so long as a'chapter 11 case is
'open', there does not appear to be any limit on the court's jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).. .. " Section 1334(b), though, always requires that the
outcome of the dispute conceivably effect the administration of the bankruptcy
case. The effect that a proceeding may have upon the administration of an
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Even though jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code is not expressly affected by confirmation of a plan, judges
are hesitant to so conclude. This resistance is probably a carryover from the
limited postconfirmation jurisdiction of Chapter XI cases under the
Bankruptcy Act and the clever wording in one decision under the Bankruptcy Act that deplored the tendency of district courts to keep reorganized
concerns "in perpetual tutelage" by orders retaining jurisdiction to supervise
the debtor's conduct. 4 However, long ago, in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,42
the United States Supreme Court recognized that a bankruptcy court has
ongoing jurisdiction to effectuate its orders.43

estate may be dependent upon factors such as the bankruptcy chapter under
which the case has been filed, the size of the estate, the nature of the claims
against the estate and whether confirmation has occurred.
Id. at 365 (citations omitted). The idea that the proceeding must affect the administration
of the estate is not a sufficient rationale for jurisdiction. It is too narrow in scope and
overlooks completely actions to recover assets for the reorganized debtor or to resolve
issues that may impact on the viability of the debtor.
41. ClaybrookDrilling Co. v. Divanco, Inc., 336 F.2d 697,700-01 (10th Cir. 1964).
For a similar decision under the Bankruptcy Code, see Pettibone Corp. v. Easley, 935
F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, C.J.).
42. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
43. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt involved a modest loan of $300. The debtor assigned his
future wages as security for the loan. After the debtor obtained a discharge in
bankruptcy, the creditor sought to enforce the assignment by suing the employer in a
Chicago municipal court. The debtor returned to the bankruptcy court and sought an
injunction to prevent the creditor from further prosecuting the action or attempting to
enforce the wage assignment. The bankruptcy court granted the debtor's request. The
matter then proceeded through the district court and court of appeals to the Supreme
Court. One of the challenges to the bankruptcy court's injunction was a lack of
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that the case initiated before the bankruptcy court
was
in substance and effect a supplemental and ancillary bill in equity, in aid of
and to effectuate the adjudication and order made by the same court. That a
federal court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill ancillary to an original case
or proceeding in the same court, whether at law or in equity, to secure or
preserve the fruits and advantages of a judgment or decree rendered therein,
is well settled.
Id. at 239.
The Court through Justice Sutherland went on to discuss abstention. Although the
Court had jurisdiction,
the Court was [not] bound to exercise its authority. And it probably would not
and should not have done so except under unusual circumstances such as here
exist. So far as appears, the municipal court was competent to deal with the
case. It is true that respondent was not a party to that litigation; but
undoubtedly it was open to him to intervene and submit to that court the
question as to the effect upon the subject-matter of the action of the bankruptPublished by Scholar Commons, 2020
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In Pettibone Corp. v. Easley4 several personal injury cases that were
pending against the debtor were stayed by the automatic stay of section
362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. After the bankruptcy case was filed, several
additional personal injury suits were initiated in violation of the stay.
Neither the new cases nor the old cases proceeded prior to confirmation.
The underlying claims were not affected by the reorganization. Plaintiffs
who had filed in violation of the stay had 30 days after termination of the
automatic stay, which occurred on confirmation, within which to file and be
assured that the filings would be timely under section 108(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Three of the plaintiffs did not do so; thus, the reorganized debtor asked the bankruptcy court to enjoin the prosecution of their
suits.
The first sentence of Judge Easterbrook's opinion was dispositive:
"Only a belief that bankruptcy is forever could produce a case such as
this."" However, he went on to conclude that, although there might be
"related to" jurisdiction, there was no jurisdiction under Marathon and 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). In his view, Article III judges had to decide tort claims
founded on state law;4 6 and this meant the whole case, including any
defenses. The bankruptcy court was not empowered to decide whether the
filing was void and, if so, whether the three cases were barred by the statute
of limitations. That was up to the judges trying the cases. And that was true
even though the personal injury proceeding may have been related to the
bankruptcy case in the sense that, if insurance coverage were exhausted, a
verdict in favor of one or more of the plaintiffs would affect the amount of
the distribution to other creditors. Judge Easterbrook also concluded that
section 1142(b) of the Bankruptcy Code did not grant jurisdiction over the
dispute. According to Judge Easterbrook, that section empowers "the
bankruptcy court to 'direct the debtor and any other necessary party... to
perform any other act. . . that is necessary for the consummation of the
plan.' Enjoining a tort suit expressly authorized by the
plan is hardly
'necessary for the consummation of the plan,' however. " 47
cy decrees.
Id. at 241. Nevertheless, other considerations aside, it is clear that the legal remedy thus
afforded would have been inadequate to meet the requirements of justice. As the Court
determined, "the sole question at issue is one which the highest court of the state of
Illinois had already resolved against [the debtor's] contention." Id.
44. 935 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 121.
46. Judge Easterbrook inexplicably ignored the fact that state court judges are not
Article Ill judges and that federal magistrates, who are also not Article mI judges, try
personal injury cases. In addition, removal need not occur until the time of trial under
§ 157(i)(5). Moreover, tort claims have been tried by bankruptcy courts under both the
Bankruptcy Act and Code. See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968).
47. Pettibone, 935 F.2d at 123.
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In his article discussing postconfirmation jurisdiction, Mr. Ronald Goss

observes that "the longstanding doctrine of postconfirmation jurisdiction
holds that this jurisdiction is much narrower than that which was exercised
before confirmation. The common rationale for this doctrine is that the
debtor's 'tutelage' status should end at confirmation."48 Mr. Goss recognized that there are authorities to the contrary, including the leading treatise.49 Mr. Goss's article contained a lengthy discussion of retention of
jurisdiction. This discussion is valuable in the sense that it discusses current
practice in Chapter 11 cases, but current practice does not justify his
conclusion that a retention of jurisdiction provision is necessary. Furthermore, in his discussion of the statutory basis for postconfirmation jurisdiction, Mr. Goss failed to recognize that Chapter X was the model for Chapter
11.50 Although much of his discussion centered on Chapter XI, which
Once the bankruptcy court confirms a plan of reorganization, the debtor
may go about its business without further supervision or approval. The firm
also is without the protection of the bankruptcy court. It may not come
running to the bankruptcy judge every time something unpleasant happens.
Formerly a ward of the court, the debtor is emancipated by the plan of
reorganization. A firm that has emerged from bankruptcy is just like any other
defendant in a tort case: it must protect its interest in the way provided by the
applicable non-bankruptcy law, here by pleading the statute of limitations in
the pending cases.
Id. at 122 (citations omitted).
48. Ronald W. Goss, Defining the Scope of Retained Jurisdiction in Chapter 11
Plans, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 3 (1992). Mr. Goss concluded that Congress did not intend
that postconfirmation jurisdiction be as broad as preconfirmation jurisdiction, and "a
review of the case law suggests that postconfirmation jurisdiction is subject to statutory
and judicial limitations." Id. However, the basic statutory grant of jurisdiction does not
contain any such limitation.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction
on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under
title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is
pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of the
property of the estate.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b), (d) (1988).
49. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 35, 1142.011 1], at 1142-3 ("[S]o long
as a Chapter 11 case is 'open,' there does not appear to be any limit on the court's
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) with respect to civil proceedings arising under
title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.").
50. See supra note 15.
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utilized the concept of "retained jurisdiction," Mr. Goss acknowledged that
"in Chapter 11 -of the current Bankruptcy Code there are no statutory
provisions expressly dealing with retained jurisdiction.""' Mr. Goss's
discussion of postconfirmation jurisdiction centered around limiting
provisions of Chapter 11, including sections 1127 and 1142. Only at the end
of his lengthy discussion does he acknowledge the importance of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) and that this section does not contain any express limitations on
postconfirmation jurisdiction. This fact compelled him to construct a
limitation, adapting the "related to" jurisdiction definition of Pacor,Inc. v.
Higgins (In re Pacor, Inc.).5 2 His construct limited postconfirmation
"related to" jurisdiction to "matters affecting the implementation and
execution of the plan."" Under this approach, the court would probably
lose jurisdiction of many pending and future adversary proceedings on entry
of the order of confirmation. As a matter of legislative policy this may or
may not make sense, but it is certainly for the legislature, not the courts, to

51. Goss, supra note 48, at 22.
52. 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984), discussedsupra note 35.

53. Goss, supra note 48, at 27. Mr. Goss stated several other formulations of
postconfirmation jurisdiction.
According to the conventional formulation of the retained jurisdiction

doctrine, the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction continues during postconfirmation
"to protect its [confirmation] decree, to prevent interference with the
execution of the plan and to aid otherwise in its operation.".,.
Case law recognizes that postconfirmationjurisdiction generally is limited
to rights arising under the plan, and "matters concerning interpretation and

administration of the [pilan." In Shores v. Hendy Realization Co., the Ninth
Circuit characterized the bankruptcy court as the court "best equipped as well
as the one properly entitled" to adjudicate such disputes.

The unifying principle underlying the various judicial views of postconfirmation jurisdiction is that a "reservation of jurisdiction beyond what is
requisite to effectuate a plan of reorganization is beyond the power of the
reorganization court."
Id. at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
Gross continues:
Despite the sometimes extravagant rhetoric that runs through these decisions,
a judicial doctrine clearly emerges. According to this doctrine, postconfirma-

tion jurisdiction generally is limited to matters pending at the time of
confirmation and matters for which jurisdiction is expressly and necessarily
retained in the plan. ...
Jurisdiction turns on whether resolution of the particular controversy is

necessary to the consummation of the plan.... However, a bankruptcy court
may exercise jurisdiction to fulfill the purposes of the plan even when a plan

fails to provide for retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 32 (footnotes omitted).
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engraft such a limitation on 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Mr. Goss concluded,
based on cases decided predominately under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy
Act, that "jurisdiction turns on whether resolution of the particular controversy is necessary to the consummation of the plan."" Mr. Goss went on
to state that "[b]y limiting its jurisdiction to matters of 'unfinished business,'
judicial supervision of the debtor will normally end at confirmation.""
Mr. Goss grounded his conclusion on two incorrect premises. The first
is that the law under the prior Bankruptcy Act limited postconfirmation
jurisdiction to "matters concerning interpretation and administration of the
plan;" and that this rule should be deemed to have continued under the
Supreme Court's standard of interpretation that pre-Code law will be
deemed to have continued absent congressional intent to the contrary.56
Additionally, Mr. Goss relied on what he identified as the "unifying
principle" that "reservation of jurisdiction beyond what is requisite to
effectuate a plan of reorganization is beyond the power of the reorganization
court. ,57

The cases that Goss relied on for this "unifying principle," with the
exception of a single bankruptcy court decision, were decisions under
section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. One of the section 77B decisions held
that there was no jurisdiction to approve new leases by the reorganized
debtor some six years after confirmation.5" The other held that the court
did not have jurisdiction to approve an extension of a voting trust created
by the confirmed plan. 9 The order confirming the plan reserved jurisdiction to "'enter such further orders as may hereafter be deemed necessary or
proper in connection with the carrying out of the terms and provisions of the
said plan.'"" The court correctly concluded that the requested modification
was not necessary to carry out the terms of the plan.6"
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Mr. Goss relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986). To the extent Midlantic applies
(and it is doubtful that it does in light of the Supreme Court's recent textualism approach
to interpretation, see generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalismand the
Interpretationof FederalStatutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991), because the
jurisdictional provisions are unambiguous), the decision is not relevant since the model
for Chapter 11 was Chapter X, not Chapter XI.
57. Goss, supra note 48, at 29.
58. Reese v. Beacon Hotel Corp., 149 F.2d 610, 611 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[R]eservation
of jurisdiction beyond what is necessary to effectuate a plan of reorganization is beyond
the power of the reorganization court.")
59. Blair v. Finan (In re Elless Co.), 174 F.2d 925, 927 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 388
U.S. 824 (1949).
60. Id. at 927 (quoting order of confirmation).
61. Id. at 929-30. In Bakers Share Corp. v. Lincoln Terrace, Inc., 130 F.2d 157 (2d
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In the bankruptcy court decision discussed by Goss, the court held that
it could award postconfirmation attorneys' fees and that such fees would be
an administrative expense claim with priority in the superseding Chapter 7
case.2 By way of dictum, the court stated, "A reservation of jurisdiction
beyond what is necessary to effectuate the plan of reorganization is beyond
the power of the bankruptcy court.'63 Thus, the three cases are not very
solid authority for the so-called "unifying principle."
Although Mr. Goss discussed abstention in some detail, he failed to
recognize that this may be the solution to any problem-real or imagined-resulting from the pervasive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
Concern about continued supervision or keeping a debtor in "perpetual
tutelage" can be solved by the court's abstaining under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(c)(2), without distorting statutory language and congressional intent.
The power to abstain allows the court to avoid resolving controversies "that
could be heard elsewhere [and that] would burden the bankruptcy
courts."64 Mr. Goss's conclusion that "discretionary abstention and notions
of comity are inadequate to deal with fundamental questions of subject
matter jurisdiction"' is difficult to fathom. Nonetheless, it seems better to
give the court discretion to abstain as to some or all of the myriad disputes
that can arise postconfirmation rather than to develop strained interpretations
of jurisdiction which reach that result but arrive there in a straight jacket.I

Cir. 1942), Judge Learned Hand was faced with a similar issue under § 77B. Finding
that the plan provided alternatives dependent on the interpretation of a state statute, Judge
Hand concluded that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to interpret the statute. He
carefully distinguished this situation from continuing administration over the successor
under the plan:
[T]he phrase in subdivision h of See. 77B, "under and subject to the supervision and control of the judge," did not invest the judge with a general
protectorate over "corporations organized * * * for the purpose of carrying
out the plan." Our theory was that such a reservation gives him jurisdiction
only to decide whether the parties to the "plan" carry out its provisions
according to their true intent. Concededly, he would have no power to
adjudge the rights and liabilities of the corporation arising from transactions
with third persons; equally he has none to adjudge even the mutual rights and
liabilities of the parties themselves, so far as those depend, not upon the
contents of the "plan," but upon subsequent transactions between themselves,
or upon modifications imposed by later changes in the law.
Id. at 159.
62. In re Tri-L Corp., 65 B.R. 774, 778 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986).
63. Id. The court cited one of the two cases relied on by Mr. Goss, Reese v. Beacon

Hotel Corp., 149 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1945), as authority for its dictum.
64. Goss, supra note 48, at 29.
65. Id. at 38.

66. Cf. In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R., 6 F.3d 1184, 1189, 1194 (7th
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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That seemed
to be the view of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Local Loan Co. v.
67
Hunt.
And it was clearly the view of the Fifth Circuit in Wood v. Wood (In
re Wood), 6 which contains an excellent analysis of the scope of jurisdiction under the 1978 Reform Act, as amended in 1982. Especially interesting
is the Fifth Circuit's observation that concerns about an overbroad interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 bringing into federal court matters best left
to state courts is properly dealt with not by restrictive interpretation of the
statutory grant of jurisdiction, but by utilizing the discretion to abstain.69
That is not to say a statutory change would not be useful. The National
Bankruptcy Conference has recommended statutory changes as to postconfirmation jurisdiction, and the recommendation should be given thoughtful
consideration.
The bankruptcy court should be divested of general administrative
juisdiction over the affairs of a reorganized debtor, unless the plan
specifically provides otherwise, as of the effective date of the plan. To
promote certainty in this area, the Code should also be amended to

Cir. 1993) (reversing reorganization court's exercise of discretionary abstention pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) after consideration of relevant factors; declaring that test
"developed in the context of a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978"
is nevertheless appropriate for application in a Bankruptcy Act case involving a § 77
debtor; stating that abstention is "but a narrow exception to the exercise of federal
jurisdiction").
67. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
68. 825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 93. The Wood decision also contained an interesting analysis of the phrase
'arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11" as utilized in the
jurisdictional grant and in the definition of core proceedings that can be finally
adjudicated by bankruptcy judges under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). As to the former, Judge
Wisdom wisely observed that the phrase was expressive of the broad grant of
jurisdiction, Wood, 825 F.2d at 92; while as to the latter it gave precision to the
definition of core proceedings by taking it in segments, id. at 96-97; cf. Goodman v.
Philip R. Curtis Enters. (In re Goodman), 809 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987), which
concerned an order of the bankruptcy court postconfirmation compelling the former
Chapter 11 debtor to settle a personal injury claim, even though the claim was not dealt
with as a source of funding for the plan obligations. The Fourth Circuit reversed,
remanding to the district court for remand to the bankruptcy court to consider the
possibility of modification of the plan. The opinion of Judge Phillips analyzed the
dispute, not as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, but as a matter of "procedural
regularity." "We therefore believe that the proper way to analyze the authority of the
courts to enter those orders is to consider their procedural regularity as orders effecting
a § 1127 modification, rather than as possible excesses of any retained post-confirmation
jurisdiction." Id. at 233.
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require that each plan contain an "effective date" upon which revestment
and discharge actually occur; after this date the debtor is empowered to
conduct its business without further court supervision, unless that
authority is expressly limited in the plan. The foregoing is not intended
to change the fact that courts will continue to retain sufficient jurisdiction to carry out their post-confirmation functions under sections 350,
1127, 1112(b), and 1144.70

The recommendation of the National Bankruptcy Conference is a good
starting point. However, it does not address jurisdiction of adversary
proceedings and contested matters pending at the date of confirmation or
filed thereafter. It also allows parties in interest to determine jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the recommendation does make it clear that "perpetual
tutelage" ends and the reorganized debtor can conduct business without
further court supervision, although it leaves open the possibility of a
reservation of administrative jurisdiction. Furthermore, it does not spell out
what type of jurisdiction remains; it provides only that there is a general
divestment of general administrative jurisdiction. Surely it is not inappropriate to allow the bankruptcy court to determine rejection or assumption of
executory contracts or to resolve administrative expense claims arising prior
to confirmation.
To the extent postconfirmation jurisdiction is to be clarified, it should
be by way of amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. For example, the section
could be amended to provide that jurisdiction over the reorganized debtor
as to the conduct of its business ceases on confirmation, but jurisdiction to
resolve pending and subsequently filed adversary proceedings and contested
matters continues, subject to the ability of the court to abstain under
subparagraph (c).
II. THE EFFECTS OF CONFIRMATION

A. The Res Judicata Effect of Confirmation
Section 1141 declares in four subsections the effects of confirmation of
a Chapter 11 plan. Subsection (a) provides that a confirmed plan binds the
debtor, any entity issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring
property under the plan, and any creditor, equity security holder, or general
partner of the debtor. 7' Whether a creditor, equity security holder, or
partner is impaired by the plan or has accepted the plan does not affect the
plan's finality as a conclusive determination of rights. Subsection (b)

CY

70. National Bankruptcy Conference Code Review Project, in ALIIABA, BANKRUPTREFORM CIRCA 1993, at 266 (1993) [hereinafter NBC Draft].
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1988).
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recognizes that the confirmation vests all the property of the estate in the
debtor except as the plan or order of confirmation otherwise provides.72 As
a result of confirmation, according to subsection (c), the property dealt with
by the plan is free and clear of the claims and interest of creditors, equity
security holders, and partners, to the extent not otherwise provided in the
plan. 3 Subsection (d) sets forth the role of confirmation in discharging
72. Id. § 1141(b); see Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In
re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio (1987) (holding that
purchaser of debtor's assets was not liable to holders of preconfirmation tort, indemnity,
and contribution claims against debtor that were discharged by confirmation of debtor's
plan pursuant to § 1141(b) and (c); also holding that bankruptcy law pre-empts state law
imposing successor liabiiity on purchaser of assets).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c). Although § 1141(c) is derived from similarly worded
provisions in the Bankruptcy Act, its meaning and implications are unclear and are
subject to diverse interpretations. Thus, it has been held that § 1141(c) does not
extinguish prepetition liens, notwithstanding its discharge of underlying claims. Relihan
v. Exchange Bank, 69 B.R. 122 (S.D. Ga. 1985) (holding that secured creditor did not
lose its prepetition lien by its failure to file a proof of claim; recognizing continuing
enforceability of lien notwithstanding discharge of claim); In re Electronics & Metals
Indus,. 153 B.R. 36 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that creditor's prepetition lien,
for which no claim was filed and which was not provided for in debtor's plan, survived
confirmation, rendering plan infeasible; fact that creditor's claim was scheduled as
"disputed" held not to affect result, although debtor's objection to creditor's claim would
have changed the result according to Sun Fin. Co. v. Howard (In re Howard), 972 F.2d
639, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1992)); In re Snedaker, 39 B.R. 41, 42 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984)
(holding that prepetition garnishment lien was unaffected by confirmation order that did
not refer to the lien); cf. Simmons v. Savell (In re Simmons), 765 F.2d 547, 554-57 (5th
Cir. 1985) (creditor's claim filed and allowed as secured claim in Chapter 13 case when
no preconfirmation objection was filed, although plan treated claim as unsecured and
creditor did not object to the plan; § 1327(b) read to restore property to debtor subject
to encumbrances not avoided during the case). In his treatise, Richard Broude concludes
that property not dealt with in a Chapter 11 plan is "subject to the same encumbrances
or other interests that existed at the time the petition was filed." RICHARD F. BROUDE,
REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 14-9 (1992) (citing

Snedaker, 39 B.R. 41).
On the other hand, there is substantial authority for the view that § 1141(c) strips
the debtor's property of prepetition liens. See, e.g., Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech Research,
Inc. (In re Arctic Enters.), 68 B.R. 71 (D. Minn. 1986) (holding that successor in
interest of debtor purchased debtor's property free of security interest extinguished by
confirmation of debtor's plan); Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co. v. Good (In re Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co.), 56 B.R. 492, 495-96 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (confirmation
deemed to have stripped debtor's property of lien rights not granted in confirmed plan);
Board of County Comm'rs v. Coleman Am. Properties, Inc. (In re American Properties,
Inc.), 30 B.R. 239, 246 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) ("After confirmation of a chapter 11
plan, a creditor's lien rights are only those granted in the confirmed plan."); 1 DAVID
G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 151 (1993) ("In a reorganization case, any of the
preexisting liens that still survive will eventually die upon confirmation."); 5 COLLIER
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debt.74 Exceptions in subsections (a) and (c) recognize that subsection (d)
carves out protections for holders of nondischargeable claims against
individual debtors and of claims against corporations and partnerships that
are liquidated.
The purposes and policies of Chapter 11 are implemented by the body
of case law that accords effect to confirmation as res judicata75 and limits

ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 35, at 1141-11, 1141-12; David A. Lander & David A.
Warfield, A Review andAnalysis of Selected Post-ConfirmationActivities in Chapter11
Reorganizations, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 203, 205 (1988) ("If the plan makes no provision
for any .... lien, then the lien is cancelled. If the debt underlying any lien is discharged
or cancelled, then that lien is automatically cancelled."); cf.Brady v. Andrew (In re
Commercial W. Fin. Corp.), 761 F.2d 1329, 1334-38 (9th Cir. 1985) (confirmation
order purporting to invalidate security interests of investors in debtor reversed for failure
to accord investors procedural rights provided in Bankruptcy Rules). In his treatise,
Richard Broude appropriately emphasized the importance of specificity in an order of
confirmation respecting its effect on security interests, lest a court read § 1141(c) to strip
the property of liens not dealt with by the plan. BROUDE, supra, at 14-8 to -9.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d).
75. Pickens v. Lockheed Corp., 990 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir.) (debtors precluded by res
judicata from seeking to set aside part or all of provisions of confirmed plan of
reorganization; debtor enjoined from taking any action or filing any pleadings relating
to any issue connected with the case; and courts in the Fifth Circuit prohibited from
accepting any pleading or document proffered by or for debtors without prior approval
of court of appeals), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3350 (1993); Findley v.
Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721, 747-49 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that settlement which divided health claimants, who were on equal footing under
plan, into two groups with differing rights as to amounts recoverable and as to timing
and rate of payment and with right to jury trial drastically curtailed, was impermissible
modification of confirmed plan; rejecting argument that changes affected only planrelated documents rather than plan; C.J. Feinberg dissenting in part on the ground that
lower courts' adjustment of payment mechanism constituted necessary and permissible
response to conditions that made adherence to original arrangement impracticable),
modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993), discussedinfra text accompanying notes
353-373; Eubanks v. FDIC, 977 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992), (dismissing, on ground that
confirmation constituted res judicata, postconfirmation action filed by debtors in state
court against banks alleging violation of blue sky laws, breach of fiduciary duties, fraud,
and breach of loan contract); Ocasek v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation
Fund, 956 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that provision of confirmed plan
prohibiting payment of interest on claims not settled prepetition barred postjudgment
interest on postpetition, preconfirmation judgment); Still v. Rossville Bank (In re
Chattanooga Wholesale Antiques, Inc.), 930 F.2d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 1991) (Chapter 7
trustee denied recovery of postconfirmation payments pursuant to a confirmed plan
notwithstanding its argument that such payments were inequitable because plan
erroneously treated recipient as a secured creditor); United States v. Carolina Parachute
Corp., 907 F.2d 1469, 1470, 1473-74 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that order confirming
government contractor's plan was res judicata and binding on Government which,
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although on notice of the confirmation hearing, made no objection to the plan and did not
appeal from the order of confirmation); Paul v. Monts, 906 F.2d 1468 (10th Cir.1990)
(although debtor and creditors were bound by confirmed plan, whether third party
investor was bound depended on factual determination as to whether he agreed to terms
of proposed purchase of debtor's stock); Wallis v. Justice Oaks H, Ltd. (In re Justice
Oaks H, Ltd.), 898 F.2d 1544, 1551 (11th Cir.) (although guarantors of debtor did not
have allowable claim for reimbursement under § 502(e)(1), they were bound by
confirmation order entered in compliance with requirements of due process; guarantors'
assertion of equitable lien and objections to plan provisions for secured creditors
dismissed), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 959 (1990); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pac. R.R., 891 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1989) (where plan confirmed in railroad reorganization case under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act specifically provided for no interest to accrue
on "liquidation date," order bound debtor and all creditors and precluded grant of
interest for period of delay between date of order for sale and actual delivery of
payments to employees); Thompson v. Kentucky Lumber Co. (In re Kentucky Lumber
Co.), 860 F.2d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 1988) (denying claim of unsecured creditors for
interest for period of postconfirmation delay in payment, in view of provision for no
interest in confirmed plan overwhelmingly accepted by creditors); Heins v. RutiSweetwater, Inc. (In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc.), 836 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting postconfirmation objections by nonvoting class of creditors to provisions of
plan that removed their lien; holding that Code deemed nonvoting, nonobjecting class to
have accepted plan); Heritage Hotel Ltd. Partnership I v. Valley Bank (In re Heritage
Hotel Ltd. Partnership 1), 160 B.R. 374 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993) (holding that res judicata
applies to Chapter 11 confirmation order and precludes filing of lender-liability actions
by debtor predicated on prepetition relationship with a lender; concluding that failure of
debtor to mention known potential claims in disclosure statement or plan and indication
in plan of intention to pay lender in full estopped debtor from prosecuting the
postconfirmation suit); In re Northampton Corp., 59 B.R. 963, 966 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(confirmed plan imposing $2 million obligation on debtor held to be binding and not
subject to modification in second Chapter 11 case); Garsal Realty, Inc. v. Troy Say.
Bank (In re Garsal Realty, Inc.), 39 B.R. 991, 993-93 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (postconfirmation motion to extend deadline established by plan for exercise of option denied as
collateral attack on plan; debtor's characterization of motion as one "in aid of administration" rejected), aff'd mem., 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985); Public Serv. Co. v. Richards
(In re Public Serv. Co.), 148 B.R. 702 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992) (confirmation order
approving debtor-public utility's Chapter 11 plan held to be res judicata, barring
prosecution of threatened lawsuit by shareholders asserting that plan solicitation violated
federal securities laws; postconfirmation suit based on "secret fraud" regarding matter
not addressed during course of case acknowledged not to be barred by confirmation, but
opportunity afforded shareholders preconfirmation to raise issues in threatened litigation
said to preclude further suit in this case); In re Southern Energy, Ltd., 98 B.R. 42, 44
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (holding lessor of nonresidential property to debtor bound by
confirmation of plan that "communicated the intention of assuming the lease, subject to
the Court retaining jurisdiction to consider rejection at a later date"); In re Fischer, 91
B.R. 55, 56 n.1 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (confirmation of plan that provided for no
distribution to creditor and for discharge of its claim held to entitle debtor to determination barring collateral attack by creditor seeking to enforce judgment lien against debtor's
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property); City Nat'l Bank v. General Coffee Corp. (In re General Coffee Corp.), 85
B.R. 905, 907 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (confirmation order held to constitute res judicata); In re Newport Offshore, Ltd., 78 B.R. 383, 386 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987) (same); In re
Earley, 74 B.R. 560, 561 (Bankr. C.D. I11.1987) (rejecting postconfirmation objection
to claim treated as secured in confirmation order); Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal
Revenue v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 60 B.R. 412 (D.V.I. 1986) (holding governmental
unit bound by confirmed plan's provisions respecting debtor's liability for prepetition
taxes); In re St. Louis Freight Lines, 45 B.R. 546, 552-53 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984)
(holding that confirmation order excluding penalties assessed on postpetition, preconfirmation taxes and approving application of debtor's payments to taxes was binding on
IRS, even though exclusion may have been erroneous); Astroglass Boat Co. v. Eldridge
(In re Astroglass Boat Co.), 32 B.R. 538 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (denying creditor's
postconfirmation motion seeking allowance of claim, because it was barred by
confirmation and because of failure to satisfy requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 60). But
cf. United States v. Gurwitch (In re Gurwitch), 794 F.2d 584 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
that tax liabilities which were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(1)(A) were enforceable
against individual debtor notwithstanding confirmation of plan allowing 100% payment
of tax claims).
In the course of determining the feasibility of a plan the court may consider the
availability of net loss carry-forwards and other tax impacts. Moreover, in light of the
prohibition in § 1129(d) on confirmation of a plan if its principal purpose is to avoid
either the taxes or the application of § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, it is arguable that
every confirmation order contains an implied finding that the plan's principal purpose
does not contravene the statutory prohibition. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Goldberg (In
re Hartman Material Handling Sys., Inc.), 141 B.R. 802, 809 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Query, whether explicit or implicit findings in the order of confirmation respecting the
principal purpose of a plan or the availability of tax benefits are binding on a governmental unit in a postconfirmation proceeding by the unit? See Robin E. Phelan et al.,
Litigating with the IRS in Bankruptcy Court, in SECOND ANNUAL BANKRUPTCY
TAXATION: ISSUES FOR THE 90S (1992). The court in the Hartman Systems case rejected
the debtor's arguments that the confirmation of its plan constituted res judicata or
collateral estoppel barring the IRS from seeking disallowance of the use of net operating
losses. The court emphasized that a preconfirmation finding could not finally determine
tax issues that do not arise until after confirmation. 141 B.R. at 811-13.
The effect of confirmation as resjudicatahas been held not to be affected by the
subsequent dismissal of the case on account of material default by the debtor with respect
to the plan. United States v. Standard State Bank, 91 B.R. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1988), aft'd,
905 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1990). Numerous cases have reached the same conclusion
respecting the effect of a postconfirmation conversion. See, e.g., Bank of La. v.
Pavlovich (In re Pavlovich), 952 F.2d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1992); Still v. Rossville Bank
(In re Chattanooga Wholesale Antiques, Inc.), 930 F.2d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 1991); Paul
v. Monts, 906 F.2d 1468, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Blanton Smith Corp., 81 B.R.
440 (M.D. Tenn. 1987); Sanders v. GIAC Leasing Corp. (In re Sanders), 81 B.R. 496
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987); In re Kaleidoscope of High Point, Inc., 56 B.R. 562, 565-66
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1986). The Blanton case was approved, and the Sanders case was
disapproved, in Reef Petroleum Corp. v. United States (In re Reef Petroleum Corp.), 99
B.R. 355 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989), where the court opined that "once a case is
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review by application of a doctrine of mootness.76

converted to Chapter 7, each case must be decided on its own facts." Id. at 360; see also
American Bank & Trust Co. v. United States ex reL IRS (In re Barton Indus.), 159 B.R.
954 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993) (holding that collateral attack by IRS on provision for
priority of security interest of bank in accounts receivable of debtor was precluded by
res judicata; and holding that debtor's default in performing its obligations under plan did
not nullify or alter rights and remedies under the plan).
In Bank of Louisiana v. Pavlovich (In re Pavlovich), 952 F.2d 114, a creditor had
made loans (1) prepetition, (2) contemporaneously and in connection with the
confirmation, and (3) postconfirmation. Two years after the confirmation, and after the
debtor ceased making payments required by the plan, the case was converted, and the
creditor objected to a discharge of the debtor in the Chapter 7 case. The bankruptcy and
district courts read §§ 348(d) and 1141(d)(1) to give the debtor a discharge from liability
on all three classes of claims, but the court of appeals reversed with respect to the
dischargeability of claims arising from postconfirmation advances of new value to the
debtor. Id. at 119. This case is discussed in Barry L. Zaretsky, Effect of Chapter11 Plan
Confirmation, 209 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1993).
In Blumenthal v. Clark (In re Hiller), 143 B.R. 263 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992), a
provision of a confirmed plan authorized the debtor to collect a judgment against his
partner. But the court, citing Pavlovich, held that the postconfirmation, postconversion
settlement by the debtor with his partner for less than the amount of the judgment was
subject to attack by the Chapter 7 trustee on behalf of the creditors.
76. If an appellant from an order of confirmation does not obtain a stay of execution,
the appeal is typically dismissed for mootness, since the consummation of the plan is
likely to have progressed beyond the point where effective relief can be granted. See,
e.g., Smith v. United States (In re Holywell Corp.), 911 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir.
1990) (dismissing appeal for mootness and rejecting arguments that bankruptcy court
lacked jurisdiction to confirm plan and that creditor had acted fraudulently in obtaining
approval of plan), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992); Rochman v.
Northeast Utils. Serv. Group (In re Public Serv. Co.), 963 F.2d 469 (1st Cir.)
(dismissing, as moot, appeal from confirmation of public utility's proposed Chapter 11
plan where, in absence of stay, performance under plan had proceeded to point beyond
any practicable annulment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992); First Union Real Estate
Equity & Mortgage Invs. (In re Club Assocs.), 956 F.2d 1065 (11th Cir. 1992)
(affirming dismissal of appeal from confirmation order as moot and for reasons of equity,
where plan had been substantially consummated and several investors not parties to the
case had committed new funds with expectation of preferred return on their investment,
and their interests could not be protected in the event of reversal of the confirmation
order; while failure to seek timely stay of confirmation order was said not to preclude
review, it was proper consideration in determining whether equitable grounds warranted
dismissal of appeal); Halliburton Serv. Co. v. Crystal Oil Co. (In re Crystal Oil Co.),
854 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing creditor's appeal of Chapter 11 plan confirmation where creditor had not obtained stay of bankruptcy court's order pending appeal,
comprehensive change of circumstances had occurred, and creditor's requested relief
could jeopardize plan); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Central Transport, Inc., 841 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1988) (creditor's appeal from order of
confirmation in absence of stay held to be moot in view of fact that plan had been
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implemented and reversal would create unmanageable and inequitable situation); Miami
Ctr. Ltd. Partnership v. Bank of New York, 838 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir.) (vacating affirmance by district court of bankruptcy court's consolidation and confirmation order and
remanding case with instructions to dismiss appeal as moot; vacating previous order of
court of appeals in 826 F.2d 1010 (1lth Cir. 1987); district court's conclusion that it
could grant effective relief by setting aside sale to a bona fide purchaser approved in a
confirmed reorganization plan and restoring the property to the debtor said to stand the
law of mootness on its head), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988); Tompkins v. Frey (In
re Bel Air Assocs.), 706 F.2d 301, 304-06 (10th Cir. 1983) (dismissing, for mootness
under former Bankr. R. 805, appeal without obtaining stay from order of confirmation
authorizing sale, in view of sale to bona fide purchaser; upholding sale notwithstanding
fact that purchaser was mortgagee who also bid in claims of creditor of debtor and that
general partner of debtor limited partnership controlled the mortgagee); Metro Property
Management Co. v. Information Dialogues, Inc. (In re Information Dialogues, Inc.), 662
F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1981) (dismissing, as moot, appeal of creditor from confirmation
where no stay had been requested and debtor had implemented substantial elements of
its plan); Trone v. Roberts Farms, Inc. (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.), 652 F.2d 793, 797
(9th Cir. 1981) (appeals from disallowance of claims, approval of settlement, and
confirmation of plan dismissed for mootness in view of failure of appellants to obtain
stay; because of intricacy and interrelationship of many transactions, "to deny mootness
and reverse would 'knock the props out from under the authorization for every
transaction that has taken place' and 'create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation
for the Bankruptcy Court'"); BROUDE, supra note 73, § 14.01 [1] (noting that stays
pending appeal are seldom granted, that appeals typically take a long time, that plan
proponents frequently accelerate performance pending appeals to enhance the likelihood
that the appeal will be rendered moot, and that the numerous rulings denying review of
order approving sales are typically followed in appeals from confirmation orders); cf.
Munson v. Antisdel (In re Munson Geothermal Inc.), 982 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1992)
(dismissing appeal from order of confirmation because it was rendered moot by
subsequent confirmation of modified plan; imposing sanctions on appellant and his
counsel for filing of frivolous appeal); Holywell Corp. v. Bank of New York, 901 F.2d
931, 933-34 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (dismissing as moot appeal from bankruptcy court decision
determining amount, validity, and extent of bank's lien; rejecting debtor's challenge to
bankruptcy court's acceptance of bank's unilateral determination of contract rate of
interest as excessive, because it struck at a crucial element of the confirmed reorganization plan, and amendment of plan would be unjust and indeed impossible), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1041 (1991) (petition challenged denial of right of appeal to Article II court
to recover amount wrongfully paid to satisfy claim that was unenforceable under
agreement pursuant to which debt arose, when all interested parties remained before the
court, and no intervening event had changed the situation). But cf. In re Andreuccetti,
975 F.2d 413, 418-20 (7th Cir. 1992) (appeal from order of confirmation held not moot
where portion of plan had not been completed, parties most affected remained before the
court, and settlement agreement allowed reinstatement of settled claims in the event of
reversal; debtors' appeal from confirmation nevertheless dismissed insofar as predicated
on challenge to limitation of rights of administrative expenses claimants since appellants
had no claims affected by the limitation); In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1148-49
(D.C. Cir.) (confirmation order reversed insofar as it required one unsecured creditor
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B. The Order of Confirmationas a Discharge of Debt
Section 1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for a broad, but not
absolute or unqualified discharge from the debtor's indebtedness.' The

to release its claims against a third party before sharing in fund to be created by the third
party and insofar as fees had been awarded to one law firm), vacated in part, 797 F.2d
1004 (D.C.Cir. 1986); Brite v. Sun Country Dev., Inc. (In re Sun Country Dev., Inc.),
764 F.2d 406, 407 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (appeal from confirmation entertained because
effective relief was still available notwithstanding substantial consummation of plan);
Jorgensen v. Federal Land Bank (In re Jorgensen), 66 B.R. 104 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986)
(although no stay pending appeal had been obtained and creditors' plan of liquidation had
not been substantially consummated because the debtor had completed only four months
of selling timber under an 18-month plan, debtors' appeal was not rendered moot;
bankruptcy court's appointment of arbitrator in confirmation order for resolution of
disputes stricken as unauthorized under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(c); confirmation order
affirmed as modified); Chang v. Servico, Inc. (In re Servico, Inc.), 161 B.R. 297 (S.D.
Fla. 1993) (holding that appeal challenging confirmation order became moot by virtue
of substantial consummation of plan, no stay having been sought; substantially all of hotel
properties to be transferred under the plan had been transferred, new board of directors
had assumed responsibility for debtor's business, distribution to creditors was nearly
complete, and millions of shares of stock of debtors had been traded on American Stock
Exchange); New York City Dep't of Fin. v. 1515 Broadway Assocs. (In re 1515
Broadway Assocs.), 153 B.R. 400, 404-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), (rejecting city's argument
that Chapter 11 plan's transformation of a former general partner in Chapter 11 debtor,
a general partnership, into a limited partnership was not mooted by confirmation, because
reorganization of the limited partnership was found to be at the core of a reorganization
of the partnership; but holding that city's effort to tax a future foreclosure provided for
under the plan and the liability of any of the parties under the plan to pay the state's
gains tax presented issues not mooted by confirmation).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1988); Holstein v. Brill, 987 F.2d 1268, 1270 (7th Cir.
1993). "Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code does not contemplate the filing of objections
to discharge as might be done in a Chapter 7 case." C.I.T. Fin. Servs. v. Novelty & Toy
Co. (In re Novelty & Toy Co.), 22 B.R. 77, 77 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1982). Confirmation
of a debtor's plan constitutes a discharge of its debts, and a postconfirmation objection
comes too late. Cf. Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., 124 B.R. 268,
276 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that preconfirmation claims of former employees for
occupational disease and tort resulting from exposure to asbestos were discharged by
confirmation under § 1141(a), and actions on the claims were prohibited by § 524(a)(2)).
Although confirmation discharges the debtor's preconfirmation liabilities under a
contract, it does not terminate the agreement, and postconfirmation costs incurred within
the contemplation of the agreement remain collectible. Shure v. Vermont (In re SureSnap Corp.), 983 F.2d 1015, 1018 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding debtor liable for attorneys'
fees incurred by creditor in defending against postconfirmation appeal by debtor); Danzig
Claimants v. Grynberg (In re Grynberg), 113 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D. Colo.) (judgment
creditor awarded postpetition appellate attorney's fees where Chapter 11 debtor appealed
a prepetition judgment), aft'd, 143 B.R. 574 (D. Colo. 1990), aff'd, 966 F.2d 570 (10th
Cir. 1992).
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subsection's discharge extends generally to all preconfirmation debt and to
certain debts whether they arise before or after confirmation? 8 An
introductory phrase of subsection (d) recognizes that the plan or the court's
order of confirmation may except indebtedness from the operation of the
confirmation as a discharge.79 The second paragraph of subsection (d)
saves from discharge debts of an individual debtor that are nondischargeable
under section 523 of the Code.80 The third paragraph of the subsection

78. Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan was held not to preclude setoff by a creditor
of a quantum meruit claim for advertising provided to the debtor, although the claim was
not referred to in the plan. Carolco Television Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co. (In re
De Laurentis Entertainment Group Inc.), 963 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 330 (1992), commented on in Brett Ludwig, Comment, In re De Laurentis
Entertainment Group: Sacrificing Confirmed ChapterPlanto DelinquentlyAssertedSetoff
Rights, 77 MINN. L. REv. 871 (1993).
79. See, e.g., Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers' Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581,589
(9th Cir. 1993), where debtor's plan did not grant a discharge, but contemplated that a
discharge would occur in the future. In the recent case of Mancuso v. Sullivan (In re
Sullivan), 153 B.R. 746 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993), the court recognized that a provision
in a confirmed plan that precluded a discharge of the debtor if he did not prevail in § 727
proceedings was binding on the debtor. See also Mancuso v. Sullivan (In re Sullivan),
153 B.R. 751 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that the Chapter 11 trustee had no
authority under the Code or the Chapter 11 plan to institute proceedings objecting to the
debtor's discharge).
80. Atassi v. McLaren (In re McLaren), 990 F.2d 850, 853-54 (6th Cir. 1993)
(upholding bankruptcy court's ruling in core proceeding that individual Chapter 11
debtor's debt was not dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)); Grynberg v. United States (In
re Grynberg), 986 F.2d 367 (10th Cir.) (gift taxes on transfers occurring within three
years prior to filing of Chapter 11 petition by individual debtor held to be nondischargeable and collectible postconfirmation notwithstanding failure to file claims for the
taxes prior to bar date), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 57 (1993). Grynberg is discussed in
Zaretsky, supra note 75.
In Star Bank, N.A. v. Reveal (In re Reveal), 148 B.R. 288 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1992), the court rejected a creditor's request for a determination that its claim for
punitive damages arising out of the debtor's false statement of his financial condition was
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2) and deferred the creditor's request for denial of
discharge as premature in light of the fact that a plan of reorganization had not yet been
filed.
The court in Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Specialized Installers, Inc. (In re
Specialized Installers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 546 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981), ruled that a creditor's
claim against an individual debtor for breach of fiduciary duty was nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(4), but qualified the ruling by adding that it was "subject to the other
provisions of Chapter 11 in the event the debtor achieves confirmation of a nonliquidating plan and continues in business." Id. at 554-55. How could confirmation of a
nonliquidating plan affect dischargeability?
In Savoy Records, Inc. v. Trafalgar Assocs. (In re Trafalgar Assocs.), 53 B.R.
693, 696 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), a case involving a limited partnership, the court
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withholds, or possibly withdraws, the effect of confirmation as a discharge
in a case where the plan is a liquidation plan, the debtor does not engage in
business after the plan's consummation, and the debtor could not be
discharged in a Chapter 7 case because, for example, it is not an individual.
This third paragraph raises numerous questions,"' but these have not
proved to be significant in practice." The fourth paragraph authorizes a
confusingly denied a request for a determination of nondischargeability of a claim for
fraud or defalcation on the ground that the request was premature. The court added that
a declaration of nondischargeability could not be made because no plan had been filed.
In In re Namer, 141 B.R. 603, 608 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1992), appealdismissed sub
nom. In re National Business Consultants, Nos. 92-1552, 92-1553, 1992 WL 164528
(E.D. La. June 17, 1992), the court declared that an individual Chapter 11 debtor was
not entitled to a discharge from a debt to the FTC for money obtained by false
representations; however, the court dismissed the debtor's Chapter 11 petition, along
with that of his wholly owned corporation, for lack of good faith.
81. The third paragraph prescribes the requirements for an attack on the effectiveness
of confirmation as a discharge to be successful. The second requirement, namely, that
the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the plan, is especially
troublesome in that it does not indicate answers to such questions as the following: (1)
What is the effect of continuation of business for a limited period of time after
consummation of the plan? (2) Is it possible for the effect of confirmation as a discharge
to be revoked or terminated by virtue of the debtor's cessation of business after a
postconsummation interval? (3) If the debtor changes the location and nature of his or her
business activities postconsummation, does the debtor escape the consequence of the
denial of discharge prescribed by § 1141(d)(3), or must he continue some or all of the
former business in order to obtain the benefit of discharge? (4) Does the bankruptcy
court have jurisdiction over a proceeding to determine whether discharge of a
preconfirmation debt was precluded by § 1141(d)(3)(B)? In any event, the third
paragraph appears to give a debtor who is subject to loss of the benefit of a discharge by
virtue of its provisions an incentive to engage in business in order to preserve the
benefits of discharge of his preconfirmation debts.
82. Research has revealed no cases in which any of the issues listed supra in note 81
were raised or considered by the court. In five cases the court deferred ruling on a
creditor's request for relief predicated on § 1141(d)(3) by saying that the request was
premature until the nature of the plan had been determined. Star Bank, N.A. v. Reveal
(In re Reveal), 148 B.R. 288 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992); Park View Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Rich-Morrow Realty Co. (In re Rich-Morrow Realty Co.), 100 B.R. 893, 895
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989); Reynolds v. Miller (In re Miller), 80 B.R. 270, 271 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1987); Savoy Records, Inc. v. Trafalgar Assocs. (In re Trafalgar Assocs.),
53 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); United Bank v. Pfliger (In re Pfliger), 57
B.R. 467, 468 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
In the following cases, a Chapter 11 debtor was held not to be discharged from
preconfirmation debts under § 1141(d): Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d
871, 874 (8th Cir. 1988) (denying individual debtor discharge because the court found
that he transferred his property with intent to defraud creditors within contemplation of
§ 727(a)(2)); citing § 1141(d)(3)(C) as statutory support for decision); In re Namer, 141
B.R. 603, 608 (Bankr. E.D. La.) (denying discharges to individual debtor and his wholly
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debtor to execute an enforceable waiver of discharge after the entry of the
order for relief. Finally, section 1144(2) authorizes revocation of the
discharge order under restricted circumstances.83
Notwithstanding the breadth of the language of section 1141(d)14 and

owned corporation and dismissing Chapter 11 petitions on motion of FTC as filed in bad
faith; citing "§ 1141(3)(c)" as authority for denying discharge of debt of corporate debtor
due to the FTC), appealdismissed sub noma. In re National Business Consultants, Inc.,
Nos. 92-1522, 92-1523, 1992 WL 164528 (E.D. La. June 17, 1992); Teamsters' Pension
Trust Fund v. Malone Realty Co., 82 B.R. 346, 349-50 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that
confirmation of plan of liquidating partnership constituted denial of discharge under
§ 1141); In re Wood Family Interests, Ltd., 135 B.R. 407 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989)
(denying confirmation of plan and discharge to partnership that proposed liquidating plan
and indicated intent not to continue in business); Reynolds v. Miller (In re Miller), 97
B.R. 760, 762 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying discharge to individual debtor who
proposed liquidating plan, desisted from engaging in business after consummation of his
plan, concealed assets, and failed to keep financial records from which alleged loss of
his assets could be determined). The courts in Tveten and Namer referred only to
subparagraph (C) of § 1141 (d)(3), thereby ignoring the statutory implication that the
requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) must also be met in order to warrant denial
of the benefits of the discharge of all preconfirmation debts.
In Borsdorfv. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 128 B.R.
976 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991), the court refused to allow a claimant to file a wrongful
death claim after the claims bar date. The court acknowledged that because the debtor
was being liquidated, the result of its ruling was to leave the claimant with a claim only
against a corporate shell without assets. The court stated that the congressional purpose
of § 1141(d)(3) was "to discourage trading in corporate shells." Id. at 981-82.
83. See infra part III.C.
84. Section 1141(d) reads as follows:
(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in
the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of
such confirmation, and any debt of a kind specified in section 502(g), 502(h),
or 502(i) of this title, whether or not(i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed
filed under section 501 of this title;
(ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or
(iii) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; and
(B) terminates all rights and interests of equity security holders and
general partners provided for by the plan.
(2) The confirmation of a plan does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt excepted from discharge under section 523 of this title.
(3) The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if(A) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of
the property of the estate;
(B)the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the
plan; and
(C) the debtor would be denied a discharge under section 727(a) of
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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the policy of the Bankruptcy Code evidenced in its legislative history to
accord a fresh start to a reorganized debtor,"5 judicial decisions have

this title if the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title.
(4) The court may approve a written waiver of discharge executed by the
debtor after the order for relief under this chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1988).
85. See infra note 230. It is sometimes loosely and inaccurately stated that the fresh
start policy does not apply to corporations. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines), 928 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 82 (1991); Pettibone Corp. v. Payne (In re Pettibone Corp.), 151
B.R. 166, 174-75 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); THOMAS JACKSON, LOGIC

AND LIMITS OF

BANKRuPrcY 225 (1986); Ellen A. Sward, Resolving Conflicts Between BankruptcyLaw
and the State Police Power, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 403, 408, Philippe J. Kahn, Note,
Bankruptcy Versus EnvironmentalProtection:DischargingFuture CERCLA Liability in
Chapter 11, 14 CARDOzO L. REv. 1999, 2034-37 (1993); Gary M. Roberts, Note,
Bankruptcy and the Union's Bargain:Equitable Treatment of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1025 n.67 (1987). The statement is a misleading
way of summarizing the effect of § 1141(d)(3) and the limitation of discharge under
§ 727 to individual debtors. See Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying
the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a
Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 337,428-29 (1993); Shawn F. Sullivan, Discharge
of CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: The Necessity for a Uniform Position, 17 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 445, 454 n.41, 458 n.57 (1993).
The author of the Note in the Cardozo Law Review cited supra purported to find
support for putting aside the fresh start objective in the context of corporate reorganizations in the absence from the House and Senate Reports on the Bankruptcy Code of
mention of fresh start as a purpose in bankruptcy reorganization. Kahn, supra, at 2037.
The fresh start policy is not a statutory concept, but has animated congressional
formulation and judicial construction of provisions of the bankruptcy law relating to
discharge, exemptions, property of the estate, and discrimination against debtors. See
Frank R. Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The
Debtor'sFreshStart, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427,445-51 (1974). Discharge of a debtor was
originally introduced into the English Bankruptcy Acts as an inducement to debtors to
make full disclosure and delivery of their assets and to comply with the provisions of the
law and orders of the court. 4 & 5 Anne c. 17 (1706). See United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434, 447 (1973) (quoting and citing JAMES A. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 20-21,
88 (1956). As Professor MacLachlan pointed out in his treatise,
The later development of the discharge represents an independent and though
not unrelated public policy in favor of extricating an insolvent debtor from
what would otherwise be a financial impasse. A business man may sometimes
get new credit after a failure, if it is of such a nature as not to discredit his
ability or character, but not if his prospective earnings are to be consumed in
trying to meet old debts.
Id. at 88.
The considerations underlying the grant of a discharge to an individual apply to a
corporation or partnership seeking reorganization, as the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws and Congress recognized in formulating the provisions of the bankruptcy reform
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engrafted significant limitations on the effect of a discharge in a reorganization case. The first limitation rests on the constitutional ground that a
creditor's claim cannot be discharged without affording the claimant due
process of law. What constitutes due process, however, turns out to be a
concept of varying content. Statutory provisions and rules prescribing
procedures to be followed in the course of a case in dealing with claims and
sales, as well as plan confirmation, have been deemed to express constitutional requirements embodied in the due process clause. And the case law
construing these provisions elaborates these limitations on the availability of
a discharge. The scope of confirmation as a discharge may be affected by
not only the characteristics of the debtor and the creditor, but also the
relationship between the debtor and the creditor. The interpretation of the
word "claim," which has generated a diversity of views, has proved to have
crucial significance in demarking the scope of the discharge. The courts'
views of the operation of confirmation as res judicata and collateral estoppel
have significant impacts on the outcome of postconfirmation efforts to
collect preconfirmation debts. Finally, the courts' analyses of the role of
subject matter jurisdiction in determining the effect of confirmation is of
crucial importance.
1. The Requisites of Due Process
As noted in the preceding paragraph, confirmation may be denied effect
as a discharge of a claim against the debtor because the claimant was not
afforded the protection of due process. The seminal case establishing the
right of a claimant to due process before his claim is barred is Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 6 In Mullane a trustee of a common
trust fund, seeking a settlement of its first account, had given notice of the
application to its many beneficiaries by local newspaper publication in
compliance with requirements of an applicable New York statute. In
reversing unanimous decisions of three New York courts," the Supreme
Court determined that notice by publication was incompatible with the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to beneficiaries
whose names and places of residence were known and who could have been

legislation of the 1970s. See REPORT I, supra note 6, at 175; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra
note 15, at 129, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6069; CMC Heartland Partners v.
Union Pac. R.R. (In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R.), 3 F.3d 200, 201 (7th
Cir. 1993); see also infra note 230.

86. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
87. The surrogate court's holding that the notice required and given was sufficient
was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in In re Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 907 (App. Div. 1949), and by the New York
Court of Appeals, 87 N.E.2d 73 (N.Y. 1949).
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easily notified by mail.
In Mullane Justice Jackson articulated his classic formulation of the
right to due process:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. The notice must be of such a nature as reasonably to
convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time
for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due regard for
the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are
reasonably met the constitutional requirements are satisfied.88
Justice Jackson's opinion was replete with the pragmatics of weighing costs
and benefits in reaching a conclusion about the demands of due process. He
acknowledged that personal service of every known beneficiary was not
required since "notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested
in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all since any objections
sustained would inure to the benefit of all. "9
Three years later, in City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co.,90 the Supreme Court cited Mullane when it unanimously overturned
lower court rulings that had discharged a reorganized railroad's property
from New York City's tax liens. The Court concluded that the City was not
afforded due process because the City did not receive reasonable notice of
the reorganization court's order prescribing the time for filing claims. 9'
Although the City knew of the pendency of the reorganization case, it did
not file a claim. The City, "[s ] omewhat as an afterthought," had contended
in the district court that a ruling barring enforcement of its liens would
constitute a deprivation without due process. 92 The district court responded
that the City's "continued failure to assert its claims in any way while the
proceedings were in progress cannot be attributed to lack of due pro-

88. 339 U.S. at 314-15 (citations omitted); cf. Southmark Corp. v. Cagan, 999 F.3d
216, 221 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure of mortgagee as debtor-in-possession in
Chapter 11 case to give adequate notice to receiver appointed in securities fraud class
action to safeguard partnership assets allowed receiver to press claims on behalf of
defrauded investors in partnership assets notwithstanding confirmation of plan that did
not include investor's claims).
89. Id. at 319.
90. 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
91. Id. at 296 (citing Mulane, 399 U.S. 306).
92. In re New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 105 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Conn. 1951),
aft'd, 197 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd, 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
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cess. "93
Circuit Judges Swan and Augustus Hand affirmed the opinion of the
district court,94 but Circuit Judge Frank wrote an extended dissent,
invoking Mullane at several points but not mentioning due process except
in his quotations from Mullane.95 Judge Frank's extended analysis adhered
to the approach taken in Mullane of weighing the benefits and costs of
conditioning discharge on compliance with requirements derived from
various sources. 96

93. Id. at 420.
94. City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. (In re New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co.), 197 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd, 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
95. Id. at 428-35 (Frank, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 430. Judge Frank's opinion elaborated the following considerations in
justification of his position:
(1) The railroad's explanation for failing to schedule the City as a creditor (because
the debtor disputed the validity of the City's claimed lien) justified a suspicion that the
railroad's real reason was a hope that the City would neglect to file its claim before the
entry of an order expunging it. Id. at 429.
(2) The district judge had improperly ordered notice by mail only to "appearing"
creditors rather than "known" creditors, thereby ignoring the statutory scheme that
contemplated giving notice by mail to the known creditors who had not appeared. Id. at
430.
(3) Notice by publication to nonappearing creditors who were known to the debtor
was definitively discredited by the Court in Mullane, where such notice was referred to
as a "gesture," a "feint," a "fiction," and lacking any "tenable ground" when names and
addresses of known creditors are available to the debtor. Id. at 430-31.
(4) The district court's predicating of the loss of the City's right as a creditor on
its neglect to follow up constructive notice of the existence of the reorganization imposed
an insupportable burden on the City to scrutinize all published notices of bankruptcy
proceedings and one wholly disproportionate to the burden imposed by the Bankruptcy
Act on the debtor. The district judge, having neglected to perform its statutory duty in
respect to the listing of creditors and ordering the giving of notice, sought to excuse that
neglect by fictionally imputing constructive notice of the bar order to the creditor. Id. at
431.
(5) As numerous cases have recognized, a creditor who is reasonably familiar with
the applicable statute would be justified in assuming that the court would order specific
notice to be given of the time for filing claims. Id. at 432.
(6) To impose constructive notice of a bar order by judicial construction on the
basis of a creditor's knowledge of the pendency of a reorganization case without regard
to how the knowledge was obtained constituted a departure from case law that typically
requires the party subject to the notice to be guilty of gross negligence or fraud. Id. at
433.
(7) While § 17a(3) of the Bankruptcy Act rendered a creditor's knowledge of the
pendency of a bankruptcy case equivalent to constructive notice of a duty to file the
creditor's claim and any available objections to discharge, the absence of a comparable
provision in § 77 negated any inference that mere knowledge of a pending reorganization
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Justice Black for the Supreme Court relied on Mullane for its disapproval of notice by publication as "a poor and sometimes hopeless substitute
for actual service of notice"; however, he acknowledged that "when the
names, interests and addresses of persons are unknown, plain necessity may
cause a resort to publication."' Justice Black agreed with Circuit Judge
Frank in criticizing both the district judge's failure to require all known
creditors to be listed and the lower courts' imposing a duty on the City of
New York to act to protect its rights because of its knowledge of the
pendency of the reorganization case. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
doubted that the City was a creditor of the debtor railroad under section
77(b) in view of the nonrecourse character of its lien, but opined without
explanation that the notice given in the case was inadequate support for the
order destroying the lien.9"
Both Mullane and New York, N.H. & N.R. Co., which reversed lower
courts' rulings that had rejected challenges to court orders grounded on
defective notice, left in considerable doubt the implications of these
decisions.99 This doubt has given rise to uncertainty and failure of reorganized debtors to realize the intended benefits of the comprehensive discharge

case would impose on the creditor any duty to act to protect its rights before receiving
notice. Id.
(8) Since the point had never been settled, it was at least arguable that the holder
of a lien need not file a claim in a reorganization case in order to preserve the right to
enforce the lien after confirmation. Id.
(9) The provisions of the plan were confusing with respect to the effect of
confirmation on the enforceability of a lien and the necessity of a timely filing of the
underlying claim in order to preserve the right to enforce the lien. Id. at 434.
With respect to the necessity of filing a claim to preserve a lien, cf. Dewsnup v.
Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
97. New York, N.H. & N.R. Co., 344 U.S. at 296.
98. 344 U.S. at 297 (Frankfurter & Jackson, J.J.).
99. The Supreme Court last had occasion to consider the requisites of due process in
claims proceedings in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478
(1988). In Pope the Court reversed Oklahoma state-court rulings that barred a claim
against a decedent's estate filed more than two months after the publication of notice of
the commencement of probate proceedings. Citing Mullane and New York, N.H. &H.R.
Co., the Pope Court stated that probate and bankruptcy proceedings are analogous
settings for deciding the issue presented. The Court held that due process requires "actual
notice" to the appellant if he was known or "reasonably ascertainable." Id. at 490-91.
Moreover, the Court explained that "actual notice" means "'[n]otice by mail or other
means as certain to ensure actual notice.'" Id. at 491 (quoting Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)). The Court had declared in 1961 that "[tihe
very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see also infra text accompanying notes 215222.
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provided by section 1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In In re Harbor Tank Storage Co.m the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the due process claim of a creditor who had not received
formal notice of the bar date for filing claims, a summary of the debtor's
plan of reorganization, or notice of hearings on confirmation of the plan.
The court deemed immaterial the claimant's knowledge of the pendency of
the debtor's reorganization case. Since the trustee knew of the existence of
the creditor and its claim and the address of the creditor, the court declared
that due process under the circumstances required more than notice by
publication. 101
Eighteen years later, in In re Penn Central Transp. Co., ° the same
court refused a claimant's request for relief from a consummation order
entered in a reorganization case, notwithstanding the claimant's argument
that it had not received constitutionally adequate notice. The claimant had
received notice by mail of procedures established for filing of claims, but
the claimant had not availed itself of these procedures because, according
to its allegations, the debtor had fraudulently concealed the existence of the
claims. The court reviewed the evidence and found no concealment."3
In 1985 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit cited New York,
N.H. & H.R. Co., for the proposition that "known creditors are entitled to
actual notice of the bar dates for filing claims."" The court nevertheless

100. 385 F.2d Ill (3d Cir. 1967).
101. Id. at 115.
102. 771 F.2d 762 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985).
103. Id. at 771-72.
104. In re Chicago Pac. Corp., 773 F.2d 909, 916 (7th Cir. 1985). The Rock Island
Railroad filed a reorganization petition in 1975 under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. The
Organization of Minority Vendors had filed a class action against the railroad and its
trustee in the federal district court in 1979, but the railroad was dropped as a defendant
in 1980 when the complaint in the class action was amended. When the claimants sought
to reinstate the railroad as a defendant in the class action in 1984, the trustee sought and
obtained an injunction. The claimants thereupon filed a $60 million claim against the
railroad ten days before the consummation date set by the court in the reorganization
case. The district court held on the eve of its consummation order that the claim was
untimely under both the applicable bankruptcy rule and the bar order previously entered
in the case and that the trustee had reasonably believed that the claimants had abandoned
their claim in 1979. On appeal the court of appeals approved the district court's
conclusion that the claimants were not known creditors entitled to actual notice of the bar
dates. The court of appeals considered whether the claims were for administrative
expenses and thus not subject to the bar date because they related to alleged discrimination during the trustee's operation; however, the court held that the claimants were
nevertheless barred by laches and estoppel. The court rejected the claimants' contention
that they were entitled to pursue their class action, because the reorganization court
clearly had the power to protect both the estate and the reorganization process against the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4

40

Kennedy and Smith: Postconfirmation Issues: The Effects of Confirmation and Post Con

1993]

POSTCONFIRMATION ISSUES

held, on a variety of grounds, that a class of minority vendors claiming
discrimination
by the debtor railroad was entitled only to constructive
05
notice.
Citing its 1952 decision, but without adverting to any constitutional
requirement, the same court in 1992 acknowledged that "actual notice is
necessary only as to known creditors, whereas constructive notice is
sufficient for unknown creditors."'6 Again the court held, on a variety of
grounds, that a claimant for reimbursement of environmental cleanup costs
against a railroad reorganized under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act was
barred by constructive notice from pursuing its claim against the railroad,
its trustee, and successors."°
In the 1980s, a series of courts of appeals decisions that denied a
debtor's invoking confirmation as a discharge of a preconfirmation claim
explicitly relied on the constitutional mandate of the Fifth Amendment for
reasonable notice to the creditor whose claim was supposed to be discharged. The cases digested in the next few paragraphs illustrate how
procedural rules have become elevated to constitutional mandates that
override the congressional declaration of the effect intended to be given a
discharge in a Chapter 11 case.
In Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co., 08 the creditor
was well aware of the pendency of the debtor's Chapter 11 case, by virtue
of telephonic notice from the creditor's attorney, over a year before order
of confirmation was entered. In fact, the debtor had filed a state-court action
against the creditor on the very contract that was the basis for the claim that
the court of appeals ultimately held not to be discharged, and the creditor

unraveling that would ensue from allowing the class action to proceed.
105. Id. at 917.
106. In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 788 (7th Cir.
1992) (citing In re Chicago Pac. Corp., 773 F.2d at 916-17). The Washington State
Department of Transportation (WSDOT) incurred environmental cleanup costs on
property it had purchased in 1984 from the trustee of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pacific Railroad Co. In 1979 one of the railroad's trains carrying copper ore was
derailed, and the resulting spill led to the contamination and need for cleanup. The
district court found that WSDOT had sufficient information to give rise to a claim or
contingent claim against the railroad before the entry of a consummation order in the
railroad's reorganization in 1985; however the court declined to find that the railroad or
its trustee had knowledge of the contamination or of WSDOT's status as a creditor so as
to be entitled to actual notice from the railroad prior to the consummation. The district
court concluded that actual notice given by the railroad's trustee to the Washington
Department of Revenue constituted actual notice to other state agencies, including
WSDOT, but the court of appeals refrained from resting its finding of notice on that
rationale. This case is discussed further infra text accompanying notes 144 and 192.
107. 974 F.2d at 788.
108. 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984).
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had removed the action to the bankruptcy court in which the debtor's
Chapter 11 case was pending. The order of confirmation in the Chapter 11
case was entered within three months after the removal of the state court
action. Because the creditor received no formal notice of the confimnation
hearing, the court declared the creditor to be deprived of a constitutionally
guaranteed opportunity to dispute the discharge of his claim. 0 9
109. Id. at 623 Compare the following statement by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in the preceding year:
When the holder of a large, unsecured claim ...

receives any notice

from the bankruptcy court that its debtor has initiated bankruptcy proceedings,
it is under constructive or inquiry notice that its claim may be affected, and
it ignores the proceedings to which the notice refers at its peril. "Whatever
is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for
inquiry, is notice of everything to which such inquiry may have led. When a
person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed to
be conversant of it."
Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1983)
(quoting D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff'd, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit's statement in Gregory is
quoted and approved in Robbins v. Amoco Prod. Co., 952 F.2d 901, 908 (5th Cir.
1992). The correctness of Reliable Elec.'s analysis of the mandate of due process is
further examined infra part II.B.4.
Kenneth Klee, one of the principal draftsmen of the Bankruptcy Code and a coauthor of a critique of the Reliable Electric court's opinion, characterized the Tenth
Circuit's decision denying the discharge in this case as "infamous." Kenneth N. Klee &
Frank A. Merola, Ignoring CongressionalIntent. Eight Years ofJudicialLegislation, 62
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 22 (1988). Klee and Merola criticized the Reliable Electric case for
its unreasonable expansion of the scope of due process on three grounds: (1) The court
refused to recognize that a creditor's knowledge of the existence of its debtor's
reorganization case constituted effective notice that provided an opportunity for the
creditor to act to protect its claim in the case. Id. at 22-25; cf. Lawrence Tractor Co. v.
Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that creditor's
claim against convicted embezzler in Chapter 13 case was discharged notwithstanding
creditor's objection to sufficiency of notice of creditors' meeting to satisfy due process
requirements for effectuating discharge). (2) The court elevated the notice of the confirmation hearing rather than notice of the bar date for filing claims to constitutional status.
(3) Rather than extending the bar date for the complaining creditor to file its claim, the
court simply held the creditor's claim to be nondischargeable. Compare In re Intaco
P.R., Inc., 494 F.2d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 1974) (not requiring acceptanceof a claim that the
court authorized to be filed postconfirmation, but opining that the problems of
administration engendered by its decision were "not beyond the ken of the court on
remand"); see also In re Harbor Tank Storage Co., Inc., 385 F.2d 111, 115 (3d Cir.
1967); In re Moskowitz, 35 B.R. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (creditor allowed extension of
time for filing proof of claim in view of fact that, although it knew of pendency of
debtor's reorganization case, creditor had not received timely notice prescribed by rule;
since no plan had been confirmed, opinion emphasized that dischargeability of claim not
in issue).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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In Broomall Industries v. Data Design Logic Systems, Inc. 10 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied the benefit of discharge of
a patent infringement claim to a debtor although the creditor arguably had
actual notice of the pendency of the debtor's Chapter 11 case. The court
cited and followed New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. and Reliable Electric in
discounting the debtor's evidence and argument respecting the creditor's
knowledge of the reorganization case and reversed the district court's
summary judgment for the debtor based on that evidence."' The debtor
had been informed of the claim three years before filing its petition, but had
not scheduled the claim, apparently on the assumption that the claim had
been abandoned. As a result, the claimant was never served with notice of
any of the proceedings in the case.
Klee and Merola read the Broomall opinion as treating every entity that
has threatened to litigate a claim as a known creditor entitled to notice of a
reorganization case, so long as the statute of limitations has not run against
the claim." 2 The opinion does not appear to go quite so far, however,
since it merely reversed the district court's summary judgment based on that
court's conclusion that the debtor was without notice of the creditor's claim.
The opinion moreover recognized that the debtor might still assert the
defenses of laches and estoppel in the trial of the case. The court noted that,
in any event, there was no indication in the record that notice by publication
had been given to unknown claimants as required by Mullane. ' 3
As Klee and Merola observed, the implication of the Broomall opinion
extends beyond that of Mullane in requiring the debtor to provide constructive notice by publication to unknown claimants, even though the debtor is
unaware of the existence of such claimants. In view of the rising risk of
liability for environmental damage of which a debtor or plan proponent has
no inkling, every plan proponent may be well advised to publish notices of
not only the initiation of a reorganization case, but also of bar dates and the
confirmation hearing."I However, to read the Fifth Amendment as

The court's opinion in Reliable Electric indeed appears to go so far as to suggest
that the failure of a creditor to be "properly notified of all vital steps in the proceeding
so they may have the opportunity to protect their interests" constitutes a constitutional
defect invalidating the discharge. Reliable Elec., 726 F.2d at 623.
110. 786 F.2d 401 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
111. Id. at 495-506.
112. Klee & Merola, supra note 109, at 26.
113. Broomall, 786 F.2d at 404.
114. See MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION, 693-94 (1987).
Commenting on In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., abstracted supra note
106, Randolph Haines suggested the following practice pointer derived from this
decision:
[D]ebtors that own or have owned real property should always give actual
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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imposing an obligation to give such notice in all or even most reorganization
cases may impose a questionable burden on a debtor seeking reorganization.
The court in Broomall observed that "Fifth Amendment due process
consideration take precedence over the discharge provisions of section 1141
of the Bankruptcy Code, in cases where the debtor has knowledge of claims
and fails to inform claimants of the pendency of the proceeding."'"1
In Spring Valley Farms, Inc. v. Crow (In re Spring Valley Farms,
Inc.)," 6 the court denied a Chapter 11 debtor the benefit of discharge
from nuisance and trespass claims of property owners who had knowledge
of the Chapter 11 case but received no official notice of the bar date for
filing claims set by the bankruptcy court. The court relied on Bankruptcy
Rule 2002(a)(8), which prescribes a 20-day notice requirement for the filing
of proofs of claim, and referred to the "[c]onsiderable support" for the
17
claimants' assertion that due process required compliance with the rule. 1
notice to the state environmental agency and the EPA, and also attempt to
provide constructive notice through newspaper publication. The Milwaukee
Road case suggests that such constructive notice will be sufficient to discharge
environmental claims if (1) the identity of the potential claimant is unknown
to the debtor, and (2) the potential claimant has reason to know of the
existence of the pollution and potential liability of the debtor for it.
Randolph J. Haines, Seventh CircuitRequires Knowledge for an Environmental Claim
to Arise, NORTON BANKR. L. ADvIsER, Oct. 1992, at 10.

For a case going far to suggest the publication of notice of the filing and perhaps
other events in every Chapter 11 case, see Orcon, Inc. v. Nevada Emergency Servs.,
Inc. (In re Nevada Emergency Servs., Inc.), 39 B.R. 859 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984). The
claimant had filed a postconfirmation tort and contract action against the reorganized
debtor, and the court held that it was precluded by the requirements of due process from
dismissing the action. The plaintiff alleged that it did not know of the pendency of the
defendant's Chapter 11 case at the time of the confirmation of its plan, and the court
assumed that the debtor did not know of the existence of the plaintiffs claims. The court
appeared to regard the case law to require publication of notice in order to bind any
unknown claimant to the terms of the confirmation of a plan. The court acknowledged
that the plaintiff should be characterized as a "claimant" rather than as a "creditor." See
also Southmark Corp. v. Cagan, 999 F.2d 216, 221 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure
of a mortgagee as debtor-in-possession in Chapter 11 case to give adequate notice to
receiver appointed in securities fraud class action to safeguard partnership assets allowed
receiver to press claims on behalf of defrauded investors in partnership assets
notwithstanding confirmation of plan that did not include investor's claims); McGlinn v.
Sullivan Ford Sales, Inc. (In re Sullivan Ford Sales, Inc.), 25 B.R. 400 (Bankr. D. Me.
1982) (holding that tort claimant was not barred by confirmation from suing debtor for
damages where claimant had no knowledge and did not receive official notice either of
filing of debtor's Chapter 11 case or of subsequent steps in case in time to file
preconfirmation proof of claim).
115. Broomall, 786 F.2d at 403.
116. 863 F.2d 832 (11th Cir. 1989).
117. Id. at 834. The court acknowledged, in a footnote, that actual knowledge by the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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2. The Scope of Debt Subject to Discharge
a. Liabilityfor Environmental Cleanup
Section 1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code declares that the confirmation
of a plan discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of
the confirmation. A "debt" is a liability on a claim." 8 These simple,
straightforward statements implicate two troublesome issues: (1) What is a
claim? and (2) When does the claim arise? A "claim" is broadly defined to
mean a "right to payment," whether fixed or contingent." 9
Two years after adoption of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 2 ° which imposes liability on persons responsible for contaminating sites with toxic wastes. CERCLA places responsibility for cleanup of
a site contaminated by toxic waste on (1) a current "owner" or "operator"
of the site, (2) a person who "owned" or "operated" the site at the time of
the contamination, (3) a person who arranged for the disposal of the waste,
and (4) a person who transported the waste to the site.' 2' A "responsible
party" (RP) or "potentially responsible party" (PRP) may be held liable to
whoever performs the cleanup or is ordered or -authorized to do so.
Does the liability thus imposed give rise to a claim under the Code, and if
so, is it discharged by confirmation of a plan under the Code?
The judicial treatment of environmental claims under the Bankruptcy
Code has been troubled by a difference of opinion as to whether such a
claim is governed by nonbankruptcy law or bankruptcy law. Confusion was
engendered by the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), now a
generally discredited precedent, 2 4 which held that a claim under the

claimants of the bar date itself rather than merely a general knowledge of the initiation
of bankruptcy proceedings might have changed the result. 1d. at 835 n.2. The court cited
In re Intaco P.R., Inc., 494 F.2d 94, 99-100 n.11 (1st Cir. 1974), where a similar
concession was made.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988).

119. Id. § 101(5)(A).
120. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).

121. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
122. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
123. 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
124. See California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 930
(9th Cir. 1993) (citing Arlene Elgart Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy
andEnvironmentalLaw,46 Bus. LAw. 623, 650 (1991)); BIENENSTOCK, supranote 114,
at 101-03 & n.14; Ralph Mabey & Annette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville, A Critiqueby the
NationalBankruptcy Conference's Committee on Claims andDistribution,42 Bus. LAW.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

45

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 4

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:621

Bankruptcy Code is to be assimilated to a cause of action under nonbankruptcy law."Z The result of that unfortunate coupling was that the inclusion of "unmatured" and "contingent" claims within the definition of
"claim" by section 101(5)6 of the Bankruptcy Code was effectively
negated. 7 Since CERCLA does not recognize a "cause of action" or
697 (1987); Charles E. Elmer, Comment, In re Chateaugay Corp.: To What Extent are
Contingent Claims *and Injunctive Remedies Under CERCLA Dischargeable in
Bankruptcy?, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 255, 281-83 (1992) (listing fifteen cases critical
of Frenville); see also In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co., 6 F.3d 1184,
1193 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing In re Jensen and quoting Mirsky et al., supra).
125. The court in Frenvilleheld that an implied right to indemnification or contribution
from the debtor for damages imposed on an accounting firm, but alleged to have been
caused by prepetition acts of the debtor, was nevertheless a postpetition claim because
it was not recognized as the basis for a lawsuit under state law prior to the institution of
a postpetition suit against the firm.
In Kilbarr Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. (In re Remington Rand Corp.), 836
F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit undertook to bridge the gap between its view

of a "claim" under the Bankruptcy Code and the prevailing view of the term. Kilbarr
presented the issue of whether the government should be permitted to file a contract
claim four years after confirmation of a debtor's plan. The government's justification for
the delay was that under the Contract Dispute Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 605(a), the
government had no right to payment until completion of a postaward audit, which had
occurred postconfirmation, and that the debtor had not notified the government of the bar
date for filing claims. The bankruptcy and district courts had sustained the government's
position, thus permitting the government to file a late claim. On appeal the court of
appeals reversed the lower courts' ruling which failed to recognize that the government
had a right to payment by virtue of a contingent and unliquidated claim that was
discovered five months before confirmation. The court acknowledged that Frenville had
"determined that state law governed the right to payment inquiry," but that "in some
cases, overriding policy would require us to consult federal law." Kilbarr Corp., 836
F.2d at 830. The court rejected the government's reliance on the provisions of the
Contract Dispute Act for determining when its claim arose, but did not explain how it
reached the conclusion that the claim arose before confirmation. The conclusion should
have been tantamount to a decision sustaining the debtor's right to a discharge but for the
conceded failure of the debtor to provide the government with proper notice of the bar
date until several months after confirmation. The court of appeals vacated the bankruptcy
court's order permitting the government to file its claim, with directions to the
bankruptcy court to determine "whether the government [had] any legal justification for
requesting the late filing of the late proof of claim." Id. at 833.
126. The definition of "claim" was moved from paragraph (4) to paragraph (5) of
§ 101 when the definition of "Federal depositary institutions regulatory agency" was
inserted as § 101(3) in 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-311, § 101, 104 Stat. 267, 268 (1990).
127. Elmer, supra note 124, at 305 ("[This view removes contingent claims from the
Code's definition of 'claim,' much as the former Bankruptcy Act's requirement of
provability and allowability did."). For an argument against the allowance of claims
before they have accrued under non-bankruptcy law, see Gregory A. Bibler, The Status
of UnaccruedTort Claims in Chapter11 Bankruptcy Proceedings,61 AM. BANKR. L.J.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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"right to payment" unless and until "necessary costs of response" have been
incurred,' a debtor's violation of environmental laws, without more,
would not, according to this analysis, give rise to a claim allowable or dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.
In 1980, the year of CERCLA's enactment, Carter Day Industries filed
a petition for relief under Chapter 11, and October 29, 1982 was fixed as
the bar date for filing claims against the estate. In 1981 a Carter Day
subsidiary, which operated two landfills, filed a Chapter 7 petition. The
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection filed claims to cover
closure costs against both Carter Day and its subsidiary in their respective
cases. The claim against Carter Day was disallowed, apparently because the
subsidiary, rather than Carter Day, was liable. A plan of reorganization was
confirmed in Carter Day's case in December of 1983. EPA fied no claims
against Carter Day, but filed a claim against the subsidiary in its Chapter 7
case in 1986. The claim against the subsidiary was allowed in the amount
of $50,000, but the subsidiary's estate had no assets. Carter Day then filed
a declaratory judgment proceeding in its case seeking a determination that
any EPA claim relating to the sites occupied by its subsidiary had been
discharged by the confirmation order of 1983.
The district court held that the issue was not ripe,' 29 and the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed after noting a conflict between the
policies reflected in the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA. 30 The court of
appeals accepted the EPA's argument that, because the agency had not yet
decided whether it would act against Carter Day, the court's discretionary
jurisdiction should not be exercised. The court added invidious comments

145 (1987).
128. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B); AL Tech Specialty Steel
Corp. v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 126 B.R. 919, 925 (W.D.
Pa. 1991) (stating that claim of purchaser of steel plants from debtor's predecessor for
response costs incurred and to be incurred was dischargeable only with respect to
facilities where actual response costs were incurred prepetition; remanding case to
determine extent costs were actually incurred at several sites); United States v. Price, 577
F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D.N.J. 1983) (holding that EPA does not to have a cause of action
under § 107(a) of CERCLA until it spends money on cleanup).
129. Carter Day Indus. v. United States EPA (In re Combustion Equip. Assocs.), 73
B.R. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988).
130. 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988). In addition to contrasting the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA, the court noted that the two statutes differed in their
"timing" inasmuch as Congress delayed litigation about cleanup costs until after the
cleanup, whereas the Bankruptcy Code often accelerates litigation by allowing estimation
of contingent liabilities. Id. at 37. By avoiding or postponing the litigation of the
dischargeability of the liability for cleanup costs, the court implemented CERCLA's
policy to the detriment of the debtor, who was left with a potential liability impending
indefinitely notwithstanding the confirmation five years earlier.
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regarding Carter Day's failure to schedule any claim by EPA or to litigate
the claim prior to confirmation.' The court also expressed sympathy for
the burden that would have been imposed on the EPA had it been required
to litigate Carter Day's complaint and similar complaints involving immature
claims. 3 2 Aside from its recitation of the conflict in the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA, the court expressed no concern respecting
the impact on Carter Day of the declination to determine the issue of
dischargeability of EPA's claim for cleanup costs. The opinion did,
however, confront and discuss tentatively how EPA's claim could be held
not to be ripe at the time of its decision and yet have been ripe during the
pendency of the reorganization case five years earlier. Without disposing
finally of the question, the court observed that "[o]ne answer is that the
bankruptcy court's power to estimate contingent liabilities, 11 U.S.C. §
502(c), substitutes for ripeness," and that "the fact that some claims could
be estimated does not mean that those claims could be ripe for resolution
after confirmation."133 The opinion hardly provided a road map for
potentially responsible parties, potential claimants, or bankruptcy courts for
dealing with the dischargeability of liabilities for future response costs under
environmental legislation.
In United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal,134 Taracorp, a debtor
who owned smelting facilities in Illinois, had been discharged in a Chapter
11 case in 1985. EPA sued Taracorp in 1990 for recovery of CERCLA
response costs relating to a Minnesota site to which the debtor had delivered
battery casings in the 1980s. The debtor sought dismissal on the ground that
its CERCLA liability was discharged by the confirmation order entered in
1985. District Judge Murphy denied the requested relief on the ground that
since no response costs had been incurred by EPA at the time of the
confirmation, the mere release of hazardous substances by Taracorp was
insufficient to create a legal obligation constituting a claim that could be
discharged. The court explicitly predicated its conclusion on the proposition
that the relevant substantive law was CERCLA and that to establish a legal
obligation under CERCLA "the United States must have incurred necessary

131. Id. at 39:
...Carter Day's concern over its fresh start seems somewhat disingenuous
since it did not include its potential CERCLA liability in the required
bankruptcy schedule of liabilities and since it evidently did not attempt to
litigate that liability in the bankruptcy court before confirmation of the plan
of reorganization, even though the PRP letters were received prior to

confirmation.
132. Id. at 40.
133. Id.
134. 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
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costs in responding to the release at the facility.""'

In rejecting

Taracorp's argument that its contingent liability gave rise to a contingent
claim, however, the court referred to the lack of knowledge by EPA or
Taracorp that a CERCLA claim could or would arise years later. In support
of its position Taracorp cited the recent district court decision, United States
v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),'36 which recognized that

release of hazardous substances may give rise to dischargeable contingent
claims in advance of the actual incurring of the costs. The Union court
answered that the context of Chateaugay was quite different because the
claim there arose during "ongoing bankruptcy proceedings"; but the court
implied that if EPA had been shown to have had knowledge of its potential
CERCLA claims in time to file timely claims in the reorganization case, the
result might have been different. 3 '
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court
in In re Chateaugay Corp. 3 8 In a seminal opinion Circuit Judge Newman
undertook to articulate and explain some of the implications of the relevant
statutory provisions of CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code. Before LTV
filed a Chapter 11 petition under the Bankruptcy Code, EPA had identified
LTV as a PRP at fourteen sites and had expended $32 million dollars in a
partial cleanup. After LTV filed its Chapter 11 petition, EPA filed a claim
for reimbursement of the response costs. The EPA sought a declaratory
judgment with respect to the dischargeability of the claims for prepetition
response costs that had not yet been incurred. The district court and the
court of appeals held that the claims were dischargeable to the extent they
were based on a prepetition release or threatened release of hazardous
substances, regardless of when the costs were incurred and when they were
39
discovered or discoverable.1

135. 1d. at 835.
136. 112 B.R. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
137. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. at 836.
138. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
139. 112 B.R. at 521-22; 944 F.2d at 1005. Chateaugay was followed in In re
Cottonwood Canyon Land Co., 146 B.R. 992, 998 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992). The opinion
of the court of appeals in Chateaugay has been the subject of extensive comment. See,
e.g., Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Fundamental
Framework,

44 FLA. L. REV. 154, 171, 191-97, 204 (1992); Nancy H. Kratzke,

DischargeabilityIssues and Superfund Claims: The Conflict Between Environmentaland
Bankruptcy Policies, 17 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 381, 392-94 (1992); James K. McBain,
Environmental Impediments to Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 68 IND. L.J. 233, 238-40
(1992); Marion M. Walsh, The Dischargeabilityof Post-ConfirmationCERCLA Liability
in Bankruptcy: In re Chateaugay and Beyond, 1 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 95 (1992); Elmer,
supra note 124; John P. Berkery, Comment, The Dischargeabilityof CERCLA Cleanup
Costs IncurredAfter Bankruptcy, 9 BANKR. DEv. J. 417 (1992); Lowell E. Blackham,
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Note, The Unstoppable Force Hits the Immovable Wall: Should Environmental Cleanup
Liability Be Dischargedin Bankruptcy?, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1357, 1382-85 (1992);
Jill Thompson Losch, Comment, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations:Clash of the
Titans, 52 LA. L. REv. 137, 171 (1991); Christina L. Diaz, Recent Decisions Note,
EnvironmentalLaw-BankruptPollutersCannotAvoidEnvironmentalResponsibilities-In
re Chateaugay Corp., 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1053 (1992); Patrick D. Shaw, Comment, See
No Evil, Speak No Evil: DischargingCERCLA Claims in Bankruptcy Without Notice, 6
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 127 (1992); Michael I. Shaftel, Note, CERCLA Injunctive Orders in
Chapter11 Bankruptcy:Fresh Start or Free Ride for the ReorganizedDebtor?, 17 VT.
L. REv. 281 (1992).
Professor Heidt criticized the Chateaugayopinion for adding a requirement to the
definition of "claim," namely, that there be no ongoing pollution, and for confusing the
definition of "claim" with the timing of the claim insofar as the Chateaugay court held
that cleanup obligations are not "claims" and therefore not dischargeable if cleanup will
end or ameliorate current pollution. See 44 FLA. L. REV. at 171, 191-96. She also
criticized the result of the court's decision to encourage the EPA to delay cleanup in
order to avoid transforming an obligation into a dischargeable claim. See id. at 196-97.
After reviewing the extensive case law embraced by the title of her article,
Professor Kratzke recommended the addition of an exception for "environmental claims"
to § 523's list of nondischargeable claims, evidencing no awareness of the policy of
§ 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code and of the inapplicability of § 523 to corporate and
partnership debtors.
Mr. McBain criticized the nexus between a release and the contemplation of
contingencies required by Chateaugayand Chateaugay'screation of an incentive for the
EPA to couple a nonclaim injunction with its cleanup orders, thereby jeopardizing the
feasibility of a reorganization plan.
Ms. Walsh criticized Chateaugayfor its susceptibility to conflicting interpretations:
(1) that before a contingent claim can be discharged, it must result from
prepetition conduct fairly giving rise to the claim in light of a regulatory
relationship between the debtor and the EPA and (2) that EPA's cost recovery
claims arise in bankruptcy merely upon the actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance.
1 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. at 126. The article concluded with an argument for adoption by
the courts of "the 'fairly contemplated' contractual standard employed in Union Scrap
in conjunction with the factors enumerated in In re Gypsum," discussed infra text
accompanying notes 149-156.
The commentator in the American Journal of Trial Advocacy acknowledged that the
Chateaugayopinion followed congressional intent in the Bankruptcy Code, but expressed
concern at the "alarming prospect of businesses discharging millions of dollars in
unknown, contingent environmental liabilities in Chapter 11 reorganizations." 16 Am.
J. TRIAL ADvoc. at 304. The commentator concluded that the court's narrow view of
injunctive claims, discussed infra text accompanying notes 163-172, which permits
imposition of liability for "on-going pollution," resulted in a "practicable balance
between the policies and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA." 16 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. at 304.
The commentator in the Bankruptcy Developments Law Journal approved
Chateaugay's determination that EPA's claim arose with the prepetition release of
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Two months after the decision in Chateaugay, Judge Murphy was again
presented with the question whether confirmation of a reorganization
discharged a debtor's liability for potential response costs incurred or about
to be incurred four years after the confirmation. 140 The court no longer
treated the issue as one controlled by CERCLA, but rejected the debtor's
argument that its contingent liability was discharged because the EPA had
no knowledge of the debtor's potential liability in time to file a claim before
confirmation. Before confirmation, both the EPA and a state environmental
agency were informed of the pendency of the debtor's reorganization case
and that the debtor was a potentially responsible party in respect to
environmental violations; however, the court concluded that the information
was insufficient to enable governmental agencies to file timely claims in the
debtor's reorganization case.'"I The court acknowledged that the debtor
was unaware of its potential liability before confirmation. The agency's lack
of sufficient knowledge of its potential claim was deemed to excuse it from
filing a timely claim, but the debtor's lack of knowledge of its potential
liability afforded it no excuse for failing to notify the agency. The court

hazardous waste, but criticized as a "dangerous and unjust precedent" its ruling that such
a claim was dischargeable with respect to sites where the debtor had not adequately
informed the EPA by its schedules of the amount, type, and location of hazardous waste
materials that might be attributed to the debtor. 9 BANKR. DEv. J. at 445, 450-51.
The Creighton Law Review and Vermont Law Review commentators argued for
congressional legislation declaring environmental-cleanup liability nondischargeable and
for judicial recognition of paramountcy of environmental protection laws over bankruptcy
laws.
The Louisiana Law Review commentator attributed to the district court's ruling in
Chateaugay, 112 B.R. at 513, the establishment of "a clear cut rule: unless a prepetition
event ... occurs prior to the filing of the petition, any subsequent liability under
CERCLA would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy." The validity of that proposition
is examined infra part II.B.7. The comment concluded with an argument for deeming
environmental obligations to be nondischargeable.
The Temple Law Review commentator approved the Chateaugayopinion's limiting
the protection available to a polluter in bankruptcy from liability for environmental
violations, but criticized (1) the court's failure to establish clear guidelines for
determining the relationship between a creditor and the debtor to bring a contingent claim
within the bankruptcy proceeding; (2) the court's failure to provide guidance for
determining whether equitable remedies are dischargeable in bankruptcy; and (3) the
court's failure to consider whether compliance with certain injunctions might be too
onerous to permit some debtors to survive bankruptcy.
The commentator in Tulane Environmental Law Journal criticized Chateaugayand
Jensen for promoting "evasive and treacherous" corporate behavior by permitting PRPs
to obtain discharge from liability for CERCLA cleanup costs without providing notice.
6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. at 156.
140. Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648 (D. Minn. 1991).
141. Id. at 653.
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justified its ruling as supported by the federal and state environmental
legislation, but made no -reference to the fresh start policy of the bankruptcy
laws.
In two railroad reorganization cases under section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit unequivocally adopted a
position in accord with Chateaugay.4 1 The first decision, In re CMC
HeartlandPartners,declared enforcement of any liability of the owner or
its predecessor for response costs incurred pursuant to CERCLA section
107(a)(2) during the pendency of reorganization proceedings to be barred by
the confirmation order and injunction entered at the end of the reorganization case. EPA knew of the potential liability for the dumping that preceded
the entry of the bar date for filing of claims in the reorganization case, but
did not file a claim. The opinion of the court evinced a sensibility of the
discharge policy of bankruptcy laws often
missing in cases dealing with
43
claims arising under environmental laws.

142. In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
143. See 966 F.2d at 1146:
A fundamental idea of bankruptcy is that bygones should not prevent the
best current deployment of assets. Sunk costs and their associated promises
to creditors create problems of allocation when the firm cannot pay its debts
as they come due. But assets that cannot generate enough revenue to pay all
claims may still produce net profits from current operations. So bankruptcy
cleaves the firm in two. Existing claims must be satisfied exclusively from
existing assets, while the "new" firm, created as of the date the petition is
filed, carries on to the extent current revenues allow. Old debts will drag
down current operations unless they are pooled and paid (or written) off
together, so old claims may not be asserted against current operations. The
idea of CERCLA is that sunk wastes differ from sunk costs. Seepage reduces
current welfare as stale debts and like bygones do not, and it may be cheaper
to purge or encapsulate the wastes than to let sleeping dogs lie.
(citations omitted); see also California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen),
995 F.2d 925, 929-30 (9th Cir. 1993), commented on by Karen Donovan, Debtors Can
Walk Away: Middle Course Taken on Cleanups, NAT'L L.J. . June 28, 1993, at 3, 31;
Myron A. Eng, Note, In re Jensen: Determining When A Bankruptcy Claim Arises in the
Context of EnvironmentalLiability,23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 259 (1993) cf. Carter
Day Indus. v. United States EPA (In re Combustion Equip. Assocs.), 838 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1988), discussed supra text accompanying note 131; In re National Gypsum Co.,
139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992), discussedinfra text accompanying note 148; Sylvester
Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648 (D. Minn. 1991), discussedsupra
text accompanying note 140; United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831
(D. Minn. 1990), discussed supra text accompanying note 134.
A substantial body of law review literature discusses the intersection of bankruptcy
and environmental law. Student notes and comments typically criticize decisions that
appear to resolve conflicts by relieving debtors from liability for environmental damage
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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The Seventh Circuit adhered to its view of the dischargeability of
claims for contingent response costs in In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pacific Railroad Co.'" Before holding that the preconfirmation purchaser of property from the railroad had a CERCLA claim that should have
been filed before the close of its debtor's bankruptcy case, the court
determined that the claimant had tied the "bankrupt debtor to a known
release of a hazardous substance which the potential claimant [knew
would] ...

lead to CERCLA response costs."145 The potential claimant

thus had a contingent claim. The court emphasized that the cases requiring
response costs to be actually incurred before claims could therefore be filed
and discharged would encourage delay in administration of bankruptcy
cases, postpone access to fresh start, and frustrate the public interest in
speedy cleanup of hazardous sites.146 The court distinguished rulings in
cases denying discharge of claims based on CERCLA when the consummation order was adopted before the enactment of the statute creating the
47
liability.

1

and argue for legislative change strengthening the enforceability of remedies and
sanctions under environmental laws. See, e.g., Kratzke, supra note 139; Elmer, supra
note 124; Berkery, supra note 139; Kahn, supra note 85; Blackham, supra note 139;
Losch, supra note 139; Kevin J. Saville, Note, Discharging CERCLA Liability in
Bankruptcy:When Does a Claim Arise? 76 MiNN. L. REV. 327 (1991); J. Ricky Arriola,
Note, The Life & Times of a CERCLA Claim in Bankruptcy: An Examination of
HazardousWaste Liability in BankruptcyProceedings,67 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 55 (1993);
Shaw, supra note 139; Shaftel, supra note 139.
A higher level of deference to bankruptcy objectives is reflected in the following
discussions: John R. Allison & John A. Rizzardi, Effects of Bankruptcy on Environmental
Liabilities, 28 TORT. & INS. L.J. 636 (1993); Joel M. Gross & Suzanne Lacampagne,

Bankruptcy Estimation of CERCLA Claims: The Processand the Alternatives, 12
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 235 (1993); Heidt, supra note 139; McBain, supra note 139; Roy B.
True, Dischargeabilityof CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy, 61 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 329
(1992); Sullivan, supra note 85; Walsh, supra note 139; Diaz, supra note 139; Robert
R. Graves, Comment, The Interactionof the Bankruptcy Code andEnvironmentalLaws:
The Grit, the Grind, and the Grease, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV.297 (1993).
144. 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992), discussedsupra text accompanying note 106 and
infra note 192.
145.Id. at 786.
146. Id. The court's criticisms were directed at Union Scrap Iron &Metal, discussed
supra text accompanying notes 134-137, and Sylvester Bros., discussed supra text
accompanying notes 140-141.
147. The court distinguished In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992), and United States v. Serafini, 135 B.R. 219
(M.D. Pa. 1991), on the ground stated in the text. 974 F.2d at 784-85. CERCLA had
been held constitutionally applicable to acts committed before its enactment. United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-37 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). See generally Developments-Toxic Waste
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

53

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:621

Recent judicial opinions, building on the structure erected by the
Chateaugaycase, have added another requirement or standard to the concept
of an allowable claim or contingent claim for future response and natural
resource damage costs-namely, that the claim be based on conduct fairly
within the contemplation of the partiesat the time of the debtor's bankruptcy148 The opinions listed illustrative factors as relevant in determining
whether fair contemplation can occur in a particular case. In In re National
Gypsum Co. the court identified the following factors: "knowledge by the
parties of a site in which a PRP [potentially responsible party] may be
liable, NPL [National Priorities Listing] list, notification by EPA of PRP
liability, commencement of investigation and cleanup activities, and
incurrence of response costs."' 49 In AM International, Inc. v. Datacard
Corp., a postconfirmation purchaser of contaminated property once owned
by a Chapter 11 debtor asserted claims against the debtor. The court
identified the following factors: the purchaser's awareness, before its
purchase, of the debtor's releases of hazardous materials at the site; the role
of the purchaser's awareness of environmental risks in the purchase price for
the property; the purchaser's contemplation of suit against the debtor when
incurring response costs three years after confirmation of the debtor's
reorganization; and the contemplation of environmental risks by the original
purchaser of the debtor's property at the time of the purchase over two years
prior to the filing of the debtor's Chapter 11 petition. 5 '

Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1555-65 (1986). Although Kaiser Steel Corporation

was reorganized and presumably discharged of preconfirmation liabilities in 1988, United
Mine Workers Association has recently advised the company of its position that the

discharge did not extinguish the company's liability for premiums levied under the Coal
Industry Retiree Benefit Act of 1992 enacted after consummation of the Kaiser Steel
Company's reorganization.
148. California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 929-30
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that individual Chapter 7 debtors were discharged from liability
for environmental cleanup costs, even though the debtors were not notified of the state's

contingent claim until after the case was closed); In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R.
397 (N.D. Tex. 1992); AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 146 B.R. 391 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
149. 139 B.R. at 408. In his opinion in In re National Gypsum Co. Judge Sanders
characterized Chateaugay as a landmark case in "reading together the statutory
framework of CERCLA and the Code" by using "the bankruptcy concept of contingent
claims to bring future CERCLA response and damage costs within the ambit of present
discharge proceedings under the Code." Id. at 405-06. Judge Sanders nevertheless
declared that he was unwilling to favor the Bankruptcy Code's objective of a "fresh
start" to the extent exhibited in Chateaugay.He questioned the implication in Chateaugay

that liability for all costs relating to prepetition conduct be discharged irrespective of
whether these costs were fairly within the contemplation of the parties prepetition.

150. 146 B.R. at 409.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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The issue of dischargeability in National Gypsum arose on challenges
to proofs of claims filed or to be filed on behalf of the United States under
CERCLA in a pending Chapter 11 case. The court's opinion settled the
allowability and dischargeability of claims for future costs to be incurred at
seven listed sites and extended the bar date for the filing of claims relating
to thirteen unlisted sites in view of the unique and extraordinary circumstances deemed to excuse delay in filing.'"' The issue in AM International,
however, arose eight years after confirmation of the debtor's reorganization
plan. Indeed, there was no evidence of knowledge of the release of
hazardous material prior to the filing of the debtor's Chapter 11 petition.
The opinion of the magistrate judge in AM International embraced the
rationale of Judge Sanders' opinion in National Gypsum as fully applicable
to the different facts in the case before him.' 52 However, the district court,
while apparently adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation for a
factual determination with respect to the claimants' knowledge of the risk of
incidence of response costs, explicitly declined to adopt the "'fair contemplation' test per se." 1'53 The factors recited in the magistrate judge's
opinion were nevertheless deemed to be relevant to the inquiry framed by
the Seventh Circuit opinion in the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
Railroadcase for determining when a claim or contingent claim for response
costs arises. 5 4
The imposition of a "fair contemplation" gloss on the recognition of a
"claim or contingent claim" for CERCLA response costs subjects both
claimants and debtors to enormous uncertainty. Furthermore, this gloss
subjects the administration of Chapter 11 cases involving premises
susceptible to potential claims for environmental damage to an escalation of
litigation, unpredictability, expense, and delay. 5 5 Determining the "fair
contemplation" in cases where the case is closed requires the court to permit
discovery of former states of mind. The testimony of disinterested witnesses
will be rare. The "fair contemplation" requirement also allows the court
leeway for weighing the policy considerations involved in determining the
dischargeability issue in Chapter 11 cases and subjects the availability of the
fresh start in such cases to judgments that depend on the judges' policy
preferences.
It is to be noted that District Judge Sanders in National Gypsum

151. 139 B.R. at 401-09.
152. 146 B.R. at 401, 406-10.
153. Id. at 394.
154. Id.
155. See Jeffrey J.Harmon, et al., Surviving a Collision at the Intersection of
CERCLA and the Code, 20 N. KY. L. REv. 47, 70-72 (1992); McBain, supra note 139,
at 238 n.37.
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disagreed with the opinion of Circuit Judge Newman as to whether "the
placing of hazardous substances in sealed containers pre-petition, followed
by release of the substances into the environment years after confirmation"
is a claim.' 56 Similarly, as noted above,' 57 District Judge Norgle in AM
International was unwilling to adopt the "'fair contemplation' test per
58
se." 1

b. Mandatory Injunction as a Claim; Claims that
Run with the Land
The Bankruptcy Code defines a "claim" to include a "right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if the breach gives rise to a
right to payment."' 59 The question arose in United States v. Whizco,
Inc. '60 whether the government's right to a mandatory injunction under the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act161 gave rise to a dischargeable claim. That Act, unlike CERCLA, gives the government no cost
recovery alternative, but only a right to a mandatory injunction requiring
restoration of a mine surface area to its natural condition. Nevertheless, the
court in Whizco held that the government's right under the Surface Mining
Act constituted a dischargeable claim since the injunction required the debtor
to spend money to correct a condition created prepetition.'61 2

156. 139 B.R. at 407 n.24.
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

146 B.R. at 394.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)03) (1988).
841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988).
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Whizco, 841 F.2d at 149-51. Like Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Kovacs (In re Kovacs),

717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 469 U.S. 274 (1985), Whizco was a Chapter 7 case,
and the court of appeals relied on and quoted its opinion in Kovacs. The Whizco court
insisted, however, that its holding was very narrow and did not discharge the debtor of
any obligation to comply with a governmental order that could be performed without
spending money. Whizco, 841 F.2d at 150-51. For discussion of Whizco, see Allison &
Rizzardi, supra note 143, at 644 (noting that Chateaugayis contra to Whizco); Heidt,
supra note 139, at 190-91 (stating that Whizco went too far by transforming an equitable
remedy into a "claim," but not far enough to give a debtor a fresh start); Linda
Johannsen, Note, United States v. Whizco, Inc.: A FurtherRefinement of the Conflict
Between Bankruptcy DischargesandEnvironmental Cleanup Obligations,20 ENVTL. L.
207 (1990).
Whizco was criticized in United States v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160, 165, 167 (W.D.
Pa. 1990), aff'd per curiam, 928 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1991), as contrary to the rationales
of Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985), and Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of
Environmental Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). The Hubler court construed
these precedents to authorize discharge only where the government has the option of
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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In the Chateaugay case 63 the district court considered which environmental claims based on injunctions were dischargeable. The district court
declared
that claims for injunctive relief based on a pre-petition release or
threatened release would be dischargeable if the injunctive relief was an
option EPA was electing to use in lieu of incurring response costs itself
and thereafter seeking reimbursement; on the other hand, ... "where
there is no right to such payment for cleanup or other remedial costs,
claims for injunctive relief
do not fall within the Bankruptcy [Code] and
64
are not dischargeable."1
The court of appeals found the district court's analysis flawed and offered
the following explanation:
Since there is no option to accept payment in lieu of continued pollution,
any order that to any extent ends or ameliorates continued pollution is
not an order for breach of an obligation that gives rise to a right of
payment and is for that reason not a "claim." But an order to clean up
a site, to the extent that it imposes obligations distinct from any
obligation to stop or ameliorate ongoing pollution, is a "claim" if the
creditor obtaining the order had the option, which CERCLA confers, to
do the cleanup work itself and sue for response costs, thereby converting
the injunction into a monetary obligation.165
The court added "that most environmental injunctions will fall on the nonclaim side of the line." On that understanding, the court affirmed the district
court's ruling concerning injunctions. 6 The court made no reference to

converting an affirmative injunction into a right to monetary compensation. Although the
debtor partners in Hubler were discharged from pecuniary liability for violation of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, the partnership and the partners were
enjoined to comply with abatement obligations specified in a cessation order issued by
the Office of Surface Mining, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture. The debtor partners did not
contest the government's disclaimer of authority to accept monetary payment in lieu of
performance.
163. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.
1991).
164. Id. at 1000 (quoting In re Chateaugay, 112 B.R. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
165. Id. at 1008. Michael Shaftel, in his note in the Vermont Law Review, epitomized
the Chateaugay opinion's treatment of injunctions by reading it to render affirmative
injunctions dischargeable and negative injunctions nondischargeable. Shaftel, supra note
139, at 315.
166. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008. In reversing a bankruptcy court order that held
a Chapter 11 debtor's obligation under state law to clean up environmental contamination
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Whizco or to the rationale that a mandatory injunction should be treated as
a dischargeable claim whenever it imposes an obligation on the debtor to
spend money to remedy conditions that were created prepetition.
In In re CMC Heartland Partners6 7 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit adhered to the distinction drawn in Chateaugay when it
upheld EPA's order, entered pursuant to section 106(a) of CERCLA, that
directed the owner of the premises to abate "an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility. " 1 The court described the effect of section 106 of CERCLA as
creating a claim that runs with the land.' 9 An order of abatement under
section 106 may issue against an owner-operator notwithstanding the entry
by the court of a confirmation order that discharged liability for a preconfirmation act constituting a release or threatened release of a contami70
nant.
The opinion of the court of appeals in Chateaugay has been appropriately criticized for its refusal to recognize that a claim exists if pollution
continues after the cleanup. "It creates an incentive for the EPA to avoid
cleaning up sites,"1 7' and to frame enforcement orders as nonclaim
injunctions to continue after confirmation so long as the debtor operates and
2
without reference to the future existence of the waste. 1

to be discharged by confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, the district court in Torwico
Electronics, Inc. v. New Jersey, 153 B.R. 24, 26 (D.N.J. 1992), aft'd, 8 F.3d 146 (3d

Cir. 1993), quoted the following conclusion from Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008: "[A]
cleanup order that accomplishes the dual objective of removing accumulated wastes and
stopping or ameliorating on-going pollution emanating from such wastes is not a
dischargeable claim." When the debtor in Torwico asserted that it was no longer in
possession of the land from which wastes were seeping and migrating, the court
responded that since the debtor's wastes were presenting a continuing environmental
hazard, the debtor's cleanup obligation ran "with the waste." Torwico, 8 F.3d at 151.
The court added that the fact that the state may have had a alternative means at its
disposal to end the ongoing threat did not convert its statutory authority to a "right to
payment" constituting a dischargeable claim. Id. at 151 n.6.
167. 966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
168. Id. at 1147.
169. Id. at 1146; cf. David Gray Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some
Unifying Themes of Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Createdby Running Covenants,
ProductsLiability, and Toxic-Waste-Cleanup, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (1887).
170. A debtor who retains possession of contaminated property may have a continuing
obligation to comply with an injunction requiring remedial action. Allison & Rizzardi,
supra note 143, at 645; True, supra note 143, at 334. But cf. infra text accompanying
note 265.
171. Heidt, supra note 139, at 196.
172. McBain, supra note 139, at 238 n.37.
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3. When Does a Claim Arise? The Asbestos Cases

The issue, when does a claim arise, has become critical in a series of
cases involving harms inflicted by exposure to asbestos. The issue has been
troublesome in these cases because the exposure may precede manifestation
of resulting injury many years later. In Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail

Corp.,' former railroad workers, representatives, and survivors brought
tort actions against railroads pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.174 The railroads became Conrail pursuant to reorganization under
section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Conrail argued that the plaintiffs' claims
were discharged by the confirmation orders in the cases of its predecessors.
However, the court denied relief on the ground that the plaintiffs who did
not suffer manifestations of injury from asbestos exposure until after
consummation of the reorganization had no claims that were dischargeable
in the reorganization case. Although acknowledging that the holder of a
contingent claim could be a "creditor" under the Bankruptcy Act, the court
distinguished cases recognizing such a claim by noting that those cases had
required the existence of a relationship between the claimant and the debtor.
The Schweitzer found no such relationship between the debtor and the
claimants.
As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged in
Chateaugay, a considerable body of case law has declined to recognize a
"claim" in advance of some manifestation of injury." 5 The court in
Chateaugaynevertheless affirmed the district court's ruling that prepetition
claims arose when releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances
occurred. 17 6 The court discussed the necessity of a relationship between
the claimant and the debtor vaguely and tentatively, concluding that the
relationship between the EPA, as claimant, and the debtor, LTV, was "far

173. 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
174. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
175. 944 F.2d at 1004 (citing Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 944; In re Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); Gladding Corp. v. Forrer
(In re Gladding Corp.), 20 B.R. 566, 567-68 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). For an argument
that this body of case law is supported by constitutional, jurisdictional, and policy
considerations, see Bibler, supra note 127. For an argument that the Gladding case and
restrictive readings of the definition of "claim" and of § 1141(d)(1) are at odds with
congressional policy, see Harvey J. Kesner, FutureAsbestos RelatedLitigants as Holders
of Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and Their Place in the
Johns Manville Reorganization(Second Installment), 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 159 (1988).
The dilemma facing "environmental creditors" in deciding when or whether to file
a claim is discussed in Arlene Elgart Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy
and EnvironmentalLaws, 46 Bus. LAw. 623, 670-71 (1991).
176. 944 F.2d at 1005.
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closer than that existing between future tort claimants totally unaware of
injury and a tort-feasor.,"'
On remand in Schweitzer, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the claims of employees for injuries not manifested
at the time of confirmation could be maintained against the reorganized
debtor notwithstanding the transfer to a purchaser of the rail properties that
had inflicted the injuries.' 78 The court explained that the original tortfeasor
remained liable as a defendant, and the purchaser was intended by Congress
to be relieved of such liability in order to be able to meet regional
transportation service needs.179
However, when former employees of the Erie Lackawanna Railway
sued their former employer for asbestos-related injuries manifested after
consummation of its reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,
as supplemented by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied recovery, although the injuries were
due to preconfirmation exposure.8 0 The court's rationale was that,
because the debtor was liquidated rather than reorganized, its unsecured
creditors received only stock in a new entity not operating a railroad; thus,
it would be "palpably unjust" to impose on the new enterprise a massive
liability for asbestos-related injuries of former employees.' 8'
Two subsequent decisions followed the Erie Lackawanna decision in
upholding recoveries by former employees for asbestos-related injuries
discovered or reasonably discoverable only postconfirmation. '2
As the court's opinion in Chateaugay recognized, 83 the Manville and
Robins cases caused a significant reorientation, outside the Third Circuit, of
the judicial approach to the issue of when a claim arises. Johns-Manville
filed for relief under Chapter 11 because the corporation's potential liability

177. Id.
178. Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 65 B.R. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1986).

179. Id. at 798-802.
180. Erie Lackawanna Ry. v. Henning (In re Erie Lackawanna Ry.), 803 F.2d 881,
884-85 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987).

181. Id. at 884-85. The court suggested that the plaintiffs might still sue the
manufacturers and installers of the asbestos to which the former employees of the Erie
Lackawanna Ry. Co. had been exposed. Id. at 885.
182. Zulkowski v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 852 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir.) (Becker,
C.J., concurring but objecting to the majority's effort to rationalize Erie Lackawanna
Ry.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 994 (1988); Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986).
183. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1004 (citing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680,
686-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), with a "cf." reference to Grady v. A.H. Robins Co.,
839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 260 (1988), and In re Edge, 60
B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986)).
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for future injuries resulting from past exposure to asbestos would have
rendered the corporation insolvent. If the claims for such future injuries
could not be dealt with by a reorganization plan, the foreseeable consequence was repeated litigation and resort to relief under the Bankruptcy
Code until exhaustion of the assets of the debtor and liquidation of the
enterprise. A similar prospect faced the A.H. Robins Co. as a result of
pending and anticipated lawsuits on behalf of women injured by use of the
debtor's Dalkon shield.
In both Manville and Robins, the debtors proposed plans to deal with
claims of persons for injuries not yet manifested, by providing trust funds
out of which payments could be made to claimants who suffered postconfirmation injuries attributable to prepetition exposure. If persons who had
suffered no preconfirmation manifestation of injury had been denied any
right to payment out of funds set aside for the purpose pursuant to a plan,
the foreseeable result would have been distributions only to those who were
able to prove the existence and extent of their injuries as of the date of the
confirmation. The courts finessed the question whether persons who had
suffered no preconfirmation injuries had allowable claims, by approving the
establishment of trusts to which those suffering post confirmation injuries
might have recourse. In the meanwhile, the debtors and the trustees of the
trusts were protected by injunctions against challenges by claimants with
allowable claims." s
In the recent case of Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Aguiar s the
court rejected the debtor's argument that asbestosis claims of former
employees were discharged by a confirmation order entered in its reorganization case. Nevertheless, the court explicitly accepted the position adopted
in the Manville case that "a claim arises at the moment when acts giving rise
to the alleged liability are performed"-i, e., when the asbestosis claimants
184. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a recent unanimous opinion joined
the chorus of criticism of the cases that hold that a CERCLA claim does not arise until
response costs have been incurred. California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re
Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 928 (1993). The court noted that the courts have employed
varying approaches in determining when such a claim arises. The court observed that
neither Frenville, cited supra notes 123-125, nor Union Scrap, cited supranote 134, "has
had substantial impact." 995 F.2d at 928. After pointing out that the bankruptcy appellate
panel in the decision below had utilized the approach of In re Chateaugay Corp., cited
supra note 138, by deeming the claim to have arisen at the time of the debtor's conduct
relating to the contamination, the court of appeals acknowledged that the approach was
not immune from criticism. In particular the court noted that the approach permitted
discharge before the creditor knew or should have known of its rights. The court
nevertheless affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy appellate panel on the basis of a
finding that the claimant had imputed knowledge of the debtor's potential liability for
cleanup costs. See infra text accompanying notes 190-191.
185. 141 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 157 B.R. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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6

4. The Discharge of Claims of Knowledgeable Creditors
As pointed out earlier in this Article,in a claimant's knowledge of the
existence of its claim for environmental damage and response costs has been
given uneven and confusing treatment in judicial opinions. A claimant's
knowledge is ordinarily not an issue in a case where confirmation has not
occurred and the court is concerned with the scope of the claim and when
it arose.
In the Chapter 7 case of Jensen v. CaliforniaDepartment of Health
Services (In re Jensen),188 the bankruptcy appellate panel made no reference to the California department's knowledge of the existence of hazardous
waste on the property owned and occupied by the Jensens. The court held
that the department's claim for the cost of cleanup that occurred five years
after the filing of the bankruptcy petition was discharged.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
deferring to the opinion of Judge Sanders in National Gypsum,'89 looked
for "indicia of fair contemplation."'" The court found such an indicium
by imputing to the department the knowledge of another state agency of the
Jensens' potential liability for releasing a tank of fungicide. This knowledge
was deemed sufficient "to give rise to a contingent claim for cleanup costs
before the Jensens filed their bankruptcy petition. . . .The claim filed by
California DHS against the Jensens therefore was discharged in the Jensens'
bankruptcy. "191
In In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. "9the
court held that the claimant had sufficient information about contamination
resulting from a derailment to give rise to a claim or contingent claim before
the entry of a consummation order in the railroad debtor's reorganization.
The court reached this conclusion even though it found that the railroad did
not know of the contamination so as to be under a duty to give to the

186. Id. at 556. Thus, inUNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Industries,
124 B.R. 276 (N.D. Ill.
1990), the court held that preconfirmation claims based on
allegations of occupational disease and tort were discharged by confirmation of the plan

and that actions on such claims against the reorganized debtor were therefore prohibited
by § 524(a)(2).

187. See supra part II.B.2.
188. 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993).
189. In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 408 (N.D. Tex. 1992), cited supra

note 148.
190. Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930.

191. Id. at 931.
192. 974 F.2d 775, 778-89 (7th Cir. 1992).
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claimant notice of claim filing bar dates.
9
4
In In re Chateaugay Corp. the court held that preconfirmation
releases of hazardous substances by the debtor generated claims notwithstanding the fact that the EPA did not "know the full extent of the hazardous
waste removal costs that it may one day incur and seek to impose upon
LTV, and it [did] not yet even know the location of all the sites at which
such wastes may yet be found." 95 The court was satisfied, however, that
the location of the sites, the determination of their coverage by CERCLA,
and the incurring of response costs were "all steps that may fairly be
viewed, 96in the regulatory context, as rendering the EPA's claim 'contingent.'" 1
Several cases not involving exposure to toxic substances have presented
the question whether confirmation discharges a claim when neither the
debtor nor the creditor knows of the existence of the claim until after
confirmation. For example, in In re Penn Central Transportation Co.19
the claimant sought relief from the injunction imposed at the conclusion of
Penn Central's reorganization in order to pursue antitrust actions against the
reorganized company. The claimant argued that the consummation of the
reorganization should not bar its pursuit of the antitrust action against the
railroad because it was not advised of the effect the reorganization would
have. The claimant acknowledged that the trustees were likewise uninformed
of the facts alleged to be the basis for the cause of action. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit denied relief, explaining that the trustees of
the railroad were not required by due process or the reorganization statute
to provide information to potential claimants as to the character of their
claims.' 9
Several subsequent cases have cited the Penn Central decision, along
with other cases, 199 as authority for the proposition "'that all claims are

193. See also CMC Heartland Partners v. Union Pac. R.R. (In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.), 3 F.3d 200, 206-07 (7th Cir. 1993) (denying claim
of Union Pacific Railroad against successor trustee of the Milwaukee Road, reorganized
under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, for indemnification under CERCLA, because the
claimant railroad had constructive knowledge of its potential liability during the pendency
of the Milwaukee Road's reorganization case but failed to file a claim; Union Pacific's
claim under Washington state law remanded for further proceedings).
194. 944 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1991).
195. Id. at 1005.
196. Id.
197. 771 F.2d 7622 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985).

198. Id. at 768.
199. F & M Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Emmer Bros. Co. (In re Emmer Bros. Co.), 52
B.R. 385, 394 (D. Minn. 1985); Bowen v. Residential Fin. Corp. (In re Bowen), 89
B.R. 800, 804 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988). But cf. Orcon, Inc. v. Nevada Emergency
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discharged by confirmation, even if the claim is not discovered until some
later date."' 2 The declaration for general dischargeability of undiscovered claims has been qualified, however, by an implied recognition that a
debtor's fraudulent concealment of the existence of facts supporting a claim
would warrant a different ruling, but that the burden to show such
concealment would be on the claimant.2"'
Knowledge by a creditor that its debtor has filed a petition, or has had
a petition filed again.st it, under the Bankruptcy Code may also be a factor
in determining the effect of confirmation in a Chapter 11 case. For most of
this century a discharge entered under section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act or
section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code has been effective against a creditor
who knew of the pendency of the case in time to file a timely proof of
claim.' The provision in section 944(c)(2) of the Code for a discharge

Servs., Inc. (In re Nevada Emergency Servs., Inc.), 39 B.R. 859 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984)
(holding that absent a showing by the debtor that plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity
for their claims to be heard, court could not, consistent with due process, conclude that
claims were barred by operation of order confirming debtor's reorganization plan),
abstractedsupra note 114.
200. Bowen, 89 B.R. at 805 (quoting Emmer Bros., 52 B.R. at 394).
201. Id. at 806.
202. "The statutory language [of § 523(a)(3)(B)] clearly contemplates that mere
knowledge of a pending bankruptcy proceeding is sufficient to bar the claim of a creditor
who took no action, whether or not that creditor received official notice from the court
of various pertinent dates." Byrd v. Alton (In re Alton), 837 F.2d 457, 460 (1 IthCir.
1988) (denying creditor extension of time for filing dischargeability complaint since
creditor had received actual notice of debtor's Chapter 11 case from debtor's counsel
within time to file timely complaint); see also Briley v. Hidalgo, 981 F.2d 246,249 (5th
Cir. 1993) (holding that default judgment against guarantors was discharged under
§ 523(a)(3) by virtue of creditor's knowledge of guarantors' bankruptcy although
judgment was never scheduled; rejecting argument that actual notice must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence); Zidell, Inc. v. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska Lines), 920
F.2d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that unscheduled creditor's due process rights
were not violated by bankruptcy court's refusal to extend filing time for proof of claim
in Chapter 7 case, notwithstanding lack of notice of claims bar date, when creditor knew
of pendency of case by virtue of having received copy of notice of first creditors'
meeting); Yukon Self Storage Fund v. Green (In re Green), 876 F.2d 854, 856-57 (10th
Cir. 1989) (dismissing creditor's complaint to determine dischargeability as untimely;
holding that failure to receive formal notice of bar date did not excuse delay in light of
§ 523(a)(3)(A) and evidence that creditor learned of pendency of debtor's bankruptcy in
time to file timely.complaint); Neeley v. Murchison, 815 F.2d 345, 347 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that creditor's objection to dischargeability was time-barred notwithstanding
clerk's failure to provide timely notice of applicable time limit, where creditor had
received timely notice of pendency of debtor's case); 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 37, 17.21[5]; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 35, 523.13[c].

The court in In re Green undertook to differentiate the creditor's rights under
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of a Chapter 9 debtor from all of its debts on confirmation except those
"owed to an entity that, before confirmation of the plan, has had neither
notice nor actual knowledge of the case " ' was recently upheld against
attack based on due process grounds. 204 It would thus appear that there is
no constitutional requirement that notice conforming to a procedural rule or
a statute be delivered to a knowledgeable creditor before the creditor's claim
can be discharged. 5

Chapters 11 and 7 by gratuitously suggesting that "11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) and (d), which
would appear to allow the discharge of the debt of a creditor without actual notice failed
to meet due process muster," whereas § 523(a)(3), by preserving the effect of a
discharge in a Chapter 7 case only when the creditor received actual timely notice (or
knowledge), satisfied due process requirements. 876 F.2d at 856-57; see also In re
Turning Point Lounge, Ltd., 111 B.R. 44, 48 n.3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1990). Although
Green upheld the constitutionality of § 523(a)(3) and purported to find § 1141(d)
unconstitutional on due process grounds, both sections were regarded as unconstitutional
in Nicholas A. Franke, The Code and the Constitution:Fifth Amendment Limits on the
Debtor'sDischargein Bankruptcy, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 853, 863 (1990), quoted infra text
accompanying notes 206-208.
203. 11 U.S.C. § 944(c)(2) (1988).
204. Nebraska Sec. Bank v. Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 7, 119 B.R. 193, 195
(D. Neb. 1990). Mr. Franke erroneously stated that "Section 523(a)(3) is the only section
of the Bankruptcy Code that conditions a debtor's discharge on any type of notice to or
knowledge by a creditor." Franke, supra note 202, at 858 n.30; see also id. at 862 n.54,
864. Mr. Franke's article did not refer to § 944(c)(2), but did cite the district court's
decision that upheld its constitutionality. Id. at 863 n.59.
205. Cases barring a creditor with knowledge of the pendency of its debtor's Chapter
11 case in time to file a timely proof of claim include the following: In re Production
Plating, Inc., 90 B.R. 277, 280-84 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that confirmation
discharged claim for intentional tort when the claimant knew of the filing of the debtor's
petition but the debtor was unaware of the existence of the claim); Siouxland Beef
Processing Co. v. Knight (In re Siouxland Beef Processing Co.), 55 B.R. 95, 100
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (holding that claim by debtor's employee, who had actual
knowledge of debtor's Chapter 11 filing long before confirmation of debtor's plan but
who failed to file timely claim, was discharged by confirmation); see also Jones v.
Arross, 9 F.3d 79, 82 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that claim of unscheduled
creditor who did not file timely claim would be dischargeable if she "had timely notice
or timely actual knowledge of the case"); Neeley v. Murchison, 815 F.2d 345, 347 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that creditor's objection to discharge of claim for fraud against
individual Chapter 11 debtor was time-barred in view of creditor's knowledge of
pendency of Chapter 11 case in ample time to file objection); cf. Hassett v. Weissman
(In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 48 B.R. 824, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (barring
creditor's late filing of claim where its allegations of ignorance of pendency of debtor's
Chapter 11 case strained credulity and trustee had no knowledge of creditor's claim or
its name and address); In re Larsen, 80 B.R. 784, 787 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987) (barring
late filing of claim where creditor knew of pendency of case but debtor had no
knowledge of claim's existence); In re Missionary Baptists Found. of Am., Inc., 41 B.R.
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In a recent article, Mr. Nicholas A. Franke nevertheless made the
following elaborate argument: (1)
Because section 523(a)(3) requires notice to creditors before discharging
their claims only when the debtor is an individual, and because no
corollary provision exists when the debtor is not an individual, the
Bankruptcy Code apparently takes the position that claims can be
discharged without notice to the clainiholder when the debtor is not an
2
individual; 0
(2) "New York Railroadand its progeny make this constitutionally impermissible";'
(3) "Therefore, the 'actual knowledge' exception found in
section 523(a)(3) violates the due process requirements of the fifth
amendment when applied in a Chapter 11 case in which the debtor knows
20 8
of the existence of a creditor and that creditor's claim."
Although we, i.e., the authors of this Article, concur in approving the
amendments to sections 1141, 1142, and 523 proposed in the National
Bankruptcy Conference's Code Review Project Working Draft,2 9 which
would clarify the relationship of notice requirements to discharge under the
Bankruptcy Code, we question Mr. Franke's analysis of the implications of
the New York Railroadcase. Section 523(a)(3)'s precursor in the Bankruptcy
Act, viz., section 17a(3), also excepted from discharge the claim of a
creditor having "notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy" ;210 however, the Supreme Court did not, in New York v. New York,
N.H. & H.R. Co. 211 or elsewhere, suggest that the precursors of section
1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, viz., sections 77(f), 95(b), 228, 371, 476,
660, and 661 of the Bankruptcy Act, carried any implication that no notice
need be given to creditors or that these sections contravened the Constitution
by failing to specify a need for timely notice of some kind. The Supreme
Court did not predicate its ruling in the New York Railroadcase on the Fifth
Amendment or even mention it.211 If the New York Railroad decision is

467, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (disallowing claim, as untimely filed, where fiscal
intermediary of Health Care Financing Administration had actual knowledge of pendency
of debtor's Chapter 11 petition ten weeks prior to bar date for filing claims).
206. Franke, supra note 202, at 864.
207. Id. at 863-64.

208. Id. at 863.
209. These proposals are summarized infra the text accompanying notes 245-266.
210. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(3), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(3) (1976) (repealed 1978).

211. 344 U.S. 293 (1953). The New York Railroad case is discussed supra text
accompanying notes 90-98.
212. See Grossie v. Sam (In re Sam), 894 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 1990). Two

opinions of the Supreme Court involving due process in nonbankruptcy contexts,
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allowed to rest on the rationale stated in Justice Black's opinion, the reason
the confirmation did not effectuate a discharge was that the court did not
comply with the statutory command for notice prescribed by the Bankruptcy
213
Act.
Judge Frank, in his dissenting opinion in New York Railroad,likewise
emphasized the district court's noncompliance with the statute, but identified
24
eight other factors that also appeared to warrant a ruling for the city.
As pointed out earlier in the discussion of New York Railroad,Judge Frank
had adhered to the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Mullane in
weighing competing considerations in determining when the requisites of due
process have been met.215
In questioning the constitutionality of sections 523(a)(3) and 1141(d),
Mr. Franke argued that New York Railroad mandates a per se rule of
compliance with formal notice.216 Although the mode of giving "formal
notice" would have to be prescribed by statute or rule, Mr. Franke argued
that Congress would be precluded from specifying actual knowledge or
actual notice in lieu of some kind of "formal notice." 217 Such an approach
is antithetical to the Supreme Court's articulation in numerous cases of the
demands of procedural due process2 8 and would overrule a substantial

however, assumed without careful analysis that New York v. New York, N.H. &H.R. Co.
was based on a constitutional mandate. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v.
Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 487-89 (1988); Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S.
791, 797-800 (1983).
213. See New York, N.H. & H.R., 344 U.S. at 296. The case does not appear to have
involved a collateral attack on the district court's order that was reversed.
214. See supra note 96.
215. See supra text accompanying note 96.
216. Franke, supra note 202, at 863-65.
217. "Creditors in all bankruptcy cases must be given official notice of the relevant
debts in the case, as required by New York Railroadand its progeny." Id. at 864.
218. Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791, 800-09 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), is an extended exposition of the
Supreme Court's previous, persistent, and long-continued refusal either to commit itself
to any formula for balancing the governmental and private interests involved or to
assume the responsibility for prescribing the form of notice the government should adopt
in determining the requisites of due process. The majority in Mennonite Boardv. Adams
held that posting and publication of notice of a tax sale of real property that complied
with an Indiana statute did not meet requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause when challenged by a mortgagee of the property that was sold. Justices
Rehnquist and Powell concurred in Justice O'Connor's dissent, and Justice O'Connor
wrote the nearly unanimous opinion of the Court in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988). See also Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.
v. Claimants Identified on Schedule I (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 995
F.2d 1138, 1144 (2d Cir. 1993) ("What process is due under the Due Process Clause
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body of case law.2" 9 A flurry of recent bankruptcy court decisions have
disapproved rulings of courts of appeals that disallow claims that are not
timely filed;' 2 but these courts have recognized the appropriateness of
subordinating such a claim to the claims timely filed." Mr. Franke did
not address whether a claim filed by a person without formal notice is
constitutionally protected against subordination pursuant to section 510(c) or
section 726(a)(3). However, a number of cases can be cited as coinciding
with the views espoused by Mr. Franke in their preoccupation with formal
notice. 2

when asked in the abstract is an imponderable question like 'What is Truth?' John 18:38.
When focused on concrete circumstances or particular parties, it still admits of no easy
answer ....").
219. Mr. Franke's article cites four cases that "discharged claims without notice to
creditors notwithstanding the Supreme Court holding to the contrary." Franke, supranote
202, at 863 n.59; see also cases cited supranotes 202-205; In re Burke, 76 B.R. 62, 64
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1987) (disallowing late-filed claim notwithstanding lack of notice that
claim had been scheduled as disputed and therefore subject to a timely-filing requirement;
creditor's active participation in case emphasized in court's opinion).
220. In re McLaughlin, 157 B.R. 873 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1993); In re Babbin, 156
B.R. 838 (Bankr. D. Colo.), rev'd in part, 160 B.R. 848 (D. Colo. 1993); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Judkins (In re Judkins), 151 B.R. 553, 555 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1993); Lastra v. Blood Servs. Program of Am.Red Cross (In re Corporacion De
Servicios Medico-Hospitalarios De Fajardo, Inc.), 149 B.R. 746 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1993);
In re Rago, 149 B.R. 882 (Bankr. N.D. 111.
1992) (disapproving three opinions of courts
of appeals that held or assumed that late-filed claims are automatically disallowed).
221. Judkins, 151 B.R. at 555 (recognizing the court's power in a Chapter 13 case to
approve differing treatment of timely and tardy claims provided by a plan); Lastra, 149
B.R. at 749-50 (discussing subordination under § 726(a)(3)); Rago, 149 B.R. at 888-90
(discussing subordination of late-filed claims under §§ 726(a)(3) and 510(c)); In re
Hausladen, 146 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992).
222. In addition to New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., discussed supra text
accompanying notes 90-98, and the court of appeals decisions discussed supra text
accompanying notes 108-117, the following bankruptcy court decisions may be cited: In
re Turning Point Lounge, Ltd., 111 B.R. 44 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
preconfirmation judgment creditor who was not "properly notified" of the bar date for
filing a proof of claim and of the hearing on confirmation was not barred from enforcing
a postconfirmation default judgment obtained against the debtor; concluding that
preconfirmation oral notice of the debtor's petition given the creditor by the debtor's
principal was ineffective as notice); Acevedo v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co., 68 B.R.
495 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. J986) (ruling that machine manufacturer's claim for indemnity
and contribution against Chapter 11 debtor, whose employee was injured while working
on machine and became plaintiff in products liability action against the manufacturer, was
nondischargeable by virtue of the debtor's failure to give timely notification to the
manufacturer of its claim; deeming § 1141(d) unconstitutional in its application to
manufacturer's claim; stating that creditors who accepted the debtor's plan shared
responsibility for not examining the debtor to insure that all claims were included in the
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Mr. Franke opined in his Pepperdine Law Review article that "[n]otice
is for the benefit of creditors, not debtors, and creditors are entitled to
adequate notice irrespective of the type of debtor."' Accordingly, he
argued that the discrimination between creditors of individuals and creditors
of legal entities other than individuals implicit in the "actual knowledge"
caveat in section 523(a)(3) and the omission of any such caveat in section
1141 must be eliminated to pass constitutional muster. 4 This argument
ignores the significant difference between the effects of the discharge of an
individual and the discharge of an entity other than an individual.
Because discharge of a liquidated corporation or partnership was
perceived to serve no useful purpose and indeed encouraged trafficking in
corporate shells and bankrupt partnerships, Congress eliminated any
provision for discharge of such entities in Chapter 7 and severely restricted
discharge of liquidated entities in Chapter 11 cases.2' In enacting Chapter
11 of the Code, however, Congress recognized that a corporation or
partnership could not survive reorganization without the protection of a
pervasive discharge of preconfirmation debts. 6 The differences between
the effects of liquidations and reorganizations on creditors of individual and
nonindividual debtors could legitimately be taken into account by Congress
in enacting bankruptcy legislation.
Mr. Franke appropriately recognized that a creditor with actual
knowledge of a Chapter 7 case has no need for notice of the bar date for
filing of a claim, whereas a creditor in a reorganization case must continually inquire about the relevant bar date.227 Thus, in Spring Valley Farms,
Inc. v. Crow (In re Spring Valley Farms, Inc.), 22 s when a reorganized
debtor relied on the cases enforcing a discharge against creditors who did
not file their claims notwithstanding their knowledge of the pendency of the
bankruptcy case of their debtor, the court responded by pointing out that the
provisions of the bankruptcy laws authorizing that result protected only
individual debtors.229 Congress nevertheless provided for a comprehensive

plan); Orcon, Inc. v. Nevada Emergency Servs., Inc. (In re Nevada Emergency Servs.,
Inc.), 39 B.R. 859 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984), abstractedsupra note 114.
223. Franke, supra note 202, at 864 n.69.
224. Id.
225. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 385, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6341; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 98, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

5787, 5884.
226. See infra note 230.
227. Franke, supra note 202, at 860 n.34.
228. 863 F.2d 832 (1lth Cir. 1989).
229. Id. at 833-34; see also In re Turning Point Lounge, Ltd., 111 B.R. 44, 48 n.3
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1990) (acknowledging that failure of a knowledgeable creditor of an
individual Chapter 11 debtor to file a timely proof of claim may result in discharge by
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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discharge in section 1141(d) and evinced a recognition of the need for as
broad a discharge of a reorganized corporation as the Constitution permits.230 It is thus anomalous to find in several judicial opinions not only
a disregard of the congressional policy of affording a comprehensive
discharge to reorganized debtors but also a discovery of Due Process Clause
protection of knowledgeable creditors against omission of any step in the
procedures prescribed by the statute and the rules.z
In Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Aguiar (In re Waterman Steamship
Corp.) 2 the debtor knew that there were future claimants, but did not
know their identity. Over 100 claims for disease resulting from asbestos
exposure had been filed in the case, and the debtor had published notices of
claims-filing dates in two national publications and in two other publications
where the debtor's operations were concentrated. It was important to the
success of the reorganization and the fairness of the treatment of future

confirmation of a plan, although a creditor of corporate Chapter 11 debtor who did not
receive formal notice of the confirmation hearing was held not bound by the confirmation).
In dismissing the significance of the claimants' knowledge of the pendency of a
reorganization case, courts frequently declare that awareness of a debtor's involvement
in a reorganization case does not impose any duty on the claimant to take steps to protect
its rights by intervening in any way in the case. New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co., 344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953); Spring Valley Farms, 863 F.2d at 834 (citing In re
Intaco P.R., Inc., 494 F.2d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 1974)); Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Constr.
Co., 726 F.2d 620, 622 (10th Cir. 1984). These courts add that the claimant has a right
to assume that the reorganization court will issue notices required by statute and rule in
due course. But cf. Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118,
1123 (9th Cir. 1983), quoted supra note 109; see also Robbins v. Amoco Prod. Co., 952
F.2d 901, 908 (5th Cir. 1992).
In In re CRC Wireline, Inc., 103 B.R. 804, 808 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989), the
court sought to confine the relevance of a claimant's knowledge of the pendency of its
debtor's case to instances where the claimant was unknown; but as the court pointed out
in Zidell, Inc. v. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska Lines), 920 F.2d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir.
1990), the creditor in Gregory had already obtained a judgment against the debtor before
the debtor filed his petition.
230. "By this broadest possible definition [in section 101(4), later renumbered 101(5)],
and by the use of the term throughout the title 11, . . . the bill contemplates that all legal
obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt
with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy
court." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 15, at 309, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6266; S. RP. No. 989, supranote 225, at 22, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5808;
see also 124 CONG. REc. 32405 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34005
(statement of Sen. DeConcini); cf. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 (1985) (".
Congress desired a broad definition of a 'claim.' . .
231. See supranotes 108-117, 143.
232. 141 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 157 B.R. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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claimants who had been exposed during the debtor's prepetition and
preconfinmation operations that these claims were dealt with in the
reorganization plan. In light of the debtor's ownership and operation of sea
vessels containing asbestos for 50 years and in light of the "highly
publicized Johns-Manville bankruptcy" the court declared that the debtor

knew there were many employees and former employees with contingent
claims in the form of unmanifested asbestos-related diseases prior to
confirmation who had not filed claims. Acknowledging the difficulties faced
by the debtor, the court nevertheless declined to grant its request for
declaratory relief discharging the claims of the nonfiling claimants. Although
published notice to claimants has been deemed to satisfy due process when
they cannot be identified, 3 the court in Waterman Steamship declared that
published notice to the nonfiling claimants would not reasonably inform
them of their claims. 4 The court suggested that the debtor could have
appointed a representative to receive notice for, and to represent the
interests of, the unidentifiable future claimants. 5 Thus, a novel procedural device, which has been developed in a series of judicial opinions within
the last decade, 6 took on the aspect of a constitutional requirement of due
process. Meanwhile, the confirmation in the Waterman Steamship case did

233. See supra text accompanying notes 97 and 106, and compare the following
statement of District Judge Keenan in Hassett v. Weissman (In re O.P.M. Leasing
Corp.), 48 B.R. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1985): "[N]otice by publication is an adequate form of
notice to advise a party of the entry of a bar order." Id. at 831 (citing Novak v. Callahan
(In re GAC Corp.), 681 F.2d 1295, 1300 (1lth Cir. 1982); Reddington v. Borghi (In re
Weis Sec., Inc.), 411 F. Supp. 194, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re International Coins &
Currency, Inc., 22 B.R. 123, 125 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982)).
In Pettibone Corp. v. Payne (In re Pettibone Corp.), 151 B.R. 166, 170-73 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill.
1993), the court appropriately held that notice by publication was inadequate
with respect to a claimant who was injured nearly two years later when operating
equipment manufactured by the debtor. The injury occurred preconfirmation, but the
debtor denied knowledge of its occurrence until sued by the claimant in state court, and
the claimant denied knowledge of the pendency of the debtor's Chapter 11 case until the
debtor filed a complaint against the claimant in the bankruptcy court. The debtor's
liability on an administrative claim of the injured plaintiff was said to depend on proof
of a postpetition failure by the debtor to warn the claimant. Id. at 175-76.
234. Waterman S.S., 141 B.R. at 559. The court referred to publication as an
"emaciated form of minimal due process." Id. at 558.
235. See infra text accompanying note 256.
236. See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1035, 1042-43 (3d Cir. 1985); In re
UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 1111, 1119-20 (7th Cir. 1984); In re UNR Indus., 46 B.R. 671,
675 (Bankr. N.D. Il.1985); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 749 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), appealdenied, 39 B.R. 234,235-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Stacy L. Rahl, Note,
Modification of a Chapter11 Plan in the Mass Tort Context, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 192,
222-23 (1992).
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not discharge the future claims of the debtor.
Ralph Mabey and Jamie Andra Gavrin, in an article published in this
symposium,"n declare that "Mullane usually mandates ... the appointment of a future claims representative in order to provide future claims
access to a court hearing."s They nevertheless acknowledge that "[u]nder
Mullane, publication notice, though futile, may suffice because only the best
notice and opportunity for hearing that can reasonably be given under the
circumstances is required."" Although Mabey and Gavrin cite cases and
commentary recognizing that the constitutional requirements of due process
contemplate a balancing of multiple factors, including the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the value of additional or substitute safeguards, 240 the
authors emphasize that the appointment of a claims representative is
constitutionally mandated when the discharge of future claims is involved. 41 Mullane did not involve the Fifth Amendment, but the authors
make the reasonable assumption that the Due Process Clauses of Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments impose identical procedural requirements. 242 It
is nevertheless arguable whether either amendment embraces the notion that
a representative must always be appointed to represent the claims of
unknown claimants.24 Mabey and Gavrin are concerned only with the
exceedingly complex and perplexing problem of future claims, an undefined
category under the Bankruptcy Code, and their article is an eloquent and
persuasive presentation of an argument in support of their ultimate
conclusion: "The Fifth Amendment's procedural due process standards.. .
do not preclude the discharge of future claims. Rather, they require only
that a debtor make the best practicable effort to give notice to future
claimants and afford them a meaningful opportunity to be heard."2 4 The
authors of this Article are concerned that the Fifth Amendment not be read
to empower creditors to attack the effectiveness of the confirmation of a plan
as a discharge of claims of unknown creditors by reciting procedural steps

237. Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie Andra Gavrin, ConstitutionalLimitations on the
Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. REv. 745 (1993).
238. Id. at 781.
239. Id. at 787 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,

317-18 (1950)). They cite seven cases sustaining the constitutional adequacy of notice by
publication to creditors unknown to debtor. Id. at 788 n. 190.
240. Id. at 781-83 & nn.152-157.
241. Id. at 779-84.

242. Id. at 779 n.142.
243. As pointed out infra text accompanying note 256, the National Bankruptcy
Conference, after extended debate, limited its recommendation for enactment of a
statutory requirement for appointment of a group representative to cases where all
members of a group of potential claimants are not identifiable.
244. Mabey & Gavrin, supra note 237, at 784.
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that conceivably could have been but were not taken after a careful
evaluation of the costs, benefits, and risks involved.
5. Proposalsof National Bankruptcy Conference Working
Groups on Dischargeof Contingentand
Environmental Claims
The National Bankruptcy Conference has approved a series of proposed
amendments that would deal with the dischargeability of contingent and
environmental claims. 5 One proposal would amend sections 1141, 1142,
and 523 to provide that, subject to exceptions for discharge of individual
debtors, a claim should be discharged if its holder's name and address are
known or are reasonably ascertainable and the holder has been served with
notice of the case in time to file a timely proof of claim and to vote on a
plan.246 Discharge would be barred if the creditor's name and address are
not known unless notice by publication is made and the court deems the
notice reasonably calculated to make the creditor aware of the case in time
to file a timely proof of claim and to vote on a plan.247 The commentary
accompanying the proposal acknowledged that "[t]his proposal would
overrule the results of such cases as Reliable Electric and Broomall."248
The Conference also proposed to amend the definition of "claim" in
section 101(5) to provide that the occurrence of one or more material acts
or failures to act at the time of or before the order for relief would create
a claim.249 If the conduct or event tending to cause harm has occurred or
is occurring at or before the order for relief, a claim for resulting damage
would be allowable and dischargeable although the damage has not yet
befallen the claimant."o The scope and likelihood of the harm would be
determined by estimation, and notice would be given to holders of potential
future claims. 5 ' The comment accompanying the proposal acknowledged
the implicit need for evidence of certainty of harm and the totality of the
likely damage." =
A new subsection (k) was proposed to be added to section 502 to
authorize the designation of "group claims." 3 The scope of this proposed

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 1-42.
Proposal S, NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 270.
Id.

Id.
Proposal T.1, NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 273-74.

250. Id.
251. Id. at 274.
252. Id.
253. Proposal T.3, NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 274.
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subsection has been the focus of extended debate. In a version tentatively
approved at a meeting in January 1993, the new subsection would apply
only when all members of a group of potential claimants are not identifiable.
In such cases the court would be required to appoint a group representa4
tive.2
The NBC Draft proposed an amendment to section 363 to provide that
a good-faith purchaser should take free and clear of successor liability."5
The accompanying comment made clear an intent not to cut off a creditor's
right to assert successor liability against a bona fide purchaser when the
creditor did not receive the notice required to be provided by the proposed
section 523(e) and did not have a group representative appointed for the
creditor and persons similarly situated. 6
The NBC Draft included a number of relevant proposals for the
treatment of environmental claims. 257 Although the Draft was explicit that
"environmental claims" should not be separately defined in the Bankruptcy
Code but should be embraced within a comprehensive general definition of
claims,28 the Draft ventured the following rule prescribing when an
environmental claim should be deemed to arise:
A claim against a debtor for environmental harm should be regarded
as arising when the debtor first acts, resulting in, fails to act, resulting
in, or otherwise becomes legally responsible for the harm, irrespective
of when the harm occurs, is manifested, is fully known or knowable, or
is remediated5 9
The Draft explained further: "Applying this rule means in most cases that
a claim arises at the time when a hazardous substance is released into the
environment."2" The proposal thus embodied the position taken in
Jensen2 ' and Chateaugay.262 If a debtor becomes legally responsible
before a release, however, the claim may arise at the earlier time, as
illustrated by the situation when leakage occurs on premises without any act

254. Id. The appointment of a group representative for a class of potential claimants
was criticized in Bibler, supra note 127, at 171-73.
255. Proposal T.11, NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 279-80.
256. Id.
257. NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 1-42.

258.
259.
260.
261.
text.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5. Jensen is cited and discussed supra notes 188-191 and accompanying

262. NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 6. Chateaugay is cited supra note 138 and
discussed in the accompanying text.
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or failure on the part of the owner.26 The fact that cleanup takes place
after the date of relief under the Code would not be significant under the
Draft proposal.2 '
The NBC Draft declared that
[a]fter a claim for recovery of environmental cleanup costs incurred is
discharged against a property owner in bankruptcy, the government
should not be able to recover the same claim against a reorganized entity
that continues to own the same cleaned up property postconfirmation.
Also, the government should not be able to assert claims for recovery
of environmental cleanup costs based on prepetition contamination
against a purchaser who buys 2the cleaned up property from the debtor's
estate free and clear of liens. 65
Citing 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), the Draft finally concluded that a reorganized
entity or a purchaser may be required to clean up postpetition any current
contamination, even though due to prepetition acts. 2

6. Discharge of Nondebtors
Section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, except for the
operation of a provision that applies only to a community claim,2 67
discharge of a debt does not affect the liability of any entity other than the
debtor or of the property of any entity other than that of the debtor.26 The

263. NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 6.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 21. The Draft acknowledged that an amendment of the Bankruptcy Code
or CERCLA may be needed to protect purchasers and to facilitate the sale of property
owned by a debtor. Id.
266. Id. at 22. The Draft pointed out that Waterville Industries v. First Hartford
Corp., 124 B.R. 411 (D. Me. 1991), would protect the purchaser on the ground that
New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953), requires some
notice to an "affected creditor" in order for the debtor to be relieved of liability. NBC
Draft, supra note 70, at 22. In Waterville Industries a mortgagee had sold contaminated
property to a purchaser who was without knowledge or notice of the contamination.
267. The exception carves out of the general negation of the discharge of the liability
of entities other than the debtor, and of property other than that of the debtor, the special
provisions for community claims in § 524(a)(3).
268. See Landsing Diversified Properties-il v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Abel
(In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 595-97 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding
that injunction purporting to protect party settling with debtor against future liability to
former attorney for debtor conflicted with § 524(e)), modified sub nom. Abel v. West,
932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991) (approving temporary injunction against attorney for
debtor "pending confirmation of a reorganization plan," but declaring permanent
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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provision is an adaptation of section 16 of the Bankruptcy Act, which
declared that "[tihe liability of a person who is a co-debtor with or
guarantor or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt shall not be altered by
the discharge of such bankrupt." 269 Numerous cases have declared the
invalidity of provisions of proposed and confirmed plans that would
discharge liabilities of purchasers of debtors' property,27 officers of
corporate debtors,2 7' partners in debtor partnerships, 272 guarantors, 273

postconfirmation injunction inappropriate); Kathy B. Enters. v. United States, 779 F.2d
1413 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that § 524(e) did not preclude collection by IRS of debtor's
taxes out of proceeds of sale of fraudulently transferred property); In re Elsinore Shore
Assocs., 91 B.R. 238, 250 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (denying confirmation of Chapter 11
plan because it "improperly" called for release of third-party nondebtors); In re Texaco
Inc., 84 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) ("The confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization should not release the obligations of non-party entities to creditors of a
debtor."), appeal dismissed, 92 B.R. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Peter M. Boyle, Note, NonDebtor Liability in Chapter 11: Validity of Third-Party Discharge in Bankruptcy, 61
FORDHAM L. REv. 421 (1992); see also Moore, Owen, Thomas & Co. v. Coffey, 992
F.2d 1439 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that because discharge of principal debtor in
bankruptcy would not discharge liability by cramdown pursuant to § 1129(b), it would
likewise not affect the guarantor's obligation; guarantor was nevertheless entitled to
determination of reduction of liability by amount of setoffs asserted by creditor against
debtor).
269. 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1976) (repealed 1978).
270. In re Sis Corp., 120 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that
proposed inclusion in plan of injunction against assertion of claims against purchasers of
property of the debtors was in conflict with §§ 1141(d)(3) and 352(c) and was "illusory
at best").
271. Kinney v. IRS (In re Video Gaming, Inc.), 123 B.R. 889 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1991)
(concluding that claim of IRS for 100% penalty taxes was not rendered dischargeable by
confirmed plan); Inforex, Inc. v. Burridge (In re Inforex, Inc.), 26 B.R. 515 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1983) (holding that corporate debtor's officers and directors were not discharged
from liability to stockholders under SEC Rule lob-5 by confirmation of corporation's
plan). But cf. In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. 792 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993)
(staying postconfirmation state court action brought by Chapter 11 debtor's shareholders
against several of debtor's directors, as an improper interference with the bankruptcy
court's order of confirmation; stating that complaint based on directors' alleged breach
of fiduciary duty in purposefully diluting shareholders' voting power was properly
presented only to bankruptcy court during course of the Chapter 11 case).
272. Cardinal Indus. v. Buckeye Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Cardinal Indus.), 102
B.R. 991, 1008 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (disapproving settlement between debtors,
including general partner of limited partnerships, and mortgagees of property owned by
partnerships, since relief contemplated by settlement required court to protect interests
of nonfiling subsidiaries of debtors and other entities and was beyond intent and spirit of
Code).
273. Shure v. Vermont (In re Sure-Snap Corp.), 983 F.2d 1015, 1019 (lth Cir.
1993) (holding that confirmation did not discharge liability of nondebtor guarantor for
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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and other codebtors of the debtor.274 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in
Stoll v. Gottlieb,275 and a number of lower courts276 have ruled unequiv-

attorney's fees incurred in defending postconfirmation appeal initiated by the debtor); In
re Timber Tracts, Inc., 70 B.R. 773, 779 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (stating that, in event
of default, debtor's officers and stockholders would remain liable under plan as cosigners
on debtor's note).
274. In re General Homes Corp., 134 B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (stating
that release of any cause of action held by a third party against a third party, including
insiders of the debtor, is unenforceable since "the cause of action is property of the
estate"); In re Mandalay Shores Co-op. Housing Ass'n, 53 B.R. 609, 615 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1985) (denying confirmation in part because settlement incorporated in plan
prohibited creditors from suing nondebtors).
Numerous cases have held that a discharge does not preclude an action against a
debtor, and later its insurer, when the objective of the actions is to recover from the
insurer. See, e.g., Owaski v. Jet Fla. Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Fla. Sys., Inc.), 883 F.2d 970
(11th Cir. 1989).
275. 305 U.S. 165 (1938), noted in 39 COLuM. L. REV. 274 (1939); 6 U. CIE. L.
REV. 293 (1939); 48 YALE L.J. 979 (1939). Stoll v. Gottlieb has not escaped scholarly
criticism. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS IN EQUITY 319-20
(1950).
276. Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1987); Sanders v. GIAC
Leasing Corp. (In re Sanders), 81 B.R. 496 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987) (determining that
enforcement of guaranty of partnership debt was precluded by res judicata based on
confirmation of Chapter 11 plan providing for release of nondebtor guarantors, even
though the confirmed plan was never consummated and no payments were made to
creditors under the plan); In re CCA Partnership, 70 B.R. 694 (Bankr. D. Del. 1986)
(holding that general partners of Chapter 11 debtor partnership were released by order
confirming plans); In re Safeguard Co., 35 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983) (holding
that confirmation discharged principals as well as debtor firm from liability predicated
on dealings with debtor); Jerome J. Steiker Co. v. Eccleston Properties Ltd., 593
N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that action by mortgage broker against nondebtor
guarantor and its president was barred by confirmation of Chapter 11 plan that provided
for their discharge; res judicata effect of confirmation overrode postconfirmation
objections raised by broker to enforcement of discharge); see also Levy v. Cohen, 561
P.2d 252 (Cal.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977). But cf. North Ala. Anesthesiology
Group, P.C. v. Zickler (In re North Ala. Anesthesiology Group, P.C.), 154 B.R. 752
(N.D. Ala. 1993) (although bankruptcy court correctly held that unappealed confirmation
order released nondebtor guarantors of Chapter 11 debtor's indebtedness, Alabama
Supreme Court's subsequent decision permitting creditor's action against guarantors held
to constitute res judicata; guarantors who failed to seek injunctive relief from bankruptcy
court against state court action before Alabama Supreme Court's final decision held to
be collaterally estopped against further action in bankruptcy court).
The ruling in Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf was qualified in Sun Finance Co. v.
Howard (In re Howard), 972 F.2d 639, 641 (5th Cir. 1992), by a holding that a
confirmed Chapter 13 plan is res judicata only as to parties who participate in the
confirmation process. In In re Electronics & Metals Industries, 153 B.R. 36, 38 (Bankr.
W.D.Tex. 1992), the court held that a creditor's claim which was scheduled as
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ocally that confirmation of a reorganization plan may discharge a guarantor
or other nondebtor from liability on an obligation when the order so
provides and is not timely contested by a party with standing.
Notwithstanding the clear and unequivocal rulings in Stoll v. Gottlieb
and its progeny, the courts of appeals of the Seventh2 7 and Ninth278
Circuits, as well as a number of lesser courts,279 have permitted collateral
attack of provisions of confirmed plans purporting to discharge or otherwise
preclude enforcement of claims against nondebtor parties. Despite the fact
that subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court has been authoritatively
held not to be subject to collateral attack,1 0 the decisions refusing to
enforce confirmation orders have relied on a rationale that declares the
orders to be beyond the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court28' or to

"disputed" by the debtor did not implicate the creditor in the process. Nevertheless, in
Howard the court conceded that the filing of an objection to the claim would have
changed the result and emphasized that Shoaf, unlike Howard, involved a secured
creditor. As indicated supranote 73, there is considerable confusion respecting the effect
of confirmation on secured claims.
277. Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982).
278. American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American
Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 624-27 (9th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing Robins case,
cited infra note 287, on the ground that it involved "unusual facts"); Underhill v. Royal,
769 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Seaport Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert
Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc.), 113 B.R. 610, 617-19
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (stating that §§ 362 and 105 do not authorize disregard of §
524(e)).
279. Mellon Bank v. Siegel, 96 B.R. 505,506 (E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 974 F.2d
1385 (3d Cir. 1989); Hat-Hanseatische Anlage v. Sago Palms Joint Venture (In re Sago
Palms Joint Venture), 39 B.R. 9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
280. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), noted
in 28 GEO. L.J. 1006 (1940); 53 HARV. L. REV. 652 (1940); 49 YALE L.J. 959 (1940);
McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 192 (1825); 2 JAMES W. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60[5] (2d ed. 1985); 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3522, at 80-81 (2d ed. 1984); Karen N. Moore, Collateral

Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 534, 560 (1981):
The principles of law regarding subsequent challenges to subject matter
jurisdiction can be summarized as follows: generally, in a contested action a
court's subject matter jurisdiction is res judicata and cannot be challenged
through collateral attack on the judgment, whether or not the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction was actually litigated.
"It has long been recognized that a bankruptcy court's order confirming a plan of
reorganization is given the same effect as a district court's judgment on the merits for
claim preclusion purposes." Eubanks v. FDIC, 977 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
five cases).
281. See cases cited supranotes 277-280.
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constitute a denial of due process.' Section 524(e) has thus inappropriately been given effect as a jurisdictional limitation on the bankruptcy court or
a constitutional mandate without any effort to distinguish or explain Stoll v.
Gottlieb.2 3 As Professor James W. Moore observed in his seminal article,
Res Judicata and CollateralEstoppel in Bankruptcy,2" it is not significant
that the party raised the jurisdictional issue in Stoll v. Gottlieb, nor that the
parties failed to do so, as in Chicot Drainage District v. Baxter State
Bank,' since "it is a 'well settled principle that res judicata may be
pleaded as a bar, not only as respects matters actually presented to sustain
or defeat the right asserted in the earlier proceeding, but also as respecting
other available matters which might have been presented to that end.' ""
In a number of cases the courts have granted a debtor's request for
permanent injunction to prohibit the pursuit of claims by creditors and others
against nondebtor parties to a settlement that is an integral part of the
reorganization plan. Such an injunction was notably issued in the A.H.
Robins27 case and was sustained against attack as violative of section
524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court acknowledged the hurdles
presented by Underhill v. Royals and Union Carbide Corp. v.
Newboles, s9 but drew some comfort from the statement of the Fifth
Circuit in Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf 9 that "'the statute does not by
its specific words preclude the discharge of a guaranty when it has been
accepted and confirmed as an integral part of reorganization.' "291 The

282. In re Timber Tracts, Inc., 70 B.R. 773, 779 (Bankr. D. Mont.1987); In re
Mandalay Shores Co-op. Housing Ass'n, 53 B.R. 609, 615 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
283. See Frank R. Kennedy, The Dischargeof Partnershipsand Partners Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 38 VAND. L. REv. 857, 884-89 (1985).
284. James W. Moore, Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 YALE
L.J. 1 (1958).
285. 308 U.S. 371, 378.
286. Moore, supra note 284, at 9. Bankruptcy Judge Nims recently sought to limit the
force of Stoll v. Gottlieb as precedential authority for the proposition that an order of
confirmation is res judicata by insisting that "it was the decision on the postconfirmation
petition to vacate or modify, to the order of confirmation, that formed the basis of the
decision in Stoll v. Gottlieb." Reef Petroleum Corp. v. United States (In re Reef
Petroleum Corp.), 99 B.R. 355, 359 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989). The court then refused
to give effect to a plan provision that granted unsecured creditors a lien with priority
over federal tax claims that arose out of the debtor's receipt of duplicate refund checks.
287. Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989). The injunction in this case barred suit by product
liability claimants against the debtor's directors, its attorneys, and its insurers' attorneys.
288. 769 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985), cited supra note 278.
289. 686 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1982), cited supra note 277.
290. 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1987), cited supra note 276.
291. A.H. Robins, 888 F.2d at 702 (quoting Shoaf, 815 F.2d at 1050). The Robins
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bankruptcy court's power to enjoin claimants' actions against a liability
insurer of the debtor was sustained in the Manville and UNR cases on
several alternate grounds: (1) as an exercise of the court's jurisdiction over
liability insurance policies of the debtor as property of the estate; (2) as an
exercise of the statutory authority under section 363(f)(4) to approve
disposition of property of the estate free of third-parties' interests; and (3)
as an exercise of the authority granted by section 105(a) to issue necessary
orders to carry out the provisions of Title 11.2' A careful study of Man-

court summarized the considerations supporting its affirmance of the issuance of the
permanent injunction as follows:
[Where the Plan was overwhelmingly approved, where the Plan in conjunction with insurance policies provided as part of a plan of reorganization gives
a second chance for even late claimants to recover where, nevertheless, some
have chosen not to take part in the settlement in order to retain rights to sue
certain other parties, and where the entire reorganization hinges on the debtor
being free from indirect claims such as suits against parties who would have
indemnity or contribution claims against the debtor, we do not construe
§ 524(e) so that it limits the equitable power of the bankruptcy court to enjoin
the questioned suits.
Id. at 702. The opinion in the Robins case was commented on favorably in John E.
Swallow, Note, The Power of the Shield-Permanently Enjoining Litigation Against
Entities Other than the Debtor-A Look at In re A.H. Robins Co., 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV.
707. The Robins case inter alia was relied on in the extended and careful opinion in In
re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 667, 685-89 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1992) (issuing permanent injunction to protect participating partners of debtor partnership
against actions by creditors on partnership debts and by other partners seeking
contribution; declaring injunction to be sine qua non of plan to provide maximum payout
and fair distribution); see also Marley Orchards Income Fund I, Ltd. Partnership v.
Walker (In re Marley Orchards Income Fund I, Ltd. Partnership), 120 B.R. 566 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. 1990) (granting preliminary injunction against suit by creditors of limited
partnership against general partnership).
292. See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 91-94 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988); Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., 124
B.R. 268,279-82 (N.D. I1. 1990) (sustaining bankruptcy court's authority to enjoin suits
against products liability insurers who had settled with the debtor against contention that
injunction was inconsistent with § 524(e)); distinguishing Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, on
the ground that guarantors released had not given anything to the estate or the creditors,
whereas preconfirmation settlement with insurers in UNR case provided cash proceeds
within jurisdiction of bankruptcy court to protect, and injunction was deemed necessary
to preserve settlement approved as part of the reorganization); see also Official Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines), 928 F.2d 565, 572-74
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 82 (1991) (sustaining permanent injunction issued
against assertion of claim by corporate parent to worthless stock deduction as appropriate
exercise of equitable power vested in bankruptcy court by § 105 inasmuch as claim
would have deprived its subsidiary, a Chapter 11 debtor, of its NOL carry forward,
which constituted property of the debtor's estate, and would have impeded the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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ville, Robins, and UNR concluded that these cases have to come to stand for
the following proposition:
[A] permanent injunction in favor of settling nondebtors is proper in
connection with a plan of reorganization if (1) the injunction is
indispensable to the debtor's reorganization by providing a settlement
fund to satisfy creditor claims, without limiting creditors' rights to
pursue noncontributing third parties (e.g., insurers, partners); and (2)
the contributions of settling parties bear a reasonable relation to their
potential liability (in the case of insurers) or their net worth (in the case
of general partners).29
Courts have sustained release of a nondebtor given on receipt of a
distribution from a fund provided by the nondebtor when the release was
29 4
consensual and not coercive.

reorganization process); In re Energy Co-op., 886 F.2d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 1989)
(sustaining injunction prohibiting creditors and former creditors from asserting claims
against member-owners of a co-operative as exercise of jurisdiction of property of the
debtor's estate and authority of court under § 105(a) "to enjoin actions which threaten
the integrity of the bankrupt's estate"); Griffin v. Bonapfel (In re All American of
Ashburn, Inc.), 805 F.2d 1515, 1518 (1lth Cir. 1986) (sustaining permanent injunction
against shareholders of debtor corporation, precluding their pursuit of action against a
second corporation, on the ground that the latter action was a derivative action belonging
to the debtor corporation and had been compromised by the trustee).
293. Howard C. Buschman III & Sean P. Madden, The Power and Propriety of
Bankruptcy Court Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 Bus. LAW. 913, 942
(1992); see also Joel C. Shapiro, Non-Debtor Third Parties and the Bankruptcy Code:
Is Bankruptcy ProtectionAvailable Without Actually Filing?, 95 COM. L.J. 345, 350-53
(1990); Barry L. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 213, 251-60 (1988).
294. In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that
although § 524(e) provides that discharge does not affect liabilities of third parties, it
does not proscribe grants of release by the court to third parties; since consensual
releases under a plan bind only those voting for the plan, creditors rejecting or abstaining
from voting for the plan were held entitled to pursue claim against third parties);In re
AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150-54 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that § 524(e) does not forbid
giving of release to a nondebtor-guarantor who provided a fund for distribution to
creditors), vacated in part,797 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re Monroe Well Serv.,
Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 334-36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that § 524(e) was not
violated by releases given by unsecured creditors to funds for distribution to creditors
executing releases); cf. In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 671
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (holding that plan which provided for priority of distribution to
participating partners who released claims ahead of nonparticipating partners who did not
release their claims was confirmable in view of fact that there would be no distribution
to partners anyway and that all partners were required to agree to receive distributions
pro rata); In re Elsinore Shore Assocs., 91 B.R. 238,251 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (holding
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Many cases illustrate the courts' strict construction of the order of
confirmation against the plan proponent.295 Confirmation of a plan providing for a debtor's payment of priority tax claims pursuant to section
1129(a)(9) has generally been held not to bar a federal tax collector from
pursuing principals of the debtor to enforce the statutory liability.296 In any
that release of nondebtors was not enforceable when release was not voluntary); In re
Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 485-86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that plan
provisions which released two nondebtors from claims of parties receiving distributions
from funds to which the nondebtors had contributed violated § 524(e)).
Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1982), cited supra notes
277 and 289 for its disregard of Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938), involved a
"settlement, satisfaction and discharge" against individual third-party guarantors in
exchange for distributions of proceeds from the property of the debtor. The court in In
re Specialty Equipment Companies, 3 F.3d at 1046, ventured as partial explanations for
the divergent results of the cases that Union Carbide was construing § 16 of the
Bankruptcy Act, "which is more explicit than section 524(e) of the current Bankruptcy
Code," and that "[t]he Union Carbide court concluded in summary fashion that the
purpose of Section 16 was to prevent a creditor from being forced to lose his claim
against a third party involuntarily and without consideration."
Releases of nondebtors may generate troublesome issues of classification and
discrimination. See, e.g., In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d at 1151-54 (holding that §
1123(a)(4) was violated by provisions for the same pro rata distribution to creditors,
some of whom were required to execute releases and some of whom had no right against
the guarantor); In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 80 B.R. at 335-36 (reserving for future
consideration issues of classification under § 1123(a)(4) and discriminatory treatment).
295. Thus, numerous cases have rejected efforts of codebtors to have confirmation
orders construed to grant them dischargeby implication. United States v. Stribling Flying
Serv., Inc., 734 F.2d 221, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1984); United States ex reL SBA v. Kurtz,
525 F. Supp. 734, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 688 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.)
(Chapter XI case), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982); Beconta, Inc. v. Schneider, 41
B.R. 878 (E.D. Mich. 1984); cf. Bridgman v. Curry, 398 N.W.2d 167 (Iowa 1986)
(holding that bankruptcy court's order imposing waiver of vendor's claim against debtor
did not bar enforcement of claims of vendor against assignees in joint venture who were
not protected in debtor's plan).
296. In re Huckabee Auto Co., 46 B.R. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (reversing bankruptcy
court's order enjoining collection of priority taxes from debtor's principals during sixyear period allowed corporate debtor for payment of taxes under § 1129(a)(9)) aff'd, 783
F.2d 1546, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1986); East Wind Indus. v. United States (In re East
Wind Indus.), 61 B.R. 408 (D.NJ. 1986); Steel Prods., Inc. v. United States (In re Steel
Prods., Inc.), 53 B.R. 999 (W.D. Wash. 1985) (reversing bankruptcy court orders that
enjoined IRS from collecting income and social security taxes during pendency of
Chapter XI case); Dore & Assoc. Contracting, Inc. v. United States ex reL IRS (In re
Dore & Assoc. Contracting, Inc.), 45 B.R. 758 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (denying
injunction against IRS to former officers of corporate debtor); In re Toy & Sports
Warehouse, Inc., 37 B.R. 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that officers of
corporate debtor remained liable for its priority tax obligations during six-year payout
notwithstanding confirmation of plan for corporate reorganization). But cf. Driscoll's
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event, there should be no doubt that a court must sustain a creditor's timely
objection to a provision of an order of confirmation purporting to discharge
a nondebtor. 297 A district court opinion that recognized a "retained
jurisdiction" by the bankruptcy court to delete as unenforceable a provision
barring enforcement of a claim against a codebtor is a variant of the cases
treating section 524(e) as a jurisdictional limitation on the bankruptcy court's
powers. 29
The National Bankruptcy Conference's Code Review Project Draft of
January 1, 1993 has proposed that if a full-payment plan is confirmed in a
partnership case, partnership creditors should be enjoined from proceeding

Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States (In re Driscoll's Towing Serv., Inc.), 43 B.R. 647,
650 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (denying motion of IRS for dismissal of debtors' complaint
seeking injunction against assessment of 100% penalties for debtor's corporate tax
obligations pursuant to I.R.C. § 6672, in order to permit debtors to show whether
assessment would interfere with orderly administration of debtors' estate), vacated, 51
B.R. 990 (S.D. Fla. 1985). See generally BROUDE, supra note 73, at 14-18 to -20;
Mitchell E. Jones, Enjoining the IRS from Assessing the 100% Penalty Pursuantto 26
U.S.C. Section 6672: The ContinuingSaga, 90 CoM. L.J. 576 (1985); Stephen H. King,
The Disappearing100% Tax Penalty, 90 CoM. L.J. 356 (1985); Zaretsky, supra note
293, at 260-74.
297. See Consolidated Motor Inns. v. BVA Credit Corp. (In re Consolidated Motor
Inns), 632 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on petitionfor en banc reconsideration,
666 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1140 (1982). This case made two trips
to the court of appeals and a like number to the Supreme Court. The original order of
confirmation of a Chapter XII plan under the Bankruptcy Act had discharged claims of
400 creditors of a debtor partnership against the partners and their spouses, and
distribution checks required the payees to sign releases of the debtor, the partners, and
their spouses. On appeal the district court reversed on the ground that the partners had
no standing to receive a discharge in the partnership's case. A further appeal to the court
of appeals was dismissed, and certiorari was denied in Consolidated Motor Inns v. Alias
Enters., Ltd., 436 U.S. 935 (1978). On remand, the bankruptcy court voided the
discharge of the partners, and the district court affirmed. On a second appeal to the court
of appeals, the court reversed the district court's avoidance of the discharge of the
partners as contrary to the policy of Chapter XII. 632 F.2d at 1183-84. A creditor who
had not consented to the plan obtained an en banc reconsideration of this second ruling.
By a final vote of 21 to 2, the court of appeals affirmed the district court judgment
insofar as it held the confirmation inoperative to discharge claims of "nonassenting
creditors" against the partners and their spouses. 666 F.2d at 191.
298. Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50
B.R. 756, 759-60 (D. Utah 1985) (holding that provision of confirmation order barring
enforcement of claims against codebtor of Chapter 11 debtor was unenforceable by
postconfirmation stay order issued by bankruptcy court, although creditor had not
objected to the provision at confirmation hearing; stating that res judicata was not
contravened because bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to delete provision beyond its
jurisdiction to approve in the confirmation order).
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against partners, so long as payments under the plan are met. 299 "A
change could be made in section 1141" to reflect this proposal, and "it
might also be necessary to amend section 524(e), although the injunction
might already be understood to be consistent with the idea that the
nondebtor's obligation cannot be discharged."" The proposal contemplated that if the plan provisions are not met, the partnership creditors should
be free to proceed against the partners. The injunction would thus not be
tantamount to a complete or permanent discharge. The Draft included the
following additional observations regarding this proposal:
[The Conference expects that plans will ordinarily have both limitations
on partner transfers and other protections to assure partner compliance
with the plan. In some cases, such protections may become requirements
to find that the plan is feasible.
The Conference believes that the normal rules governing bankruptcy
settlements should be applicable, and that the courts have the power to
release the general partner (as part of the plan or a separately approved
compromise) from post confirmation claims of creditors of the partnership and contribution and indemnity claims of other (non-settling)
30
general partners. 1
7. Dischargeabilityof Administrative Claims
It is frequently assumed that, to be allowable or dischargeable, a claim
or debt must have arisen or been in existence at, or even prior to, the filing
of the petition by or against the debtor. However, it is clear that a claim and
a debt may be postpetition. Section 1141(d) declares that confirmation
discharges debts that arose before confirmation, 3" and section 305 and
subdivisions (g), (h), and (i) of section 502 provide for the allowance of
postpetition claims. Since section 1129(a)(9)(A) requires claims for

299. NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 170.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (1988). In Fonda Group, Inc. v. Contemporary

Packaging Corp. (In re Fonda Group, Inc.), 108 B.R. 962 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989), the
court noted that the original bankruptcy bills introduced in the 95th Congress and the
accompanying House and Senate Reports referred to claims arising "'before the date of
the order for relief,'" and that "[tihe legislative history provides no insight as to the
change." Id. at 966 n.3. The section on discharge in the reorganization chapter of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1973 proposed by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
simply provided that "[tihe confirmation of a plan shall ... extinguish all claims against
the debtor other than those excepted from discharge under section 4-506." REPORT I,
supra note 6, at 255. Section 4-506 excepted from discharge certain claims against
individual debtors, as does section 1141(d) of the enacted Bankruptcy Code.
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administrative expenses to be paid in cash as a condition for confirmation
unless the claimant agrees to different treatment, the question of the effect
of confirmation on unpaid administrative expenses does not often arise. In
any event, judicial dicta and commentary that appear to require claims to
have arisen prepetition, rather than preconfirmation, in order to be
discharged by the confirmation must be regarded as erroneous.
Even when an erstwhile Chapter 11 debtor cannot invoke confirmation
of a plan as a discharge pursuant to section 1141, there are difficulties
confronting an administrative expense claimant who seeks to collect the
claim from the debtor after the close of the case. Neither the debtor nor its
successor is an obligor with respect to administrative claims. While efforts
to collect administrative expense claims from a debtor after the close of a
case have no doubt typically come to naught, 3 there are surprisingly a
number of cases where courts have allowed recovery of such claims from
the debtor or an entity liable for the debtor's obligations. 3"

303. See, e.g., McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 332 (1891) (judgments against
equity receiver payable only from the funds in his hands); In re Western Farmers Ass'n,
13 B.R. 132 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1981) (acknowledging that administrative expense
claims are worthless if the estate would not be sufficient to pay them); cf. Bright v. Fred
C. Sproul, Inc., 616 P.2d 189 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (dismissing, for lack of
jurisdiction, action filed in state court by attorney to collect fee for services rendered to
Chapter XI debtor-in-possession).
304. In re Alton, 81 B.R. 97 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that tax liability
incurred by partnership during pendency of its Chapter 11 case was not chargeable as
administrative expense of Chapter 11 estate of general partner; stating that claim of state
for unemployment taxes was nevertheless allowable as a seventh priority pursuant to
§ 507(a)(7)(C), although claim apparently arose postpetition); In re Safren, 65 B.R. 566,
571-72 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that claim for brokerage services rendered a
partnership as a debtor-in-possession survived dismissal of its Chapter 11 case and was
assertable against estates of partners in consolidated Chapter 11 cases, but not as priority
administrative expense claims); Birmingham Elec. Battery Co. v. Elmer's Auto Parts (In
re Elmer's Auto Parts), 34 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (declaring that holder
of unpaid administrative expense claim arising during course of Chapter 11 case was
"free to proceed against the Debtor despite the Debtor's discharge in bankruptcy in any
Court having jurisdiction; provided further, that such leave to proceed is stayed so long
as Debtor pays $25 per month until the debt is paid in full and Creditor is enjoined from
attempting to collect ...by either civil or criminal process"); In re Mann, 4 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 514, 523 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1978) (although holding that administrative
expense claimants were compensable only out of estate, allowing debtor's attorney to be
compensated out of postpetition acquisitions of debtor for postpetition services in seeking
discharge); Mt. Wheeler Power v. Gallagher, 653 P.2d 1212 (Nev. 1982) (holding that
claim for administrative expenses incurred by partnership as Chapter XII debtor in
receiving electrical services was collectible from partners after case was closed); cf.
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Manton, 164 U.S. 636, 639-41 (1897) (holding debtor liable
for tort inflicted during operations of railroad by equity receiver where debtor had
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Section 348, which prescribes the effects of conversion of a case,
generally provides that a preconversion claim shall be treated as a prepetition claim but excepts from that provision a claim specified in section
503(b).30 5 Accordingly several cases have recognized continuing priority
in a converted case for administrative claims that arose in the superseded
Chapter 11 case.30 6 The surviving priority has not been protected, however, against subordination to administrative claims arising in a superseding
Chapter 7 case. 3°
In a recent case, In re Benjamin Coal Co.,3' the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit acknowledged the argument of a creditor for priority
for a postpetition loan and for its continuity under section 348(d). However,
the court rejected the argument on the ground that the confirmation of the
plan had discharged the preconfirmation priority claim and that the new

procured or at least acquiesced in termination of receivership without a sale of the assets,
and restoration of the assets to the debtor was deemed to be subject to an assumption by
the debtor of liability for valid, unpaid claims against the receiver); In re Cardinal
Indus., 151 B.R. 833 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (equipment lessor's claims against general
partner, a Chapter 11 debtor, based on postpetition modification of leases with limited
partnerships, denied classification as administrative expense since no direct and
substantial benefit to partner's estate was shown; postpetition debt of partnership said,
however, not to be precluded from constituting administrative claim against general
partner as a matter of law).
305. 11 U.S.C. § 348. Section 348(d) provides:
A claim against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for
relief but before conversion in a case that is converted under section
1112 ...

of this title, other than a claim specified in section 503(b) of this

title, shall be treated for all purposes as if such claim has arisen immediately
before the date of the filing of the petition.
306. In re Peter DelGrande Corp., 138 B.R. 458, 461-62 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992)
(holding that interest accruing on Chapter 11 debtor's postpetition tax liability retained
status as administrative expense notwithstanding conversion be first priority); White Front
Feed & Seed, v. State Nat'l Bank (In re Ramaker), 117 B.R. 959, 962 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1990) (holding that, despite failure of farm reorganization, expenses incurred in
farm operation retained administrative expense priority after conversion); In re Iberis
Int'l, Inc. 72 B.R. 624, 627 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986); In re Kaleidoscope of High
Point, Inc., 56 B.R. 562, 564 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1986).
307. In re Peter DeIGrande Corp., 138 B.R. at 462 n.6; White Front Feed & Seed,
117 B.R. at 962; In re Kaleidoscope of High Point, Inc., 56 B.R. 562; In re BlantonSmith Corp., 44 B.R. 73, 75 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (administrative expense claimant
who waived right to full payment out of Chapter 11 debtor's estate in exchange for
perfected security interest in recoveries for preferential transfers nevertheless subordinated to administrative claims for expenses incurred postconversion in Chapter 7 case),
rev'd, 81 B.R. 440 (M.D. Tenn. 1987). Blanton-Smith is criticized by BROUDE, supra
note 73, at 14.6.
308. 978 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1992).
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30 9
claim created by the plan was merely a contractual nonpriority claim.
Since the claimant in the Benjamin case had "failed timely to file his 'new'
contractual claim in [the debtor's] Chapter 7 case," the court disallowed the
31 0
claim.
An issue similar to that discussed in the previous paragraph arises when
a Chapter 11 debtor fails to perform an obligation assumed in a confirmed
plan and then files a second Chapter 11 petition. Section 348(d) does not
apply, and the courts have generally rejected creditors' arguments for
survival of the priority of an administrative expense claim against the estate
of the Chapter 11 debtor in the second Chapter 11 case. The most noteworthy case of this genre is In re Jartran, Inc.,3n where the Seventh Circuit
recognized the propriety of the filing of a second Chapter 11 petition when
the debtor was seeking liquidation rather than reorganization. The bankruptcy court,312 district court, 3 and court of appeals 314 rejected efforts of
creditors to assert priority for administrative expenses deemed to have been
incurred during the first Chapter 11 case.31 5

309. The Benjamin case was followed in Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Erie Hilton
Joint Venture (In re Erie Hilton Joint Venture), 157 B.R. 244 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993)
(holding that, after confirmation of Chapter 11 plan and conversion of case to one under
Chapter 7, creditor's sole remedy for nonpayment of administrative expense as provided
in Chapter 11 plan was the filing of a proof of claim in the Chapter 7 case; stating that
creditor did not retain right to administrative claim after confirmation but only to
contractual right to full payment of claim in accordance with the plan).
310. Benjamin Coal, 978 F.2d at 828; see also infra note 314 (noting the similar fate
of the administrative expense claim in the Jartrancase).
311. 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g 87 B.R. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'g 71 B.R.
938, 944-45 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987). The Jartrancase is further discussed infra text
accompanying notes 411-418.
312. 71 B.R. at 945 (denying creditor's claim to administrative claim priority for
$1,500,000 incurred in marshaling and repossessing leased equipment, because the
expense was incurred for the claimant's benefit).
313. 87 B.R. at 528 (affirming bankruptcy court's denial of administrative expense
priority for rejection of executory contract during pendency of Chapter 11).
314. 886 F.2d at 870-71 (denying continuity of administrative expense priority from
JartranI to JartranII, denying priority to claim for rejection of executory contract
during JartranI, and denying priority to claim for postconfirmation expenses because
expenses conferred no benefit on estate).
1987)
315. See also In re Jartran, Inc., 76 B.R. 123, 125-26 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
(holding that truck lessor's administrative expense claim arising in first Chapter 11 case
was discharged by confirmation of plan, stating that unpaid liability under first case plan
became unsecured claim in superseding second case, and denying lessor's request for
extension of time for filing unsecured claim). Jartranwas followed in United States v.
Shepherd Oil, Inc. (In re Shepherd Oil, Inc.), 118 B.R. 741,747 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990)
("The priority that a creditor may have in the initial Chapter 11 proceedings does not
necessarily carry over in the subsequently filed Chapter 11 proceedings if the debtor has
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The Seventh Circuit distinguished Jartran in a subsequent case that
sustained a claim to a continuing priority for trust fund taxes after confirmation of a plan in its first Chapter 11 case and the filing of a second case by
the same debtor.3" 6 The Third Circuit in Benjamin Coal appropriately
questioned the Seventh Circuit's disregard of the mandate of section 1141(d)
discharging all preconfirmation claims, including tax claims.317
8. Dischargeability of Liability to Disgorgea
Voidable Preference
Whether the right of a debtor-in-possession or trustee to recover a
voidable preference from a preconfirmation creditor was a dischargeable
claim has been considered in at least two cases. In Fonda Group, Inc. v.
Contemporary Packaging Corp. (In re Fonda Group, Inc.),3 "s the court
found no reason to exclude such a right from the scope of a "claim" that
must be filed within the time prescribed by the court in the transferee
creditor's case. Fonda filed an adversary proceeding, in the court where its
Chapter 11 case was pending, to avoid a preference allegedly received by
Contemporary. The proceeding was filed eight months after confirmation of
a plan of reorganization had been entered in Contemporary's Chapter 11
case. Contemporary argued that the confirmation in its case constituted a
discharge of any obligation to return the preference. Citing In re Remington
Rand Corp."9 for the proposition that a claim arises under the Bankruptcy
Code only when the claimant knows of its existence, the court ruled that
Contemporary would "have to establish at trial not only Fonda's knowledge
of Contemporary's Chapter 11 case but also knowledge of the bar dates
within which Fonda had to file or otherwise give notice of its claim. "320
After citing New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. 321 and its progeny, 3" the court added cryptically, "The applicability of those cases may
be limited by reason of the fact that Fonda was not a 'creditor.' "31
engaged in serial filings of Chapter 11 petitions.") (citing Jartran, 886 F.2d 859).
316. In re Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of White Farm Equip. Co., 943
F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292 (1992).
317. In re Benjamin Coal Co., 978 F.2d 823, 828 (3d Cir. 1992) (pointing out that
the Senate version of § 1141(d)(2) had saved certain taxes from discharge, but that the
Senate acceded to the House's objections to the "undesirable uncertainty surrounding
[corporate or partnership] reorganizations" that would result from retaining an exception

of taxes from discharge).
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

108 B.R. 962, 966, 970-71 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989).
836 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1988), discussedsupra note 125.
108 B.R. at 966.
344 U.S. 293 (1953).
See supra text accompanying notes 99-115.
108 B.R. at 966. The court's rejection of Contemporary's defenses of equitable
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In Ossen v. First Software Corp. (In re Northeastern Software)324 the
court likewise assumed that the rules governing the filing of claims were
applicable to a transferor's avoidance proceeding. Accordingly, the court
denied the transferee's motion for summary judgment. The transferee's
position was predicated on the transferor's failure to file a proof of claim
and on the transferee's lack of knowledge that the transferor had a
"preference claim." The transferee was a Chapter 11 debtor whose plan had
been confirmed in February 1987, nearly four months after the transferor
had filed its Chapter 11 petition, but a month before the transferor filed an
adversary proceeding in its own Chapter 11 case to recover $648,649.42 in
preferential payments. The court cited cases that differed about what
constitutes adequate notice when a debtor does not know about a creditor's
claim and the creditor has knowledge of the debtor's bankruptcy case.
However, the court explained that it did not have to resolve the conflict
among the cases because a dispute existed about whether the transferee knew
of the transferor's claim. Inferentially such knowledge would have imposed
a duty on the transferee to give notice to the transferor of the bar date for
filing claims and perhaps other relevant dates in the transferor's Chapter 11
case. To convert a transferor of a preference into a creditor because of the
possibility of a future avoidance proceeding is a distortion of the ordinary
meaning of the term as used in the Bankruptcy Code and the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. 3"
The implication of the courts' treatment of the right to avoid a
preference as a claim that must be filed within the time limitations, and
subject to the other requirements that apply to a claim as the term is used
in subchapter I of Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code and in Part III of the
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is at best questionable. Indeed, it is
contrary to the understanding underlying the provisions of the Code and
Rules that apply to claims to construe them as applicable to avoidance
proceedings under Subchapter III of Chapter 5 of the Code and the Rules

and judicial estoppel and res judicata was not exceptionable. Contemporary contended
that when Fonda requested orders reducing and expunging claims, including that of
Contemporary, it should have joined its claim against Contemporary based on voidable
preferences. But the court answered that Bankruptcy Rule 7018 does not mandatejoinder
of claims and that Rule 7013 does not compel the filing of a counterclaim. The court
further suggested that § 546(a)(1) may contain a subtle accommodation of a debtor's
inclination to leave a preference intact. Id. at 969-70.
324. 111 B.R. 387 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990).
325. Thus, in Koch Refining Co. v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc., 831 F.2d
1339, 1351-52 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988), the court held that
potential defendants in preference actions brought by the trustee could not be considered
'creditors" for the purpose of enabling the trustee to sue under § 544(b) to avoid a
transfer voidable by creditors under nonbankruptcy law.
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governing adversary proceedings under Part VII. Insofar as Fonda Group
or Northeastern Software hold or suggest that any entity which has received
a preconfirmation transfer remains vulnerable to postconfirmation avoidance
of the transfer unless it can establish its ignorance of the transferor's case
or, alternatively, monitors the transferor's case and makes certain that the
transferee receives formal notice of all the steps in the transferor's case,
these cases can hardly be taken seriously. The court in Fonda Group
avoided a determination about whether the transferor could file a claim and
limited its authority to a determination of whether the transferor had a
preference claim, leaving to the court where Contemporary's case was
pending, to determine how the claim should be treated.326 The court in
Northeastern Software simply denied the transferee's motion for summary
judgment because of its failure to carry the burden of showing its lack of
knowledge of the transferor's claim.3 27
9. Nondischargeabilityof Postconfirmation Claims
Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan does not discharge a postconfirmation claim.328

326. 108 B.R. at 970-71.
327. 111 B.R. at 390-91.
328. Shure v. Vermont (In re Sure-Snap Corp.), 983 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (11th Cir.
1993) (holding that confirmation did not discharge liability of debtor for attorney's fees
incurred in defending postconfirmation appeal initiated by the debtor); Bank of La. v.
Pavlovich (In re Pavlovich), 952 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that, although
creditor was bound by confirmation order insofar as it discharged debtor's liability for
preconfirmation debts and acts, creditor whose claims arose from and after confirmation
as not barred from asserting such claims), discussedin Zaretsky, supra note 75, at 3; In
re Central R.R., 950 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that claim of former employee
against successor-in-interest to railroad reorganized under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act
accrued under both bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law when claimant discovered or
reasonable persons would have discovered injury resulting from exposure to toxic
substances while working for railroad; denying successor's request for injunctive relief
against prosecution of lawsuits under Federal Employers' Liability Act, notwithstanding
provision of § 77 rendering property dealt with by reorganization plan free and clear of
claims of creditors), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1586 (1992); Zulkowski v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 852 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 994 (1988), cited supra
note 182; Farber v. Wards Co., 825 F.2d 684, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting debtor's
argument that landlord's claim for damages for breach of lease in failing to remove
fixtures on termination of lease should be dismissed as barred by discharge or allowed
as prepetition claim entitled to distribution as an unsecured claim); Schweitzer v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 943-44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864
(1985), cited anddiscussedsupra text accompanying notes 173-179; Continental Country
Club, Inc. v. Burr (In re Continental Country Club, Inc.), 114 B.R. 763,767-68 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that claim of former employee of reorganized debtor for
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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III. POSTCONFIRMATION PROCEEDINGS

A. Implementation of Plan
The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that the court will, to the extent
necessary, enter orders to effectuate or implement the plan. Section 1142(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code directs the debtor and any entity organized to carry
out a plan to comply with "any orders of the court."329 Section 1142(b)
expressly authorizes the court to
direct the debtor and any other necessary party to execute or deliver or

to join the execution or delivery of any instrument required to effect a
transfer of property dealt with by a confirmed plan, and to perform any
other act, including the satisfaction of any lien, that is necessary for the
330
consummation of the plan.

Generally speaking, the provisions of a confirmed plan are intended to
preempt otherwise applicable law. Congress attempted to express this intent
by providing in Bankruptcy Code section 1142(a) that "[n]otwithstanding
any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, rule, or regulation relating to
financial condition, the debtor and any entity organized or to be organized
for the purpose of carrying out the plan shall carry out the plan and shall
comply with any orders of the court. "331 The Bankruptcy Commission's
termination wages under employment contract was not discharged by confirmation of
plan since claim arose postconfirmation); Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co. v. Good (In re
Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co.), 56 B.R. 492 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (holding debtor
liable for reasonable value of postconfirmation storage notwithstanding rejection by plan
of contract of bailment of debtor's truck to defendant). But in In re Pettibone Corp., 151
B.R. 178 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1992), the court held that a confirmed plan barred the
allowance of postconfirmation interest to products liability claimants, even though there
was adequate insurance to cover the interest.
In In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), the
bankruptcy court disallowed a claim for $10,000,000 filed by a legal representative on
behalf of persons asserting liability by the debtor based on postconfirmation events. The
court emphasized that it was not determining whether any or all holders of future claims
against the debtor based on postconfirmation events may have a future nonbankruptcy
remedy.
329. 11 U.S.C. § 1142(a) (1988). See Lewis U. Davis, Jr. et al., Corporate
Reorganizations in the 1990s: Guiding Directors of Troubled CorporationsThrough
Uncertain Territory, 47 Bus. LAW. 1, 30-31 (1991).
330. 11 U.S.C. § 1142(b). See Lander & Warfield, supra note 73, at 205-06.
331. 11 U.S.C. § 1142(a); see Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers' Ass'n,
997 F.2d 581,587 n.11 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Regardless of any plan provision, a bankruptcy
court has statutory jurisdiction under 11 U.S.C. § 1142(b) to ensure that any act
necessary for the consummation of the plan is carried out and it has continuing
responsibilities to satisfy itself that the plan is being properly implemented."); Findley
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proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973 was more specific; section 7-312(a) stated
that
the debtor and any corporation organized for the purpose of carrying out
the plan shall have full power and authority to take all action necessary
to carry out the plan and the orders of the court, notwithstanding any
law or court decision or regulation of any regulatory agency of any state
or subdivision thereof to the contrary, except that if the debtor is a
public utility, the debtor or any successor corporation shall obtain the
consent of any regulatory
agency having jurisdiction over the debtor as
332
to any rate change.
The Bankruptcy Code expressly deals only with jurisdiction over public
utility rates. Section 1129(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code preserves the
authority of the applicable rate-setting body by providing that the court may
confirm the plan if "[a]ny governmental regulatory commission with
jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan, over the rates of the debtor has
approved any rate change provided for in the plan, or such rate change is
expressly conditioned on such approval. " 333 In an attempt to state more
clearly the preemption intended, Congress amended section 1123(a) in
1984. 3 ' This section, which contains the requirements of a plan of
reorganization, was amended in its prefatory phrase by adding "[n]otwithstanding any otherwise applicable bankruptcy law. " 3 ' This amendment
still left in doubt the preemptive effect as to provisions not found in section
1123, such as the power of local governing bodies over utilities in addition
to their power over rates covered by section 1129(a)(6).336

v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S.Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721, 750 (2d Cir. 1992)
(rejecting objections to postconfirmation appointment of experts to advise on estimating
future claims), modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A. v. Sultan Corp. (In re Sultan Corp.), 81 B.R. 599, 602 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987)
(approving postconfirmation award of attorney's fees for legal services rendered by
debtor's attorney); In re Auto W., Inc., 43 B.R. 761 (D. Utah 1984) (approving postconfirmation employment of counsel to represent debtor in state court litigation); In re Tri-L
Corp., 65 B.R. 774, 779 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986) (allowing administrative claim for
postconfirmation legal services performed in aid of consummation of Chapter 11 plan and
pursuant to plan's directives); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a), discussed infra notes 334336 and accompanying text. See generally BROUDE, supra note 73, §§ 9.01, 14.02[1].
332. REPORT II, supra note 7, at 255-56.
333. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(6).
334. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, sec. 449, § 507(a), 98 Stat. 333, 374.
335. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a).

336. Section 7-310(d) of the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, which contained the
prerequisites of confirmation, provided in subparagraph 2(F) that a regulatory
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A rather plain vanilla example of the exercise of postconfirmation
implementation authority is Texas Extrusion Corp. v. Lockheed Corp. (In re
Texas Extrusion Corp.). 33 7 In that case, the court directed counsel for the
debtors to execute documents. An unusual example of an implementation
order was an order of a bankruptcy court appointing a trustee postconfirmation, despite the objection of the United States trustee that the plan must
provide its own liquidating agent.338
In addition to Bankruptcy Code section 1142 and the inherent power of
a court to enforce its own decrees, section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code is
another source of power for the court to enter orders implementing plans.
Additional support is found in Bankruptcy Rule 7070, which incorporates
Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although this rule applies
only in adversary proceedings, the court is empowered under Bankruptcy
Rule 9014 to make it applicable to contested matters. Thus, the power of the
court to direct a party to perform some act required under the plan is
express under Bankruptcy Rule 7070. Moreover, this power can be
exercised either in an adversary proceeding initiated to compel performance
or by way of a motion to compel performance pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
9013, unless Rule 7001(7), which defines an adversary proceeding to
include one to obtain an injunction
or other equitable relief, compels the
339
filing of an adversary proceeding.
B. Modification of Plan
The Bankruptcy Act and the Bankruptcy Rules applicable to reorganization cases allowed the modification of plans postconfirmation. If the
modification materially and adversely affected the interests of creditors or

commission must approve a rate change. REPORT II, supra note 7, at 253. This approach
was followed in the Bankruptcy Code, and § 1129(a)(6) at best gives only a negative
inference that regulatory commissions are preempted as to other matters, e.g., the capital
structure of the reorganized utility, and perhaps as to rate changes during the pendency
of a Chapter 11 case. The Bankruptcy Code failed to include a provision like that of § 7312(a) of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973. See supra text accompanying note 332.
337. 844 F.2d 1142, 1153-54 (5th Cir.) (relying on FED. R. BANKR. P. 7070, which
applies FED. R. Civ. PROC. 70 to adversary proceedings), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926
(1988).
338. In re Nigg, 63 B.R. 630 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986). Contra In re U.S. Truck Co.,
47 B.R. 932 (E.D. Mich. 1985), aft'd, 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
339. In Harlow v. Palouse Producers Inc. (In re Harlow Properties, Inc.), 56 B.R.
794, 797-98 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1985), an adversary proceeding was used to compel a
recalcitrant debtor to transfer property pursuant to the provisions of a confirmed plan.
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the bankruptcy court's order
compelling the transfer due to a failure to serve the complaint on the debtor's principals.
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stockholders in a Chapter X case, a hearing was necessary. Neither section
222 of the Bankruptcy Act nor former Rule 10-306 specified a standard for
approval of a modification of a Chapter X plan by the court. Section 222 did
not limit standing to propose a modification. Section 229c did, however,
preclude material and adverse modification of a Chapter X plan after
substantial consummation. 340
The provisions of Chapter XI differed. Only the debtor could propose
a Chapter XI plan or its modification.3 4' Postconfirmation modification
was dependent on an express reservation of jurisdiction to do so; however,
even this power over the time of payment of deferred installments or a
reduction in the amount of the payments was precluded if the payments had
been fully made or were represented by negotiable promissory notes that had
been delivered to creditors.342
Postconfirmation modification under Chapter XII of confirmed real
property arrangements was permitted by section 469 of the Bankruptcy Act.
This section required that the court authorize the modification, but no
standard was provided. Unlike Chapters X and XI, Chapter XII included no
provision for an express end to the modification power.
The proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973 utilized a different approach to
modification. Reorganizations that were routed on four tracks under
Chapters VIII, X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act were channeled onto
a single track in Chapter 11. Professor Lawrence P. King was the initial
draftsman. He was also the Reporter for the Chapter X, XI, and XII Rules
and used an early draft of the Chapter X Rules as the basis for the first draft
of the consolidated chapter. Thus, Chapter VII of the Proposed Bankruptcy
Act of 1973 took on the appearance of Chapter X in large part. Section 7305 thereof allowed a material and adverse modification up to the point of
substantial consummation. This approach was followed in Bankruptcy Code
section 1127(b), which allows the proponent of a plan or the reorganized
debtor to modify a confirmed plan prior to substantial consummation.343
There has been some litigation about the meaning of substantial
consummation, a defined term under Chapter 11. 14 For example, in In re

340. See Bankruptcy Act § 229c, 11 U.S.C. § 629(c) (1976) (repealed 1978).
341. Bankruptcy Act §§ 306, 363, and 387(1), 11 U.S.C. §§ 706, 763, and 787(1)
(1976) (repealed 1978); see also Bankr. R. 11-36(a), 11-39, and 11-40.
342. If fraud was "practiced" in procuring confirmation, modification was also
permitted. Bankruptcy Act § 386, 11 U.S.C. § 786 (1976) (repealed 1978).
343. 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b) (1988). Surprisingly, there has been litigation about whether
one other than the proponent or reorganized debtor may propose a material and adverse
modification. See Solon Automated Servs., Inc. v. Georgetown of Kettering, Ltd. (In re
Georgetown of Kettering, Ltd.), 22 B.R. 312 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (precluding
proposed modification by other than reorganized debtor or plan proponent).
344. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2).
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Heatron,34 5 the bankruptcy court concluded that completion of 53 % of the
payments required under the plan did not constitute substantial consummation.346 Although the debtor satisfied the third prong of the definition"commencement of distribution under the plan" 34 7-it did not satisfy the
first prong-"transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by
the plan to be transferred. "348 The court thus equated payments to transfers of property. The Heatron case has been criticized for eviscerating the
third prong of the definition.34 9
Not surprisingly there has been litigation as to the meaning of
"transfer" as used in this definition. In FederalLand Bank of Louisville v.
Gene Dunavent & Son Dairy (In re Gene Dunavent & Son Dairy),35° the
court held that delivery into escrow pending the outcome of an appeal did
not constitute a transfer within the meaning of the definition of substantial
consummation. On the other hand, in Hyman v. University Cafeteria, Inc.

(In re University Cafeteria, Inc.),35 the court held that the sale of a
majority of the debtor's assets was sufficient to constitute substantial
consummation.
Courts have attempted to circumvent the limits on modification. For
3 52
example, in the Manville reorganization the first attempt was successful.
There, the trustees of the trust created under the plan made a motion to
suspend operation of the claims resolution facility when there would no
longer be funds available to make payments. The court upheld this action as
a variation with respect to timing and intensity of claim processing, rather
than a modification prohibited by section 1127(b).
The second effort, however, was unsuccessful, but only at the appellate
level. 353 This effort involved much more pervasive changes. Again, propo-

345. 34 B.R. 526 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).
346. Id. at 529; see also Jorgenson v. Federal Land Bank (In re Jorgenson), 66 B.R.
104 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986). Contra In re Hayball Trucking, Inc., 67 B.R. 681 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1986). See generally Lander & Warfield, supra note 73; Renata D.
Kendrick, Note, Postconfirmation Modification of the Plan of Reorganization:Section
1127(b), 5 BANKR. DEv. J. 211 (1987).

347. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2)(C).
348. Id. § 1101(2)(A).
349. BROUDE, supra note 73, at 14-27. The National Bankruptcy Conference has
proposed an amendment to § 1101(2) to make it clear that the "transfer of property" test
of subparagraph (H) does not include distribution to creditors as covered by subparagraph
(C). NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 90.
350. 75 B.R. 328, 331-33 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987).
351. 47 B.R. 404 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985).
352. State Gov't Creditors' Comm. for Property & Damage Claims v. McKay (In re
Johns-Manville Corp.), 920 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1990).
353. Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721 (2d
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nents of the changes argued that they were not modifications. The Second
Circuit did not agree, concluding that they were modifications precluded by
section 1127(b). Nonetheless, the Second Circuit left open the possibility of
substantial changes under the guise of a settlement of a "mandatory non-optout class action" under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Second Circuit recognized that the class action rule does not
have the protections afforded by the Bankruptcy Code and that a substantial
question exists as to whether a class action "may be used against an
insolvent entity to adjust the claims of creditors vis-a-vis each other, without
observing the protections that would be available under bankruptcy
law. " " However, the Second Circuit felt bound by its decision in SEC
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, Inc.),355 in which it approved an adjustment of creditors' rights
against an insolvent entity. Since the change was successful only because
"the rights of the plaintiff class [were] revised vis-a-vis each other and
consent to the resulting settlement [was] given by representatives who
purport to represent the undifferentiated class of plaintiffs as a whole, rather
than the interests of each of the subclasses whose rights are being altered,"356 the court remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion.
The confirmed plan in the Manville case established a trust for the
purpose of satisfying "asbestos claims." The trust was funded with
substantial assets,357 but "[d]espite this funding, it soon became apparent
that the liquidation of the claims of thousands of asbestos victims was
substantially depleting the Trust's cash. .

.

. By the spring of 1990, 'the

Trust was effectively out of money to pay its current and short term
obligations.'"35

At the instigation of District Judge Weinstein a non-opt-out class action
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) was filed, accompanied by a proposed and agreed
settlement of the class action.35 9
On the day the complaint was filed, District Judge Weinstein and
Bankruptcy Judge Lifland (hereafter "the Trial Courts") jointly entered
orders to show cause why orders should not be entered (a) conditionally
certifying the class, (b)appointing a legal representative for beneficiaries
Cir. 1992), modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
354. Id. at 736.
355. 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 1070 (1993), and cited
in Findley, 982 F.2d at 737-39.
356. Findley, 982 F.2d at 739.
357. See id. at 725.

358. Id. at 726.
359. Id. at 727.
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of the Trust who have not yet asserted asbestos claims, and (c) staying
all proceedings against the Trust pending determination of the class
action. A hearing was scheduled for November 23, four days after the
complaint was filed (and the day after Thanksgiving). On November 23,
after hearing oral argument, the Trial Courts entered orders (1)
conditionally certifying the class and appointing representative counsel,
(2) setting fairness hearings in four cities and approving a form of
notice, (3) staying payments by the Trust, (4) staying proceedings
against the Trust, (5) making exceptions to th6 order staying proceedings, and (6) appointing counsel as representatives for defendants, other
than the Trust, in pending asbestos litigation.
Copies of the foregoing orders were mailed to counsel for each
known claimant and each co-defendant and to approximately 1,500 pro
se claimants. Copies were also distributed to all courts in which the
Trust was a party to litigation, and to various other interested persons.
Notice of the proposed settlement was published in 11 major newspapers. Hearings on the fairness of the proposed settlement were conducted in four cities. The hearings, conducted over eight days, received
evidence from proponents of the settlement and objectors. Thirty-seven
witnesses and attorneys were heard.
On February 3, 1991, the Trial Courts issued an Order and Partial
Judgment, certifying a mandatory non-opt-out class under Rule
23(b)(1)(B). At that time a motion by a member of the class to opt out
was denied.3 °
The settlement established a distribution mechanism that divided the
claims into two levels and discriminated as to the treatment of the two levels.361 Several challenges to the ruling were made on appeal. The ones
relied on by the Second Circuit in vacating the judgment were (1) inappropriate subclasses362 and (2) impermissible modification of a confirmed plan.363

360. Id. at 728-29 (citations omitted).
361. Id. at 729.
362. The court stated:
We are therefore willing to permit the use of such a class action in the
pending case, so long as there exists, as occurred in Drexel, appropriate
designation of subclasses to provide assurance that the consent of groups of
claimants who are being treated differently by the settlement is being given
by those who fairly and adequately represent only the members of each group.
The inevitable tension between the limited protections of Rule 23 and the
more complete protections of the Bankruptcy Code is strained by any use of
a mandatory non-opt-out class to settle claims against an insolvent entity that
is subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction. But that tension reaches the breaking
point when, instead of the traditional limited fund settlement that achieves a
pro rata reduction of the claims of all members of the plaintiff class, the
rights of the plaintiff class are revised vis-a-vis each other and consent to the
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The Second Circuit panel that decided the appeal 3" was very wary of
the use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as a means of settling creditors' claims against
an insolvent entity." The protections afforded creditors under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) are considerably weaker than those offered under the Bankruptcy

resulting settlement is given by representatives who purport to represent the
undifferentiated class of plaintiffs as a whole, rather than the interests of each
of the subclasses whose rights are being altered.
Id. at 739.
363. The court also stated:
Though the Trial Courts relied primarily on the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction and the application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as authority to approve the
Settlement restructuring the Trust, they also invoked their bankruptcy
jurisdiction to some unspecified extent. We therefore proceed to inquire
whether approval of the Settlement is valid in the exercise of the Trial Courts'
bankruptcy jurisdiction. The objecting health claimants contend that the
modification of their rights as Class-4 creditors is not authorized by the Plan
or its attached documents and, in any event, violates section 1127 of the
Code. We consider first the amending authority within the Plan.
Id. at 745-46.
364. Circuit Judges Feinberg, Newman, and Winter.
365. See Findley, 982 F.2d at 735-36:
The Trial Courts concluded that the insolvency of the Manville Trust
rendered it a "limited fund." Plainly, insolvency does not present the classic
instance of a "limited fund," such as would be involved if a group of
claimants asserted claims of an aggregate amount that would deplete a fixed
sum of money. Whether, and for what purposes, (b)(1)B) may be used with
respect to an insolvent entity are perplexing issues that we would have
expected to have received more extended consideration than is apparent in the
cases thus far decided.
With respect to aggregate claims in excess of a fixed sum of money, a
(b)(1)(B) class action is appropriate to avoid an unfair preference for the early
claimants at the expense of later claimants. With respect to an insolvent
entity, however, bankruptcy law is normally the source of protection to assure
a fair and orderly distribution of assets insufficient to meet claims. Insolvency
exerts powerful pressures upon contending creditors to compromise their
positions so that a fair distribution of assets is achieved-through a reorganization that contemplates the continuation of the debtor where feasible, and
otherwise through liquidation. To lessen the risk that these pressures will lead
to unfair compromises, bankruptcy law provides numerous safeguards not
contained in class action procedures. For example, for a plan of reorganization to be approved, the plan must be put to a vote of all members of
impaired classes of creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 1126, the vote is taken only after
a solicitation based on a detailed description of the plan, id. § 1125, the plan
can be "crammed down" over the objection of a dissenting class of creditors
only if strict fairness standards are met, id. § 1129(b)(1), and the plan may
not be imposed against the wishes of an impaired class that would fare better
under liquidation, id. § 1129(a)(7).
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Code.366 The panel observed that, but for another Second Circuit panel's
recent decision in In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.,367 "which
approved a more adventuresome use of a class action settlement to make a
non-uniform adjustment of creditors' rights against an insolvent entity,"36 '
it would probably not allow the use of mandatory non-opt-out (b)(1)(B) class
action. However, as the panel acknowledged, Drexel was different in that
it involved a "limited fund," and its use was essential to confirmation of a
plan of reorganization.
On the question of whether the settlement improperly modified a
confirmed, substantially consummated plan, the answer was that the Plan

366. See id. at 736:
These differences raise a substantial question whether a class action may
be used to adjust claims against an insolvent entity that is eligible for
bankruptcy protection. And, even if, in the context of insolvency, a "limited
fund" class action may be used for its traditional purpose of effecting a pro
rata reduction of all claims, an even more substantial question is raised as to
whether a class action may be used against an insolvent entity to adjust the
claims of creditors vis-a-vis each other, without observing the protections that
would be available under bankruptcy law.
(citing Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875
(1952)).
Interestingly, two of the major cases permitting this use of the Rule have been
decided by Judge Weinstein. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F.
Supp. 1407 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); see also SEC v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 113 S.Ct. 1070 (1993); Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re
Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litig.), 693 F.2d 847, 851
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky.
1977).

In Keene Corp. v. Fiorelli (In re Joint E.& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), _F.3d
,
1993 WL 497538 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 1993), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reaffirmed its reservations about the availability of a class action for dealing with mass
tort claims in lieu of resort to the bankruptcy laws. The Keene Corporation, alleging an
insufficiency of assets to permit a case-by-case adjudication of all asbestos claims filed
against it, filed a mandatory, non-opt-out, limited, final class action under FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(1)(B). The court of appeals held the complaint insufficient to state a case or
controversy adjudicable by a district court under Article In of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the action as an attempt to evade "the exclusive legal
system established by Congress for debtors to seek relief." Id. at *13. For comment on
this case, see Charles F. Vihon, Is Title 11 Totally Preemptive?, NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISER, Jan. 1994, at 4-6.
367. 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1070 (1993).
368. Findley, 982 F.2d at 737.
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documents provided for modification. The panel found, however, that the
Plan documents did not do so and, therefore, did not discuss whether this
would have been permitted. If permissible, then any plan could waive the
limitation of section 1127(b) in that manner.
The panel easily disposed of the argument (and holding below) that the
modification was permissible since it was a modification of a Plan document, not of the Plan.369 As to argument that the modification was a minor
change of procedure, the court disagreed, but in any event found no such
distinction drawn in section 1127(b).
The court recognized that even though the time to modify had passed,
when a case has not been terminated, the court has ongoing jurisdiction.
"The Bankruptcy Court has continuing responsibilities to satisfy itself that
the Plan is being properly implemented."370 Unfortunately, the court stated
that
[t]he Plan expressly provides that the Court shall retain jurisdiction for
various purposes, including "to determine any and all disputes arising
under the Plan, the Trust Agreement... and the Settlement Agreements," "to enforce and administer the provisions of the Plan," and "to
enter such orders as may be necessary or appropriate ... to facilitate
implementation of the Plan. "371
The implication is that the plan or order of confirmation controls jurisdic37
tion-a suggestion disagreed with previously in this Article. 1
The efforts of Judge Weinstein to solve a difficult problem were
courageous and imaginative. There does not appear to be any good reason
why the non-opt-out procedure cannot work. Judge Weinstein's effort failed

369. See id. at 748:
The Trial Courts additionally sought to avoid the restrictions of section
1127(b) by contending that the settlement effects no change in the Plan, but

only in Plan-related documents. As the Trial Courts' Opinion states, "We
have found no case that has applied section 1127(b) to bar variations in a
plan-related document." That argument will not suffice. It could be said with
equal conviction that no case has ever approved variations in a plan-related
document, without regard to section 1127(b), where the effect is to alter
substantial rights of creditors. The question remains whether a change that
would contravene section 1127(b) if made in the provisions of a plan can be

accomplished by modifying the provisions of a plan-related document. The
answer must be no.
(citation omitted).
370. Id. at 750 (citing In re Dilberts' Quality Supermarkets, Inc., 368 F.2d 911, 924

(2d Cir. 1966); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 97 B.R. 174, 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
371. Id.
372. See supra notes 32 and 40 and accompanying text.
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only because of improper classification. Given a proper classification it may
work, although the Supreme Court might deny the use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
or hold that it is actually a modification impermissible under section
1127(b). The possible alternatives then would be those pointed out by the
majority of the panel:
We need not consider at this time whether any of the changes in
claim adjudication and payment can yet be made by the settlement of a
proper class action or by procedures other than the settlement of a class
action, such as a Chapter 11 proceeding for the Trust itself (if it
qualifies as a business trust, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(8)(A)(v)), a "reopen[ing of] all aspects of the Plan" (as suggested by the appellants,
Joint Brief for Appellants at 50), a consensual modification of the3 7Plan,
3
or, more likely, a second Chapter 11 proceeding for the debtor.
Like Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy
Code does not set forth a standard as to when modification is permissible.
However, section 1127(b) requires that the plan as modified satisfy
requirements of sections 1122 and 1123. Furthermore, the modification is
effective only if the court, after notice and hearing, confirms the modified
plan under section 1129. Thus, it would appear that the standard for
modification is compliance with sections 1122, 1123, and 1129. Nonetheless, at least one bankruptcy judge has required more, such as "unforeseen
and uncontrollable intervening circumstances. "74
Bankruptcy Rule 3019 addresses only modification of an accepted plan
before confirmation. It provides that the court can allow the modification if
it determines that the modification "does not adversely change the treatment
of the claim of any creditor or the interest of any equity security holder who
has not accepted in writing the modification. "17 If the court so finds, the
modification is "deemed accepted by all creditors and equity security holders
who have previously accepted the plan. ,3 76 That procedure seems inconsistent with Bankruptcy Code section 1127(c), which requires that the
proponent of a modification comply with section 1125. If so, it is unenforceable since the Bankruptcy Rules cannot vary the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 3 " The alternative presents difficulties, however, since the

373. Findley, 982 F.2d at 750-51 (citing In re Jartran, Inc., 71 B.R. 938 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill.
1987), aff'd, 87 B.R. 825 (N.D. Ill.
1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989)).
374. In re Ernst, 45 B.R. 700,703-04 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); cf. Federal Land Bank
v. Gene Dunovant & Son Dairy (In re Gene Dunovant & Son Dairy), 75 B.R. 328, 33334 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).

375. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3019.
376. Id.
377. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988). Prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
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confirmation process would start anew; that is, the acceptances and
rejections previously solicited would be ignored, and an amended disclosure
statement and modified plan would have to be filed, the amended disclosure
statement approved, and a new vote taken.
As to postconfirmation modification, there is no applicable Bankruptcy
Rule. The Code comprehensively regulates this area; any modification must
satisfy the requirements of sections 1122, 1123, and 1129, and the
proponent of the modification must jump through the section 1125 hoops as
well. This conclusion seems perfectly clear; nonetheless, some bankruptcy
judges ignore the statute and rule provisions by requiring reballoting only
if there is a material, adverse affect.378 The statute provides some flexibility, however, in that under section 1127(b), the holder of a claim or
interest must change its previous acceptance or rejection, or it will be
deemed to have accepted or rejected in accordance with its prior vote.
Modification of a plan should be distinguished from modification of an
order of confirmation. Bankruptcy Rules 9023 and 9024 make applicable the
post-judgment motion practice of Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. These rules apply to confirmation orders since they are
applicable generally in cases under the Bankruptcy Code.
A request for a new trial, alteration, or amendment of an order of
confirmation must be served within ten days after the entry of the order
under Federal Rule 59, which is applicable without relevant modification by
way of Bankruptcy Rule 9023. Thereafter, relief is available under Federal
Rule 60. Bankruptcy Rule 9024, however, expressly limits the relief under
Federal Rule 60 as to complaints seeking revocation of an order of
confirmation for fraud to those filed within the 180 days allowed by
Bankruptcy Code section 1144, not the one year allowed for motions based
on fraud under Federal Rule 60(b). Federal Rule 60 allows a motion based
on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered
evidence, or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
order, in addition to fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party. Accordingly, it is arguable that an order of confirmation
could be set aside on grounds other than fraud within the Rule 60(b) time
limit of a reasonable time not to exceed a year where the motion is
grounded on, e.g., mistake or newly discovered evidence.
The relevant exception, Bankruptcy Rule 9024(3), shortens the time
1978, 28 U.S.C. § 2075 provided that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976),
amended by Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 247, 92 Stat. 2549, 2672 (1978). According to the
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1001 of the Bankruptcy Rules, "The effect of the
amendment is to require that procedural rules ... be consistent with the bankruptcy
statute, both title 11 and 28 U.S.C."
378. Davis et al., supra note 329, at 30-31.
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within which to file a complaint to revoke an order of confirmation for fraud
to 180 days consistent with section 1144 of the Bankruptcy Code. It is
uncertain whether an order of confirmation can be set aside after ten days
but within 180 days where relief is sought under Federal Rule 60(b) on a
basis other than fraud. Section 1144, read literally, precludes revocation
other than for fraud.
It is hard to determine from Bankruptcy Rule 9024 what was intended;
it appears to conflict with section 1144. Likewise, Bankruptcy Rule 9023
arguably conflicts with section 1144. In re Birdneck Apartment Associates,
II, L.P.3 79 involved an intentional omission of notice to counsel for a
secured creditor of a hearing on confirmation of a plan that would adversely
affect the creditor's secured claim. The plan was confirmed, and after
hearing of this, counsel for the secured creditor filed a motion to vacate the
order of confirmation under Federal Rules 60(b)(3) and (6), as made
applicable by Bankruptcy Rule 9024. Without discussion of 11 U.S.C. §
1144, the court vacated the order of conformation under Federal Rule
60(b)(6).
C. Revocation of Order of Confirmation of Plan
Fraud as used in section 1144 is undefined, but it probably should be
the "but for" cause of the order of confirmation, since section 1144 states
that the order must be procured by fraud before it can be revoked by the
court. One bankruptcy judge faced with a revocation complaint concluded
that section 1144 required "that a showing be made that the court relied
thereon and that a creditor or other party was damaged thereby." 38 °
Those who rely in good faith on the order of confirmation are to be
protected under section 1144(1). The order of revocation must "contain such
provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good
faith reliance on the order of confirmation." 3"' Examples of fraud in the
cases include misrepresentations to the court as to the value of property as
well as a materially defective disclosure. 3" One court distinguished
between fraudulent intent and an intent to defraud, although the distinction

379. 152 B.R. 65 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
380. United States v. Kostoglou (In re Kostoglou), 73 B.R. 596, 599 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1987); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Michelson (In re
Michelson), 141 B.R. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992).
The requirement of court reliance raises interesting problems, e.g., the applicability
of FED. R. EvID. 605.
381. 11 U.S.C. § 1144(1) (1988).
382. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 108 B.R. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Bill Roderick
Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 760 (D. Utah
1985).
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is not self-evident. 3
Even the procedural aspects of revocation are uncertain. Authorities
differ as to whether a complaint under the adversary rules or a motion under
the contested proceeding rules is the appropriate procedural vehicle.
Certainly a complaint is appropriate under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(5), but
that may not mean that a motion under Bankruptcy Rule 9024 is inappropriate. Indeed, such a motion would seem to be most appropriate because a
proceeding is pending, and requiring a new proceeding to be initiated would
be anomalous.
D. Conversion of Case
A Chapter 11 case may be converted under section 1112(b) for a
variety of reasons. Conversion can occur after confirmation of a plan, since
section 1112(b) allows the court to convert to Chapter 7 for cause, including
"3
"inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed plan, 84
"material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan,"" and
"termination of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified
in the plan."386 A debtor probably cannot convert a Chapter 11 case to a
Chapter 7 case after confirmation, except pursuant to section 1112(b), since
section 1112(a) allows only a debtor-in-possession to do so. Although it is
not certain, it is doubtful that a debtor remains a debtor-in-possession
postconfirmation since the debtor as such is revested with the property of the
estate under section 1141 (b) and there is no longer any property of the estate
to manage or possess.387

383. See Kostoglou, 73 B.R. 596.

384. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(7).
385. Id. § 1112(b)(8).
386. Id. § 1112(b)(9).
387. Several courts have held that the estate created on the filing of a Chapter 11 case
terminates on confirmation of a plan. E.g., In re Westholt Mfg., Inc., 20 B.R. 368
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932 (D. Kan.
1984); Abbott v. Blackwelder Furniture Co., 33 B.R. 399 (W.D.N.C. 1983); cf. In re
Tri-L Corp., 65 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986).
The rule was to the contrary under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 228
of the Bankruptcy Act provided that:
Upon the consummation of the plan, the judge shall enter a final decree(I) discharging the debtor from all its debts and liabilities and terminating
all rights and interests of stockholders of the debtor, except as provided in the
plan or in the order confirming the plan or in the order directing or

authorizing the transfer or retention of property;
(2) discharging the trustee if any;

(3)making such provisions by way of injunction or otherwise as may be
equitable; and
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(4) closing the estate.
Bankruptcy Act § 228, 11 U.S.C. § 628 (1976) (repealed 1978). See Meyer v. Kenmore
Granville Hotel Co., 297 U.S. 160 (1936). This is an important issue. Arguably
administrative expenses can be created only so long as there is an estate. See generally
11.15, at 290. This is of critical
6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37,
importance where a plan is confirmed and later there is an order of conversion to
liquidation. Former Bankruptcy Rule 10-215(c)(5) expressly recognized that on
conversion to liquidation the court had the power to allow reasonable compensation for
services rendered and reimbursement of expenses incurred in the Chapter X case. Bankr.
R. 10-215(c)(5); see also Bankr. R. 10-308 (providing that a case could be converted to
a liquidation case after confirmation if the confirmed plan was not consummated and
conversion was in the best interest of the estate and otherwise appropriate under the Act).
In the Westholt case, involving the priority of postconfirmation, preconversion,
federal taxes, a bankruptcy judge held that the rule was changed under Chapter 11 and
that the estate was terminated on confirmation and there was no estate as to which there
could be administrative expenses after confirmation. Westholt Mfg., 20 B.R. at 371-72.
The court relied on 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d), which provides for the discharge of the debtor
on confirmation of a plan. The court also relied on section 348(d), which is clearly
authority to the contrary, since it provides that "the claim arising after the petition and
before conversion, other than a claim specified in section 503(b) of this title, shall be
treated for all purposes as if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the
filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1988). As suggested by one student
commentator, the Westholt court simply rewrote section 348(d) as a result of its
interpretation to read "'[a] claim . . . that arises after the order for relief but not after
confirmation . . ." is treated as though it arose before the filing of the petition.
Hopkinson, supra note 39.
The district court, in affirming the bankruptcy judge, did not rely on section
1141(d) but rather on section 1141(b) and (c). Redmond, 36 B.R. at 934.
The Westholt case has been followed in several recent decisions. In re Ernst, 45
B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Air Ctr., Inc., 48 B.R. 693 (Bankr. W.D. Okl.
1985); Abbott v. Blackwelder Furniture Co., 33 B.R. 399 (W.D.N.C. 1983). In the
Abbott case, the court struggled with § 326(a), which provides that "after an estate is
fully administered and the court has discharged the trustee, the court shall close the
case." 11 U.S.C. § 326(a); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 5009. Bankruptcy Rule 3022
provides for a final decree after an estate is fully administered, and such decree closes
the estate. As pointed out by the student commentator, the Abbott court concluded that:
a case terminates when closed pursuant to section 350, but an estate
terminates upon confirmation.
The Code. . . does not make the artificial distinction between the closing
of the "estate" and a "case" that the Abbott court made. Throughout the Code
and Bankruptcy Rules there are references to the existence of a postconfirmation estate. Section 1112 allows for post-confirmation conversion
when it is in "the best interest of creditors and the estate." Sections 348 and
726 acknowledge that claims against the estate may arise after confirmation.
Also, Bankruptcy Rule 3020(d) specifically provides that "[n]otwithstanding
the entry of an order of confirmation, the court may enter all orders necessary
to administer the estate." Section 350(a) and Rule 3022 provide for the

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

105

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:621

Once a case is converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, section 348 of
the Bankruptcy Code provides that the date of the initial petition, rather than
that of the order of conversion, is, generally speaking, to be considered the
date of the filing of the petition, the commencement of the case, or the order
for relief in the Chapter 7 case as well. There are exceptions under section
348 to the provision that the order of conversion is the order for relief under
Chapter 7. An example of an exception is section 342, which requires notice
of an order for relief and written notice to an individual of each chapter
providing relief for an individual. Obviously, the operative date should be
the filing of the initial petition. However, there is a special rule that
administrative claims in the superseded Chapter 11 will continue their status
as administrative claims;"'8 on the other hand, postpetition claims that are
not administrative claims will be treated as unsecured claims that arose prior
to the filing of the original petition.
There is uncertainty with respect to avoidance powers. Section 348 does
not deal with the avoidance power sections. However, if the original petition
date controls, all transfers during Chapter 11 and subsequent to confirmation
will be postpetition transfers. But section 549(a) concerns only property of
the estate. Thus, after confirmation of a plan, section 549 should not come
into play, since there is no longer an estate and property of the estate has
vested in the debtor. Transfers after the filing of a Chapter 11 petition and
before conversion would appear to be subject to section 549, but nonetheless
saved from avoidance under section 549(a)(2)(B), since deemed to be
authorized under section 1108 of Chapter 11. Sections 547 and 548, as well
as section 544, do not apply to transfers occurring after the filing of the
Chapter 11 case, since these sections affect transfers occurring at or before
the filing of the petition.
There is, however, a glitch in the statutory framework. Property
acquired by a Chapter 11 debtor after the filing of the petition and prior to
confirmation should be property of the estate (except to the extent it consists
of postpetition earnings of an individual debtor). However, a literal
application of section 348(a) would lead to a contrary result-the return of
such property to the debtor on conversion.
An interesting issue may arise in a confirmed Chapter 11 case, which
is later converted to a Chapter 7 case, if a previously and properly perfected
security interest becomes unperfected postconfirmation for failure to renew.
closing of the case when the estate is fully administered indicating that the
estate terminates when the case does. Thus, even though the Code clearly
envisions a post-confirmation estate, and grants the courts authority to issue
orders regarding that estate, the Abbott court held that no such estate exists
after confirmation.
Hopkinson, supra note 39, at 390.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 302-307.
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The security interest cannot be set aside by the Chapter 7 trustee, however,
since the trustee acquired the position of a lien creditor or purchaser as of
the original petition date, not the conversion date.
A perplexing issue unresolved by the statute is what to do with claims
impaired under the plan of reorganization. Section 348 is silent on this
point, although it provides that the original petition date is the effective date
of the Chapter 7 case. Furthermore, under section 348(d), any claim, other
than an administrative expense claim, against the estate or the debtor (but
not the reorganized debtor) that arises after the initial petition is treated as
a pre-Chapter 7 unsecured claim. Are the claims in the Chapter 7 case
modified by the plan, or do the claims remain as they existed prior to the
filing of the Chapter 11 case?
E. Dismissal of Case
A Chapter 11 case can be dismissed for a variety of reasons. Surprisingly enough, dismissal can occur after confirmation of a plan, since section
1122(b) allows the court to dismiss a Chapter 11 case for cause, including
"inability to effectuate substantial confirmation of a confirmed plan" 389 or
"material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan. "39 Once
a case is dismissed, section 349 does several things, absent a court order,
for cause, to the contrary. 91 Section 349(b) attempts to undo the impact
of the Chapter 11 case by reinstating proceedings, transfers, and liens.
Section 349(b)(2) seeks to vacate orders affecting property interests of third
parties. The impact of dismissal is to revest property of the estate as it
existed before the initiation of the Chapter 11 case. Section 349(a) also
makes it clear that the dismissal does not prejudice the debtor in respect to
a subsequent petition. 392
389. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(7) (1988).
390. Id. § 1112(b)(8).
391. Id. § 349(b):
Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than
under section 742 of this title(1) reinstates(A) any proceeding or custodianship superseded under section 543 of

this title;
(B) any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549,
or 724(a) of this title, or preserved under section 510(c)(2), 522(i)(2), or 551
of this title; and

(C) any lien voided under section 506(d) of this title;
(2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered, under section
522(i)(1), 542, 550, or 553 of this title; and
(3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property
was vested immediately before the commencement of the case under this title.
392. 11 U.S.C. § 349(a):
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It is difficult to find a reported decision of a postconfirmation dismissal
of a Chapter 11 case. The rarity (or paucity) of such dismissals is probably
due, at least in part, to the fact that confirmed plans often provide a remedy
other than dismissal. Furthermore, conversion, rather than dismissal, is
generally a better procedure from the viewpoint of creditors.
One court of appeal decision, Howe v. Vaughan (In re Howe),39
involved a motion to dismiss a Chapter 11 case after a plan had been
confirmed. In 1982, the Howes initiated a voluntary Chapter 11 case, and
a plan of reorganization was confirmed in January of 1983. Some five years
later, the Howes filed a state-court suit alleging lender liability claims
against Premier Bank and Benjamin Vaughan. Prior to the confirmation of
the Chapter 11 case, the Howes had contested Premier's claims and had
sought to reject a management contract of Mr. Vaughan. These matters were
resolved in the plan. The lender liability claims were not scheduled as an
asset of the estate, and they were not disclosed in the disclosure statement.
In late 1988, the Howes defaulted on their monthly payment to Premier and
filed a Chapter 12 case. Premier requested that the deed held in escrow
pursuant to the Chapter 11 confirmed plan be released to it, and the Howes
then moved to dismiss the Chapter 11 case. The request to dismiss was
denied and the request of Premier for release of the deed was granted."w
The court held that the debtors' request that the Chapter 11 case be
dismissed and that they be allowed to proceed under Chapter 12 constituted
a de facto conversion to Chapter 12, which was precluded under the
provisions of Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986. 395 Since a Chapter 12 was not permissible, the
court dealt with the issue of dismissal for material default under 11 12(b)(8)
of the Bankruptcy Code. In that regard, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
bankruptcy court that the plan provided an alternative remedy upon
nonpayment, "which sheltered the Chapter 11 proceedings from dismissal
for material default of the plan.""' Therefore, the Fifth Circuit declined
to dismiss the Chapter 11 case."

Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case
under this title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of
debts that were dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of
a case under this title prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a subsequent petition under this title, except as provided in section 109(f) of this title.
393. 913 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1990).
394. Id. at 1140-41.
395. Pub. L. No. 99-554, sec. 205, § 1208(e), 100 Stat. 3088, 3109 (1986).
396. Howe, 913 F.2d at 1149.
397. Id. In In re Kelley, 53 B.R. 961 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985), the court also refused
to dismiss a confirmed Chapter 11 plan which provided that:
"Should the Debtor fail to make any payment shown on the preceding
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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F. Successive Cases
The Bankruptcy Code precludes modification of a confirmed plan after
substantial consummation. In most situations, substantial consummation will
occur within a relatively short time of confirmation, since, by definition, it
occurs on:
(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by
the plan to be transferred;
(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under
the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all
of the property dealt with the by plan; and
398
(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.
Although the bankruptcy court is not authorized to confirm a plan that is not
feasible,3 99 in fact, plans are confirmed that are not feasible or that fail
because of unanticipated events occurring after confirmation. What then is
to be done with the reorganized debtor or the successor to the debtor under
such a plan? Is relief available under the Bankruptcy Code? If so, is it
limited to liquidation under Chapter 7? If relief is available, how are the
claims provided for under the confirmed plan to be dealt with in a new plan

schedule, Mammoth Cave may forthwith retake possession of all of its
collateral, without further orders or proceeding. Should Mammoth Cave
Production Credit Association retake possession of its collateral, the Debtor
shall have no further obligation to Mammoth Cave Production Credit
Association hereunder."
Id. at 962 (quoting plan). The court observed that:
A reorganization plan which expressly provides for certain remedies upon
default may close the door to the traditional creditor's remedy of dismissal of
a Chapter 11 case for a default of that same type. That lesson of logic is
learned from the case at hand.
The creation of an alternative remedy gives the debtor, in effect, an
option: Either make the payments when due or hand over the property. With
such a provision the debtor gained no additional advantage, and the creditor
made no further sacrifice, than would have occurred in a straight liquidation
proceeding. In fact, given the judicial history of farm reorganizations in this
district, this "walk-away" provision is a fair restatement of the laws of
probability.
Id.
398. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (1988).
399. Id. § 1129(a)(11) ("Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any
successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is
proposed in the plan.").
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or the superseding Chapter 7? These issues and others have been vigorously
litigated in recent years. Although these issues are not necessarily settled,
because the Supreme Court has not spoken on any of these issues, they
appear to be well on their way to satisfactory resolution by the lower courts.
There is a general impression, at least among those not well versed in
bankruptcy law, that there is a temporal limit as to relief-i. e., that a bankruptcy petition may be filed only once every six years. The confusion stems
from the provision of section 727(a)(8) (and its predecessor, Bankruptcy Act
section 14c(5)) that a discharge shall not be granted to an individual who
was granted a discharge in a case commenced within six years of the date
of the filing of the petition.4" This rule does not apply to Chapter 11
debtors who engage in business after consummation of the plan or whose
assets are not substantially liquidated. 40 ' Furthermore, the rule does not
preclude the filing of a petition under Chapter 11, but only a discharge in
certain situations. Congress has not dealt with repetitive filings, except to
a limited extent in section 109(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, which is aimed
at a specific type of abuse in consumer cases. 4° On the other hand, some
bankruptcy courts have dealt with repetitive filings by dismissing the second
case as a "bad faith" filing. There are at least two other impediments to a
successive case: (1) the prohibition by section 1127(b) of the modification
of a prior confirmed plan after substantial consummation, and (2) lack of
jurisdiction by the court in which the subsequent petition is filed if the prior
case is pending.
Two bankruptcy judges have held that successive Chapter 11 cases are
impermissible. 40 ' These two decisions stand for what has been referred to

400. Id. § 727(a)(8). This rule is ameliorated somewhat in Chapter 12 and 13 cases.
Section 727(a)(9) provides that a discharge can be granted within six years if payments
under the plan totaled 100% of allowed unsecured claims in such case, or 70% of such
claims and the plan was proposed in good faith and was the debtor's best effort.
401. Id. § 1141(d)(3). See supra text accompanying note 84.
402. Section 109(g) precludes the filing of a bankruptcy case by an individual or a

family farmer who was a debtor in a case pending within the proceeding 180 days if that
case was dismissed for wilful failure to obey orders of the court, or to appear before the
court, or if the debtor obtained a voluntary dismissal following the filing of a request for

relief from the automatic stay. This is the only express limitation on repetitive cases
found in the Bankruptcy Code. The implication is obvious: Congress knew how to

preclude successive cases if it so chose, but it has not chosen to do so except in section
109(g). As observed by the Seventh Circuit, "Congress could easily have included repeat

corporate debtors in [section 109(g)]; its failure to do so indicates that corporate debtors
are exempt from even the minimal constraints on serial filings imposed on other kinds
of debtors." Fruehauf Corp. v. Jartran, Inc. (In re Jartran, Inc.), 886 F.2d 859, 870 (7th

Cir. 1989).
403. In In re Northampton Corp., 37 B.R. 110 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), a debtor filed a
successive Chapter 11 petition. The purpose was to restructure a secured obligation
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/4
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as the per se rule precluding a successive Chapter 11 case. Other courts
have dismissed successive Chapter 11 cases on the basis of a lack of good
faith, 4" while others have permitted successive cases because changed
circumstances rebutted allegations of bad faith.4 5 Although an improvement over the per se rule, the "good faith" decisions plunge the courts and
litigants into the difficult task of determining the subjective intent of the
petitioner. As Judge (now Professor) Ayer has cogently pointed out, the lack
of good faith or the presence of bad faith as a test does not serve any useful
function; it is "merely a pejorative phrase, functioning at such a high level
of abstraction that one can scarcely discern what might be underneath

provided for in the plan confirmed in the prior Chapter 11 case. The bankruptcy court
held that this was an impermissible attempt to modify the prior order of confirmation and
converted the second case to one under Chapter 7.
Shortly after the Northampton decision, another bankruptcy judge was faced with
a successive filing, again seeking to modify the obligations of a prior confirmed Chapter
11 plan. The court dismissed the case as not having been filed in good faith because the
court deemed the successive case to be a "veiled attempt" to modify the obligations of
the plan confirmed in the prior case. In re AT of Me., Inc., 56 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Me.
1985); see also In re Caperoads Plaza Ltd. Partnership, 154 B.R. 614 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1993) (dismissing successive Chapter 11 case due to pendency of previously filed case
filed by same debtor). See generally Jonathan Moss, Note, "Consecutive" Chapter 11
Filings: Use or Abuse?, 19 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 111 (1991).
404. Elmwood Dev. Co. v. General Elec. Pension Trust (In re Elmwood Dev. Co.),
964 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that second Chapter 11 petition was filed in bad
faith when factors relied on as changed circumstances warranting another chance at
reorganization with a different plan were foreseeable and indeed expected); Integon Life
Ins. Corp. v. Marbleton-Booper Assocs. (In re Marbleton-Booper Assocs.), 127 B.R.
941 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (dismissing second Chapter 11 petition as filed in bad faith
where debtor could have anticipated circumstances, including managerial employee's
drug use, leading to default under confirmed plan).
405. CFC 78 Partnership B v. Casa Loma Assocs. (In re Casa Loma Assocs.), 122
B.R. 814 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (denying motion to dismiss second Chapter 11 petition
filed by debtor; concluding that filing of second plan was not prohibited by Code when
unanticipated change of circumstances prevented completion of first plan; acknowledging
that mere change in market conditions did not constitute sufficient justification for filing
of second petition); In re Garsal Realty, Inc., 98 B.R. 140, 148-52 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1989) (although substantial consummation was not deemed synonymous with order
closing Chapter 11 case, subsequently filed Chapter 11 petition was not viewed as effort
to modify confirmed plan in derogation of section 1127(b) where debt of Chapter 11
debtor doubled, levels of tenant vacancy dropped due to drop of interest rates that
encouraged purchase of homes, and closing of nearby company caused loss of tenants
accounted for change of circumstances that warranted second filing; dismissal of second
petition under section 1112(b)(1) and (2) held to be premature); Moss, supra note 403,
at 144 ("Recognizing the inconsistencies between the good faith interpretations, recent
decisions support a consecutive Chapter 11 standard that includes a changed circumstances component as a separate test from the more general good faith considerations.").
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it." 4 6 From the point of view of counsel for the successive Chapter 11

debtor, Judge Ayer's admonition that a legal concept "has meaning only if
it has some expository convenience-if it can help counsel and litigants 4to
understand just what they should and should not do in any given case" 1
is especially sound. Judge Ayer concluded that "'good faith' [or its counterpart, bad faith] is utterly unable to do this sort of job.""' This was
precisely the reason the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws recommended
abandoning good faith as a condition of filing a reorganization case. 40 9

406. In re Victory Constr. Co., 42 B.R. 145, 149 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984).
407. Id. at 148-49.
408. Id. at 149.
409. See generally Gerald K. Smith & Randolph J. Haines, Chapter11-Reorganization, 1988 ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L., 495, 498-509 (1989).
The historical development suggests that the explicit statutory test of
§ 1112(b)(2) may be the only good faith element that remains viable and
useful in the Bankruptcy Code. This conclusion is firmly supported by the
minutes of the original draftsmen of the Code, the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Law of the United States.
At the Commission's meeting of February 22-24, 1973, the Commission
had under consideration a draft prepared by Commission Consultant Professor
Lawrence P. King consolidating Chapters X, XI and XII, and an analysis and
recommendations regarding that draft prepared by Deputy Director Gerald K.
Smith. Minutes of that meeting reflect a considered decision by the Commission to delete the good faith requirement and to substitute specific grounds for
dismissal or lifting of the automatic stay:
In returning to the discussion of the reorganization Chapters, Chairman
Marsh moved to Mr. Smith's recommendation that the good-faith test of a
Chapter X petition be abolished. Mr. Smith explained that these requirements
lead to fruitless litigation, i.e., they encourage and require secured creditors
unnecessarily to litigate the issue of good faith at an earlier stage in order to
lift the stay against exercise of their repossession or foreclosure remedies.
While he recognized that they should have the opportunity to challenge the
stay, he viewed their challenge at the approval [of the petition] stage as
usually premature, if based on a lack of good faith in the sense that there was
no possibility of a feasible plan. The issue should come up later, after the
functionaries have a chance to investigate ....
Mr. Smith stated that his recommendation also contemplated eliminating
as a ground for dismissal the adequacy of relief under nonbankruptey law,
which is currently part of the "good faith" test. He believed that any debtor,
regardless of any state court proceeding, should be able to choose relief under
the Bankruptcy Act ....

It was generally agreed that the good-faith test should be replaced with
specific grounds for dismissing or adjudicating a Chapter case, either on a
creditor's application or on the court's own initiative. The grounds should
apply in all Chapter cases ....

These recommendations, as adopted by the Commission, were followed
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That is not to say that there cannot be an abuse of the bankruptcy
process inherent in the filing of any Chapter 11 case, whether initial or
successive. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws, and Congress, in
enacting Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, expressly recognized this
possibility by allowing conversion or dismissal for cause. But the mere filing
of a successive Chapter 11 case is not cause. Contrary rulings of bankruptcy

in both the Commission draft and in the Bankruptcy Code as ultimately
approved by Congress. The Commission draft deleted the answer and
approval of a voluntary petition, noting that "no one can contest a voluntary
petition." The Commission draft provided that the only limitation on a
debtor's choice of chapter relief was that only wage-earners could elect wage
earner relief; otherwise, "the court shall direct the relief requested." The
Commission draft provided for a method by which creditors could obtain
relief from the automatic stay short of dismissal of the case, and in reorganizations, provided specific grounds for dismissal or conversion to liquidation:
On the complaint of any party in interest, the court may order that a case
be (1) converted to one for liquidation,...

or (3) dismissed at any time prior

to substantial consummation of a confirmed plan if
(A) if its unreasonable to expect that a plan can be effectuated;
(B) there has been unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to
creditors;
(C) no plan is proposed, approved, accepted, or confirmed, within the times
fixed or extended by the administrator;
(D) confirmation is set aside for fraud and a modified plan is not confirmed;
or
(E)a confirmed plan is not substantially consummated.
The Commission Note to this provision stated that it was "derived from
§ 146(3) and (4) of the present Act," but that the former "procedure was
complex and the appropriate tests have been shifted to this section."
Obviously all of the provisions of the Commission draft, incorporating the
recommendations adopted at the February 1973 meeting, have nearly exact
counterparts in the ultimate Code. The Code therefore embodies the
Commission's conscious intent to (1) eliminate any good faith or other
limitation on the right of any individual, partnership or corporation to elect
Chapter 11 relief, (2) provide grounds on which creditors may obtain relief
from the stay short of obtaining dismissal, and (3) provide specific grounds
for dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 11 case instead of the Chapter X
good faith requirements, of which only inability to effectuate a plan retained
significance.
The history indicates that, except for the unusual case that could truly be
said to have been beyond the contemplation of the Commission, dismissal
should be limited to the express grounds set forth in § 1112(b) rather than any
broader analysis of good faith. Since the new debtor syndrome and individuals
seeking business reorganizations had already generated a significant body of
case law but were not adopted as grounds for dismissal by the Commission,
these should not be grounds for finding a lack of good faith under the Code.
Id. at 503-06 (footnotes omitted).
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courts are not only wrong as a matter of interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Code, they are wrong as a matter of policy. The argument in support of a
successive case has been ably stated by Mr. Gerald Munitz, counsel for
Jartran in its two Chapter 11 cases.
No case, whether a serial chapter 11 or an original filing, should be
permitted to abuse the bankruptcy process. The answer to a "serial"
chapter 11 case is not to prohibit or automatically convert or dismiss it,
but to judge it on the merits. Moreover, the availability of serial chapter
11 filings for good-faith debtors is consistent with Congress' intent to
provide corporate debtors with a rational and flexible method to continue
in business while ensuring that similarly situated creditors are treated
equitably.
If the serial filed case proceeds, all of the chapter 11 safeguards will
pertain to its administration. For instance, any party in interest can
move for the appointment of a trustee under section 1104, move to
convert or dismiss on other grounds under section 1112, file a competing plan of reorganization under section 1121, participate in the
disclosure process governed by section 1125, vote against the plan as
provided in section 1126, object to confirmation under section 1128,
and, by the rejection of an impaired class, require invocation of the
absolute priority rule of section 1129(b). The ultimate safeguard is a
denial of a discharge if the plan, although confirmable, fails to meet the
requirements of section 1141(d)(3). Thus the argument that a per se
prohibition of serial chapter 11 filings is needed to avoid abuse of the
bankruptcy process is without merit since protection against abuse is
already provided by existing Code provisions.41
The Seventh Circuit is the only court of appeals that has addressed the
successive case issue. In Fruehauf Corp. v. Jartran,Inc. (In re Jartran,
Inc.),41 the Seventh Circuit phrased the issue as "whether a debtor whose
original plan of reorganization has failed may file a new liquidating Chapter
11 rather than converting to Chapter 7 for liquidation." 41 2' The Seventh
Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it
found that the successive case was filed in good faith and refused to dismiss
or convert the case.41 3 Unfortunately, the Jartrancourt discussed the issue
in the context of "good faith" and "bad faith," perhaps because skillful
410. Gerald Munitz, Serial Chapter11 Filings and RelatedIssues 7-9 (paper prepared

for 1990 Iowa 20th Annual Advanced Bankruptcy Procedure Seminar) (footnotes
omitted).
411. 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989).
412. Id. at 866.
413. Id. at 868.
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counsel so argued the case.4" 4
It appears that the Northampton and AT of Maine cases are aberrational
insofar as they stand for the proposition that a successive case is impermissible per se or that a successive case must be dismissed as filed in bad faith.
The courts,
at least in the reported decisions, are permitting successive fil15
ings.

4

According to Mr. Munitz, the decision to file JartranH was influenced
by the ability to reject the Fruehauf leases that had been assumed in Jartran
L The result would be "to relegate Fruehauf s significant rejection claim to
general unsecured status," whereas if JartranI had been converted to a
Chapter 7 case, it "would have permitted Fruehauf to assert administrative
expense status for its claim."41 6 Thus, the filing of a new Chapter 11 case
was of considerable importance to unsecured creditors, and the directors of
the debtor had a fiduciary duty to creditors on the insolvency of Jartran.417
It is, therefore, rather odd that such a filing would be attacked as being filed
"bad faith."
The cases that have permitted a successive Chapter 11 case are, with
limited exception, liquidating Chapter 11 cases. Thus, these issues do not
involve the difficult question of whether claims and interests dealt with

414. Id. at 867. The Seventh Circuit attempted to distinguish the bankruptcy court
decisions in AT of Maine and Northampton by stating that "[t]he courts in AT of Maine
and Northamptoncertainly could have concluded that in light of the Code's policy against
modification of substantially consummated plans, a serial Chapter 11 filing designed to
evade an existing plan was in bad faith." Id. As pointed out by Mr. Munitz in his paper,
To the extent that Northampton and ATofMaine stand for the proposition
that serial chapter 11 filings are per se prohibited, those decisions are wrongly
decided and cannot be reconciled either with Jartran or with one of the
primary goals of bankruptcy law-to rehabilitate worthy debtors. There is not
only a distinction but a significant difference between, on the one hand, the
prohibition of plan modification once that plan is substantially consummated
and, on the other hand, the commencement of an entirely new chapter 11 case
which affects all of a debtor's obligations, including those remaining under a
prior plan.
Munitz, supra note 410, at 15.
415. W.A. Krueger Co. v. Sportpages Corp. (In re Sportpages Corp.), 101 B.R. 528,
530 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (second petition sought a liquidation rather than a reorganization of
modification of the provisions of the plan in the initial case); In re White Farm Equip.
Co., 103 B.R. 177 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1989) (involuntary Chapter 7 case filed postconfirmation converted into voluntary Chapter 11 liquidation case), rev'd, 111 B.R. 158
(N.D. Il. 1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292
(1992); and In re GHR Cos., 50 B.R. 925 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
416. Munitz, supra note 410, at 10.
417. E.g., Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of
Directors of the Financially Troubled Company, 48 Bus. LAW. 239, 243-45 (1992).
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under the initial Chapter 11 case plan can be altered under a plan in a
successive Chapter 11 case. Section 1127(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides that a plan can be modified before substantial consummation, and
this possibility leads to the conclusion by implication that a plan cannot be
modified after substantial consummation. Furthermore, at least in Jartran
II, Mr. Munitz very skillfully met all conceivable tests of good faith. The
bankruptcy court found good faith on the facts of the case, which included
Jartran's inability to continue operations and the fact that conversion to
liquidation would have led to a variety of problems. 8
A notorious example of a successive Chapter 11 case is the second
ContinentalAirlines Chapter 11 case filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware. 4 9 The first ContinentalAirlines Chapter 11 case was
filed in the Southern District of Texas, 420 and matters remained to be
resolved by the bankruptcy court handling the First Continental Case.
Nonetheless, Bankruptcy Judge Balick, who was assigned the Second
Continental Case, held that she had jurisdiction and enjoined further
proceedings in the First Continental Case.42'

418. See Munitz, supra note 410, at 12-13:
[Tihe bankruptcy court was concerned with the "mindboggling" administrative
problems that would arise as a result of conversion. Six years had passed
since the commencement of Jartran I and 18 months had elapsed since
confirmation of the JartranI plan. Under section 348 of the Code, conversion
of a case relates back to the date of the original filing. Because of this, the
bankruptcy court envisioned problems with the exercise of the Code's
avoidance powers and with having holders of claims first arising after the
confirmation of the plan, being told they were creditors in a case commenced
in 1981. A related problem was the need to separate pre-conversion claims
that would qualify under section 348(d) as "a claim specified in section
503(b)"-an administrative expense-from pre-conversion claims that would
be treated as if they had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of the
petition-a general unsecured claim.
419. Actually there were a number of affiliated cases including that of Continental
Airlines. In re Continental Airlines, Nos. 90-932 to 90-984 (Bankr. D. Del. 1990)
[hereinafter Second Continental Case].
420. As in the Second Continental Case, there were several cases filed, including that
of Continental Airlines, Inc. and several affiliates. In re Continental Airlines, No. 8304019-H2-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) [hereinafter First Continental Case].
421. Bankruptcy Judge Balick issued an order on extremely limited notice, restraining
the O'Neill Group from
making or pursuing any application, attending any hearing, acting to obtain
the scheduling of any hearing, or taking, initiating or permitting any other
steps whatever in or before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Texas ...

in support of or related to any proceeding that

seeks any relief against Continental Airlines, Inc. or against any other debtor
in these cases, or that seeks to transfer any of these cases to that court.
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Continental Airlines v. O'Neill, No. 91-34 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 14, 1991) (Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause). The order was sought to prevent a hearing
on March 18, 1991 before the Houston Bankruptcy Court. Despite the strictures of FED.
R. Civ. P. 65(b), the order had no termination date, although a hearing on the issuance
of a preliminary injunction was set before Judge Balick nearly a month and a half later.
The comments of the District Judge led to the restraining order's being vacated on
motion of Continental Airlines on March 17, 1991. The motion to vacate stated that it
was made at the request of defense counsel "to permit proceedings about settlement
proposals the parties are working on to finalize." Prior to the commencement of
settlement discussions, the O'Neill Group and another creditor in the First Continental
Case, American General Corporation, filed motions to transfer venue of the Second
Continental Case to Houston. These motions were filed with the Houston Bankruptcy
Court, rather than the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, on the basis of Bankruptcy Rule
1014(b), which provides,
If petitions commencing cases under the [Bankruptcy] Code are filed in
different districts by or against (1) the same debtor .... or (4) a debtor and
an affiliate, on motion filed in the district in which the petition filed first is
pending and after hearing on notice to the petitioners ... and other entities
as directed by the court, the court may determine, in the interest of justice or
for the convenience of the parties, the district or districts in which the case
or cases should proceed.
FED. R. BANKR.P. 1014(b). According to the Affidavit of counsel for the O'Neill Group
filed in support of the Motion for Leave to Appeal from the restraining order, Judge
Balick did not allow the O'Neill Group to be heard. The affidavit stated as follows:
I received a telephone call on March 13 at 2:17 p.m. from Dan Casey,
a Continental vice president, and Paul Welsh, an attorney representing
Continental in its Delaware bankruptcy case .... They ...informed me that
they had, ex parte, arranged with the Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Balick to
hear their injunction motion (which was not yet filed) at 11:00 a.m. Delaware
time the next day, March 14 (which would be 9:00 a.m. Phoenix time). ...
Messrs. Casey and Welsh did not inform me in that telephone call any basis
for the injunctive relief they would seek. We did discuss whether I would be
allowed to appear by telephone if the hearing occurred, and Mr. Welsh
informed me that Judge Balick had permitted such appearances before, and
that he would make such a request on my behalf at the hearing ....
I waited by my telephone [the next day] for approximately the next hour
and ten minutes, in the hope that I would receive a telephone call from the
Delaware Bankruptcy Court. Finally, at approximately 10:00 a.m. Phoenix
time, I received a telephone call from Mr. Welsh, who was apparently back
in his office. He stated that the hearing had been held, and that he had
requested that I be allowed to appear by telephone, which the judge denied.
He informed me that the judge stated that she found telephone conferences to
be unsatisfactory, and in addition indicated that it would violate a local rule
requiring association with Delaware counsel. Mr. Welsh also informed me
that Judge Balick had granted the temporary restraining order as requested,
and a further hearing was set for April 26. I inquired what Mr. Welsh or
Judge Balick intended to do when the TRO expired by its own terms in ten
days pursuantto F.R.C.P. Rule 65(b), to which he responded that rule did not
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Prior to filing its motion to transfer venue, the O'Neill Group, as
appellants in an appeal from a ruling in the First Continental Case,
responded to a letter from the Fifth Circuit requesting input as to whether
the automatic stay arising on the filing of the Second Continental Case
precluded further proceedings. The O'Neill Group took the position that it
did not for the following reasons: (1) the automatic stay applies only to legal
proceedings initiated against the debtor in bankruptcy, not proceedings
initiated by a debtor in bankruptcy; since the appeal arose from legal
proceedings initiated by Continental in the First ContinentalCase, it was not
subject to the automatic stay; (2) the court having jurisdiction of the First
Continental Case had exclusive jurisdiction, and an automatic stay emanating from a bankruptcy case filed in another bankruptcy court could not
divest the court of jurisdiction nor stay its proceedings; and (3) the

apply because this was not a temporary restraining order without notice.

In In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patient Litig., 140 B.R.
969 (N.D. Ill. 1992), Judge Balick did the same thing to the federal district court for the
Northern District of Illinois. Unfortunately for her, Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook was
sitting by designation. Needless to say, Judge Easterbrook did not take kindly to this
treatment and had the following to say:
In other words, the bankruptcy judge in Delaware not only asserted
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the meaning of § 362 but also instructed
counsel to remain silent during the hearing scheduled in this court. (Perhaps
even showing up would be a prohibited "act" to "continue" the proceeding.)
In forbidding Mahurkar and Quinton from "conducting or participating in any
type of discovery" in the entire "Patent Infringement Action," this TRO also
apparently halts the litigation with IMPRA. It did not, however, issue in time
to prevent Mahurkar from filing his reply brief.
On learning of this preposterous order (I practically fell out of my chair,
and I have a sturdy chair), I entered the following order of my own:
Lest there be any misunderstanding about the telephonic instructions that
have previously issued, I now issue my order in writing.
Counsel for Kendall and Mahurkar are to be present in court tomorrow
morning at 10:00 a.m. This is an order, not an invitation. Failure to appear
will lead to sanctions.
My instructions to appear and argue this case were issued last week. Any
subsequent order from any other court is ineffectual. Kendall's ex parte
application to the bankruptcy judge in Delaware appears to be an abuse of
process. No bankruptcy court is authorized to instruct litigants in this court
not to obey this court's orders. Any court has jurisdiction to determine its
own jurisdiction, and this court unquestionably has the authority to determine
what effect the bankruptcy stay has on the litigation. For the purpose of
making that decision, the hearing will proceed as scheduled, and counsel for
all parties are free to make whatever presentations they deem appropriate.
Id. at 972. Judge Easterbrook entered an order that those involved in this sorry episode
were "permanently enjoined from enforcing or attempting to enforce the temporary
restraining order issued by [Judge Balick]." Id. at 978.
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automatic stay in any event did not preclude litigation in the bankruptcy
court. The O'Neill Group also urged "two additional reasons why. . [the
Fifth Circuit] should not deem itself stayed by Continental's second
bankruptcy case. First, the filing of such a second bankruptcy case while the
first remains pending is not permissible. Second, a second filing cannot
modify the debtor's obligations to pay claims under a prior confirmed plan
of reorganization." 4' The authorities relied upon for the two additional
reasons included the Supreme Court's decision in Freshman v. Atkins4'
and the Colony Square case.424
Continental, in reply, argued that the decision of the Eleventh Circuit
in the Colony Square case and the Supreme Court's decision in Freshman
v. Atkins were inapposite. As to Colony Square, the reply stated that
the Colony Square cases turned on a jurisdictional conflict between the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and Chapter XII of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 .... Because the Chapter XII bankruptcy

court had retained jurisdiction over an unconsummated plan of reorganibar to the application of the
zation, Section 403(a) was a direct
425
automatic stay of Section 362(a)(1).

The reply therefore concluded that the Colony Square cases had nothing
to do with the issue before the Fifth Circuit, since the special transitional
rule was the basis for the result reached in the Colony Square decisions, and
that transitional rule was not relevant to two cases under the Bankruptcy
Code. As to Freshman v. Atkins, the reply argued that the Supreme Court
merely held that "[d]enial of a discharge

. . .

or failure to apply for it within

the statutory time, bars an application under a second proceeding for
discharge for the same debts."426 The O'Neill Group had cited Freshman
v. Atkins for the proposition that "a second bankruptcy case may not be filed
while the prior case remains pending." The reply also asserted that those

422. Letter from Randolph J.Haines to Gilbert F. Ganucheau, Clerk of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Jan. 3, 1991).
423. 269 U.S. 121 (1925).
424. Colony Square Co. v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. (In re Colony Square Co.), 779
F.2d 653 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986); see also Colony Square Co. v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co. (In re Colony Square Co.), 788 F.2d 739 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Colony Square Co., 40 B.R. 603
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 62 B.R. 48 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Colony Square Co., 29 B.R. 432 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 666 (3d Cir.
1983).
425. Reply of Appellee at 8, O'Neill v. Continental Airlines, (No. 89-2943) (footnotes
omitted).
426. Freshman,269 U.S. at 123.
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bankruptcy courts that had applied a per se rule to bar the filing of a second
bankruptcy petition during the pendency of the first "mistakenly derived the

rule from Freshman v. Atkins." 427
The brief of Continental in support of its motion for a restraining order
made the following interesting observation as to the 1983 or First Continental case:
. . * [A]I1 that remains in Texas is a specifically reserved exclusive
jurisdiction of the 1983 Cases-not the estates, and not the 1983
Debtors-to administer and execute the 1983 Case Plan ....

That

includes ordinary, non-exclusive jurisdiction over the 1983 Debtors,
whose successors continue to be subject to suit in that Court, in
personam, solely to the extent of the jurisdiction reserved in the 1983
Case Plan. But the reserved in personam jurisdiction over the postconfirmation debtor was not exclusive-the 1983 Case Plan permits
people to sue the reorganized Continental and its successors in other
courts, without court permission, on any post-confirmation matter, as
various litigants have routinely done. Otherwise, it would be impossible
to reconcile 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (providing for exclusive jurisdiction
of estate) with 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (releasing estate upon confirmation).

428

427. Reply of Appellee, at 13-14, O'Neill (No. 89-2943).
428. Plaintiffs Opening Brief at 14, Continental Airlines v. O'Neill (In re Continental
Airlines, Inc.), No. 90-932-984 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 14, 1991) (order granting
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction). The brief went on to argue that
no jurisdiction inconsistent with a subsequent bankruptcy filing was retained.
For example, In re Jartran,Inc., 71 B.R. 938, 940 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1987),
aff'd, 87 B.R. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989),
Jartran, Inc. filed for relief under Chapter 11. The Jartran I plan was
confirmed in September 1984 but, as is common, the court retained certain
post-confirmation jurisdiction (71 B.R. at 940):
to hear and determine all claims against Jartran [I and to enforce all causes
of action which may exist in its favor, to enter such orders regarding the disbursement of funds under the Plan or the consummation thereof as may be
necessary to protect the interests of Jartran [1M
and its creditors.
In March 1986, Jartran commenced a new Chapter 11 case, "creating a new
debtor in possession, Jartran Il" in a "separate" case "characterized by
different objectives, assets and claims" (71 B.R. at 941).
That was proper. As the Seventh Circuit later explained, In re Jartran,
Inc., 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989), "serial Chapter 11 filings are permissible
under the Code if filed in good faith" (886 F.2d at 866-67), and corporate
debtors "are exempt from even the minimal constraints on serial filings
imposed on other kinds of debtors," and "[o]nce a bankruptcy plan is
effectuated, all indications from the Code would incline us to treat the
reorganized entity as we would any other company," (886 F.2d at 870).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the stay in the
Second Continental Case prevented the Fifth Circuit from resolving the
pending appeal.
Pending before us is an appeal from a summary judgment order of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Singleton, J., affirming the Bankruptcy Court's grant of Continental's
Motion for Summary Judgment against the appellants, the O'Neill and
Stephens Groups of 1,069 pilot-employees of Continental (hereafter
"Pilots"). Specifically, the Pilots' claims involved in this appeal are for
furlough pay arising out of the temporary shutdown of operations which
occurred around the time of Continental's Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing
on September 24, 1983.
Since that time, on December 3, 1990, Continental has instituted an
entirely new Chapter 11 proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Delaware (Balick, J.). Continental urges that
this 1990 bankruptcy proceeding automatically stays the present appeal.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)....
For reasons we will subsequently file, the Court concludes that the
present appeal is automatically stayed by operation of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a), in light of the current bankruptcy proceedings. Nothing in this
Order shall be construed as a determination of the validity or legality of
the Delaware bankruptcy proceedings, and, on the contrary, the Court
assumes without deciding that such proceeding is valid and subsist429

ing.

Although there has not yet been a significant number of successor
Chapter 11 cases, there will be with the passage of more time. There are a
number of issues that will have to be litigated in those cases, and it is
desirable to provide, to the extent possible, legislative rather than judicial

Accord In re Grimes, 117 B.R. 531, 536 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) ("Thus a
debtor who has been granted a discharge under one chapter under Title 11
may file a subsequent petition under another chapter even though the first case
remains open, as long as the debtor meets the requirements for filing the
second petition."); In re Garsal Realty, Inc., 98 B.R. 140, 150 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1989) ("There is no per se rule against successive [Chapter 11]
filings and a bona fide change in circumstances may justify a debtor's multiple
filings"). See In re Martin-Trigona, 35 B.R. 596, 600 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983) (Refusing to apply Rule 1014(b) as to prior non-duplicative bankruptcy
proceeding). Thus, this Court properly acquired exclusive jurisdiction of the
1990 Debtors and their estates, and the pre-existing in personam jurisdiction
of them that any other court, including the Houston Bankruptcy Court, might
have is automatically stayed.
429. O'Neill v. Continental Airlines (In re Continental Airlines), 928 F.2d 127, 12930 (5th Cir. 1991).
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solutions to these issues. To that end, the National Bankruptcy Conference
in its Code Review Project has recommended several amendments to
Chapter 11.
Serial bankruptcy filings should be allowed in three instances: (a) when
changes in the debtor's capital structure since confirmation have been
sufficient to eliminate the connection between case I and case II; (b)
when the filing is consensual and all the affected classes of debt and
equity have agreed upon an appropriate modification; and (c) when the
debtor seeks to file a serial plan of liquidation.
To address issues raised by a serial filing, priorities from case I
should not carry over into case 11 unless they otherwise qualify for
priority under applicable bankruptcy law; there should be no separate
priority for debts created under the plan in case I. Additionally, the date
of the second petition should be the relevant date for purposes of the
avoiding powers in case II. All transactions created under the plan in
case I are subject to these avoiding powers, but payments made
reasonably contemporaneously with the confirmation of the plan in case
I should be exempted from the definition of antecedent debt for avoidance purposes.430
These changes may be unduly restrictive. They do not cover all the
situations where unanticipated events octurring after substantial consummation create a need for further relief under Chapter 11. Under the National
Bankruptcy Conference proposal, unless the connection between case I and
case II has been eliminated by changes in the debtor's capital structure, only
liquidation under Chapter 11 would be permissible, unless all "affected
classes of debt and equity have agreed upon an appropriate modification."
That provision would, of course, give a veto power to substantial creditors,
the very modification of whose rights may be required.43'

430. NBC Draft, supra note 70, at 94.
431. Another recommendation of the National Bankruptcy Conference overlaps the
second basis for a serial plan "when the filing is consensual and all the affected classes
of debt and equity have agreed upon an appropriate modification." That proposal
provides:
Consensual plans of reorganization should be allowed to include

provisions for post-consummation modification if a default occurs under the
plan after substantial consummation has occurred. In order to be so modified,
the plan must include specific provisions authorizing such modification, be

consensual and modifications can only be made according to these provisions.
These enabling provisions in such a plan may either (a) specify that modifica-

tion shall take place under court supervision pursuant to a retention of section
1127 jurisdiction by the court, or (b) provide mechanisms in the event of a

default under the plan for consensual amendments of the various instruments
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IV. CONCLUSION

Confirmation does not end the controversy and litigation in a Chapter
11 case, but confirmation effects a significant cleavage in the case. Section
1141 of the Code identifies most of the important effects of confirmation:
the modification of the rights and relations of the debtor, the creditors, and
other parties to conform to those specified in the plan; the vesting of the
property of the estate in the debtor or other entity specified in the plan or
confirmation order, "free and clear" of claims and interests not saved by the
plan or confirmation order; and the discharge of all preconfirmation debts
except for relatively minor qualifications.
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates the continuing
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Unlike former Chapter XI, Chapter 11
does not make jurisdiction dependent on the provisions of the plan. There
are few differences between pre- and postconfirmation jurisdiction, although
the power of the court is expressly limited as to plan modification and
revocation of an order of confirmation. Nonetheless, a number of decisions
have limited postconfirmation jurisdiction primarily as to postconfirmation
adversary proceedings. Although some statutory clarification may be
appropriate, courts can readily clarify matters themselves by finding
jurisdiction and abstaining in appropriate situations from the exercise of such
jurisdiction.
The provisions of the Code and its legislative history manifest a
Congressional purpose to assure to a reorganized debtor the "broadest
possible" freedom from the burden of preconfirmation indebtedness. The
most significant limitation on the realization of that legislative purpose has
been the application of vague and inconsistent judicial conceptions of due
process. Particularly troublesome have been cases presenting conflicts
between the language and policies of CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code
and cases involving claimants whose claims arose out of acts and events that
occurred preconfirmation but caused no preconfirmation manifestation. The
National Bankruptcy Conference has approved proposals to clarify the
requisites of procedural due process applicable in the determination of the
effect of confirmation on preconfirmation claimants.

issued under the plan, without the need for court supervision under section
1127.
All post-consummation modifications requiring court supervision must be
done in conformity with the Code's general requirement of good faith. Debts
and liabilities incurred by a reorganized debtor after consummation may not
be impaired by any modification of the confirmed plan of reorganization,
since such debts and liabilities are not part of the obligations treated by this
confirmed plan.
Id. at 93.
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Although section 524(e) declares that the discharge of a debtor does not
affect the liability of any entity other than the debtor, it is doubtful that the
section overrules authoritative pre-Code precedents that sustained the
discharge of a codebtor of a debtor's obligation when a court order
explicitly providing such was not timely contested by a party with standing.
The relevant case law under the Code is in conflict. The case law is also in
conflict over the effect of a confirmation order on unpaid administrative
expense claims that arose during the course of a reorganization case. The
rationale for enforcing such a claim against a debtor seems especially
doubtful when a trustee was appointed and served in the case. Two cases
dealing with the effect of confirmation on a creditor's liability for disgorging
a voidable preference are questionable for their treatment of the transferee
as a creditor. The inapplicability of the confirmation order to postconfirmation claims has been uniformly recognized by the courts.
Once a plan has been confirmed, it can be set aside or altered only
under prescribed circumstances. Revocation must be for fraud in the
procurement of the confirmation order and modification by the proponent
or reorganized debtor before substantial consummation, which generally
occurs shortly after confirmation. There are, however, other remedies. The
Chapter 11 case can be converted to a Chapter 7 case if there is a material
default under the plan. A less effective remedy is dismissal for material
default, a remedy that some courts have refused where the plan provided an
alternative. But conversion and dismissal are blunt swords when often a
sharp scalpel is needed. A successive Chapter 11 petition may be more
effective. A good example is ContinentalH. And recently another means of
modifying rights under a nonmodifiable plan was attempted, the non-opt-out
class action under Federal Rule 23(b)(1)(B). It was not successful as
employed, but the Second Circuit sanctioned its use.
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